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01-1368 Nevada Dept of Human Resources v. Hibbs
Ruling Below: (Hibbs v. HDM Dept. of Human Resources, 9th Cir., 273 F.3d 844, 2001
U.S. App. Lexis 26364, 145 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P34,418, 81 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P40,842,
2001 Cal. Daily Op. Service 10272, 2001 DailyJournal DAR 12844, 7 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d
(BNA) 865)
The court held that the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
allowed private suits against states by virtue of Congress' section 5 powers under the
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent sex discrimination through broad prophylactic
legislation.
Question Presented: Is the family-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 a proper exercise of Congress's section 5 power of the Fourteenth Amendment,
abrogating state immunity to suit under the Eleventh Amendment?
William HIBBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, United States of America, Intervenor,
V.
HDM DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES; Charlotte CRAWFORD; Nikki
FIRPO, Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided December 11, 2001
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge:
I. BACKGROUND
[Hibbs worked for the Nevada
Department of Human Resources,
Welfare Division. When his wife became
ill, he received 480 hours of unpaid leave
to be used from May to December under
the Family and Medical Leave Act. He
received and additional 380 hours of paid
"catastrophic leave," which he was told
would count against his FMLA leave. In
November, Hibbs was informed he had
no more leave time and had to report to
work or face disciplinary action. In
December, Hibbs faced dismissal and
argued at his hearing that his FMLA leave
should begin after his catastrophic leave
expired. The hearing officer disagreed,
and Hibbs was dismissed.
After a series of failed appeals, Hibbs
brought suit in Federal Court. The district
court granted summary judgment for the
state on the grounds that Nevada had
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment.]
III. DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
and the FMLA
"Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state
is immune from suit under state or federal
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law by private parties in federal court
absent a valid abrogation of that immunity
or an express waiver by the state." [... ]
Congress can abrogate state sovereign
immunity if it both (1) unequivocally
expresses its intent to do so, and (2) acts
pursuant to a valid exercise of power.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (citing
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 88 L.
Ed. 2d 371, 106 S. Ct. 423 (1985)).
Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign
immunity by means of its Article I
powers. Id. at 72-73. It can, however,
abrogate state sovereign immunity by
means of its enforcement power under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962, 148 L.
Ed. 2d 866 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80, 145 L. Ed. 2d
522, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
There is no case law in our circuit on the
validity under the Eleventh Amendment
of private FILA suits against the states.
[The court distinguished this case from
other circuits' decisions, which had held
that the FMLA was not a valid exercise of
Congress' section 5 power. The court
argued that because the provision at issue
in this case provides for leave to care for a
sick family member, it may be construed
as an attempt to remedy gender
discrimination.]
In Hibbs' case, the district court held that
Nevada has not waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The court also
held that the FMLA does not contain a
sufficiently clear expression of
congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity, and that, in any
case, the FMLA was not enacted pursuant
to a valid exercise of the section 5
enforcement power. For the reasons given
below, we conclude that the district court
erred both in finding that congressional
intent to abrogate is not sufficiently clear
and in holding that the FMLA was not
enacted pursuant to a valid exercise of
Congress' section 5 power.
1. Waiver
[The court found that Nevada did not
waive its immunity to private suits under
the FILA, because states cannot
constructively waive their immunity.]
2. Express Congressional Intent to
Abrogate
[The court held the FMLA has a
sufficiently clear expression of
congressional intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. The language in the
FEMLA is the same as that in the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which the Supreme
Court held to be clearly expressed intent
to abrogate.]
3. Valid Exercise of the Section 5
Power
a. Doctrinal Background
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
gives Congress the "power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions" of
the amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
5. Valid section 5 legislation must be
aimed at remedying or deterring violations
of the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive provisions, but it "is not
limited to mere legislative repetition of
[the Supreme Court's] constitutional
jurisprudence." Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963;
see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81. Because
"difficult and intractable problems often
require powerful remedies," 528 U.S. at
89, "Congress' power to 'enforce' the
Amendment includes the authority both
to remedy and to deter violation of rights
guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a
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somewhat broader swath of conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden
by the Amendment's text, " 528 U.S. at
81. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963.
In enacting such prophylactic legislation,
however, Congress must not cross the line
between "appropriate remedial legislation"
and legislation that amounts to"
substantive redefinition of the Fourteenth
Amendment right at issue." Kimel, 528
U.S. at 81. The Supreme Court has
policed this boundary by requiring that
there be "'a congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end. 'Id. [ ... ]
[ ... ] Here, intervenor United States has
defended the constitutionality of the
FMLA on the ground that it is aimed at
remedying and preventing gender
discrimination, and gender discrimination
is subject to heightened scrutiny.
'r , *
The post-Seminole Tribe case law from
the circuit courts does little to clarify how
the congruence and proportionality
inquiry changes when the legislation is
meant to remedy or prevent gender
discrimination, rather than discrimination
with respect to a nonsuspect classification.
A number of circuits have held that the
Equal Pay Act ("EPA") and Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 are
valid section 5 legislation aimed at
preventing gender discrimination, but the
analysis in those cases is sparse and rests
largely on the fact that the EPA and Title
IX prohibit almost no conduct beyond
what the Equal Protection Clause itself
prohibits. [citations omitted] Those cases
consequently do not explain how
legislation that is meant to prevent gender
discrimination, but that sweeps
substantially more broadly than the Equal
Protection Clause, should be analyzed
under section 5. Only Kazmier, which
held that the FMILA provision regarding
leave to care for an ailing family member
(i.e., 5 2612(a)(1)(C)) is not valid section 5
legislation, provides a detailed analysis of
the issue. See Kazmier, 225 F.3d at 524-
27.
b. Scope of the Constitutional Right at
Issue
The first step in the congruence and
proportionality inquiry is "to identify with
some precision the scope of the
constitutional right at issue." Garrett, 121
S. Ct. at 963. The United States defends §
2612(a)(1)(C) on the ground that it is
meant to remedy and prevent
unconstitutional gender discrimination.
The argument is supported by the text of
the FMILA See 29 U.S.C. 5 2601(a)(5)
("Congress finds that ... due to the nature
of the roles of men and women in our
society, the primary responsibility for
family caretaking often falls on women,
and such responsibility affects the
working lives of women more than it
affects the working lives of men...."); id. §
2601(b)(4) ("It is the purpose of this Act
... to accomplish [the Act's previously
described purposes ]in a manner that,
consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
minimizes the potential for employment
discrimination on the basis of sex by
ensuring generally that leave is available
for eligible medical reasons (including
maternity-related disability) and for
compelling family reasons, on a gender-
neutral basis ....").
The United States argues that because
women are regarded as having "the
primary responsibility for family
caretaking" (both for infants and for sick
family members), employers commonly
offer less caretaking leave to men than to
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women. The United States further
concludes that this kind of gender-
discriminatory leave policy is harmful
both to men --because they are not given
enough leave to care for their families --
and to women --because reduced leave for
men forces women to spend more time
taking care of their families, and women's
consequently greater needs for caretaking
leave make them less attractive job
candidates than men. Additionally, as we
explain later, it appears that in enacting
the FMLA Congress was also striving, in
light of a long history of unconstitutional
legislation mandating stereotypical family
roles, to remedy the gender-discriminatory
impact of employer policies that provide
no family leave at all. The statute aims to
remedy all these forms of discrimination
by setting a gender-neutral minimum
standard for the granting of caretaking
leave. Cf. Laro, 259 F.3d at 12 (noting that
the argument in support of a valid
Eleventh Amendment waiver is stronger
with respect to the parental and family-
care leave provisions than it is with
respect to personal medical leave).
State-sponsored gender discrimination is
subject to" intermediate scrutiny" under
the Equal Protection Clause. Such
discrimination is thus unconstitutional
unless it is substantially related to the
achievement of an important
governmental interest.
needed, the court did not read Garret to
imply that support in the legislative record
is required for the use of this power.
Rather, legislative history is merely one
means for determining whether an act of
Congress has section 5 justification.]
For all of these reasons, we are persuaded
that the FMiLA should be treated
differently from both the ADA and the
ADEA because the FMILA is aimed at
remedying gender discrimination, which is
subject to heightened scrutiny. Because
state-sponsored gender discrimination is
presumptively unconstitutional, section 5
legislation that is intended to remedy or
prevent gender discrimination is
presumptively constitutional. That is, the
burden is on the challenger of the
legislation to prove that states have not
engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional
conduct.
d. Legislative History
Discrimination in Granting Leave
and
Alternatively, we also hold that the
legislative history of the FMLA contains
substantial evidence of gender
discrimination with respect to the granting
of leave to state employees, and that it
therefore justifies the enactment of the
FMLA as a prophylactic measure.
* * *
c. Section 5 and Heightened Scrutiny
[The court found that this section of the
FMLA prohibited more state conduct
than that which falls within the Equal
Protection Clause. However, it was still a
valid exercise of section 5 powers because
Kimel established that some problems
require broad prophylactic legislation. In
determining whether such legislation was
We recognize that a weakness in this
evidence as applied to Hibbs' case is that
the BLS [Bureau of Labor Statistiscs] and
Yale Bush Center studies deal only with
parental leave, not with leave to care for a
sick family member. They thus do not
document a widespread pattern of
precisely the kind of discrimination that 5
2612(a)(1)(C) is intended to prevent. But
the studies do nonetheless constitute
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strong circumstantial evidence of state-
sponsored gender discrimination in the
granting of leave to care for a sick family
member, because if states discriminate
along gender lines regarding the one kind
of leave, then they are likely to do so
regarding the other.
e. The FMLA As a Remedy for State
Legislation Fostering Traditional
Gender Roles
There is one more basis for concluding
that the FMLA fits within Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment authority In
providing for minimum levels of leave for
employees to care for family members,
Congress was acting against a background
of state-imposed systemic barriers to
women's equality in the workplace that,
under recent constitutional doctrine, were
undoubtedly unconstitutional. The FMLA
can be understood as, in part, an
appropriately limited scheme designed to
undo the impact of that history of state-
supported and mandated sex
discrimination as it continues to affect
private and public employment.
(i) The Historical Record
[The court recounted the history of male
and female roles in American society and
the workplace. Discrimination against
women took a variety of legislative forms,
usually justified as "protecting" women.
Because of the long record of this in
judicial history, the court held it was not
necessary for Congress to have noted this
in the legislative history of the FMLA]
(ii) A Remedy Needed
The FMLA's legislative history documents
statistically the harmful and extant effects
of stereotypical gender roles on women's
participation in the workplace immediately
prior to the Act's enactment. The
evidence revealed that women still bore
the brunt of domestic responsibilities in
American society, and that this burden
hindered women's participation in the
paid workforce.
(iii) The FMLA Remedy and the
Historical Record
[The stated purpose of the FMLA was to
minimize the potential for sex
discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment and to promote equal
employment opportunities for women and
men.
The court found that the provision of the
FMLA granting unpaid leave for care of a
family member met these goals for several
reasons: (1) unpaid leave allowed women
to participate in the workplace despite the
needs of family members and despite the
stereotypical assumption that men have a
wife at home to handle such emergencies;
(2) families could choose which family
member would take care of the ill relative
- women were not forced into the
domestic role; (3) employers would not be
tempted to avoid women employees out
of any presumed higher need for personal
leave.]
(iv) Congruence and Proportionality
The FMvLA takes a modest step towards
eliminating the negative impact of, and
discrimination based upon, the stereo-
typical gender roles that have restricted
women's opportunities in the workplace.
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As recounted above, in enacting the
FMLA, Congress appropriately sought to
counteract the various problems for
gender equality in public and private
workplaces created by workplace policies
that reflect traditional, formerly state-
supported assumptions about gender roles
in the domestic and public spheres.
Additionally, Congress sought to deter
future intentional discrimination against
women based on those same stereotypes.
As to the "congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that
end," Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963 (quoting
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520),
congruence and proportionality of
remedial legislation "must be judged with
reference to the historical experience it
reflects." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525
(alterations in original omitted). Thus, we
must view the FMLA against the
continuing impact of nearly two centuries
of systemic state sex discrimination in
employment and related laws. In light of
this "historical experience, "the FM/ILA
congruently and proportionately remedies
the contemporary impact of such
constitutional violations.
[The court gave several reasons why the
remedies of the FMLA were congruent
and proportionate: (1) the provision in
question focuses only on balancing
family-care leave, which was historically
perceived as a woman's role; (2) a
gender-neutral solution was required; (3)
the intrusion into the policies of the
employer were narrow, providing only for
leave, not continuation of wages; (4)
exceptions existed for employers in
certain situations; and (5) provisions were
built into the FILA for evaluation and
modification by Congress.}
B. Ex Parte Young
[The court addressed the argument raised
by Hibbs that he could file suit against the
parties in their official capacities rather
than against the state. The court found
Hibbs did not fully develop his argument,
and would not grant relief on these
grounds.]
C. Procedural Due Process
[The court addressed Hibbs' argument
that his termination violated procedural
due process. The court found Hibbs
received appropriate notice and a full
opportunity to be heard. Hlibbs had no
procedural due process clain.]
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court erred both in
concluding that congressional intent to
abrogate state sovereign immunity is not
sufficiently clear and in holding that
Congress did not validly exercise its
section 5 power when it gave state
employees the right to sue their employers
for violations of 5 2612(a)(1)(C).
Accordingly, the district court's grant of
Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the FMLA claim is reversed.
Because the district court's dismissal of
Hibbs' state-law claims was dependent on
its dismissal of the federal claims, we
vacate the dismissal of the state-law claims
as well, and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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The Supreme Court: Federalism; Justices to Hear a Major State-Immunity Case
The New York Times
June 25, 2002
Linda Greenhouse
While pressing to finish its current term
this week, the Supreme Court today set
the stage for resuming its battle over the
boundary between state and federal
authority when its next term begins in
October.
The justices accepted an appeal filed by
the State of Nevada in a major federalism
case that challenges Congress's authority
to require the states to give their
employees unpaid leave to deal with
family medical emergencies. The court
took the case over the opposition of the
Bush administration, which said that the
provision of the Family and Medical
Leave Act at issue was clearly within
Congress's constitutional authority and
that because few lower courts had
addressed it, there was no need for the
justices' intervention.
On the surface, the case appears little
different from other recent federalism
cases that have reached the court,
including state challenges to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act and
the Americans With Disabilities Act. In
each of those cases, the Supreme Court
ruled that Congress had lacked authority
to breach the states' constitutional
immunity from suits brought under those
laws by their employees.
But the new case is in fact even more
consequential than those important
rulings, and a decision in favor of the
states would cut closer to the core of
Congress's authority to enforce the equal
protection guarantee of the 14th
Amendment. The reason is that the
Family and Medical Leave Act, passed in
1993, was an effort by Congress to
address lingering problems of sex
discrimination in the workplace, where
Congress found that the burden of taking
care of sick family members fell
disproportionately on women.
Under the Supreme Court's equal
protection jurisprudence, age
discrimination, which the court addressed
in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents in
2000, and disability discrimination, which
it addressed last year in Board of Trustees
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
receive only minimal judicial scrutiny.
That is, actions by government that treat
people differently on the basis of age or
disability are presumed to be rational and
constitutional. Consequently, the court
said in the Kimel and Garrett decisions,
Congress overreached its authority to
open the states to suit on that basis by
their employees.
But along with racial discrimination, sex
discrimination by government agencies is
presumed to be unconstitutional under
the court's equal protection doctrine, and
discrimination of this type receives special
judicial scrutiny. The court has held that
Congress has special authority to breach
the states' immunity when it attacks
discrimination of this kind, by invoking its
power under Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment to enact "appropriate
legislation" to enforce the amendment's
equal protection guarantee.
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So the new case, Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, No. 01-1368,
amounts to a direct challenge to the
court's precedents on the relationship
between state sovereign immunity and
Congressional authority to make national
rules aimed at eradicating sex
discrimination and, arguably, race
discrimination.
Solicitor General Theodore B. Olson
emphasized that point in a brief trying to
dissuade the court from taking the case.
He told the justices that "resolution of this
important constitutional question -- going
to the heart of Congress's Section 5 power
to enforce the rights of individuals long
subjected to a well-documented history of
unconstitutional discrimination and thus
potentially implicating numerous other
civil rights statutes -- should be
undertaken only after due deliberation and
thoroughgoing consideration by the lower
courts."
That deliberation has not yet occurred, the
solicitor general said. Only one federal
appeals court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New
Orleans, has cast doubt on the provision
at issue in this case, the brief said.
The case began in 1997 as a dispute over
the eligibility of a Nevada state worker,
William Hlibbs, to care for his ailing wife
by taking the 12-week unpaid leave that
the Family and Medical Leave Act makes
available to care for a family member with
a "serious health condition." Denied the
leave, Mr. Hibbs sued the state, which
then argued that it was immune from suit
under the 11th Amendment, which
generally bars suits against states in federal
court.
In enacting the Family and Medical Leave
Act, Congress had explicitly made the law
applicable to the states as employers. But
the Federal District Court in Reno, Nev.,
ruled in 1999 that the law was not a valid
abrogation of the states' immunity.
Mr. Hibbs appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
San Francisco, with the assistance of the
federal government, which intervened in
the case to defend application of the law.
Last December, the Ninth Circuit
overturned the district court and ruled
that the suit could proceed. The state then
appealed to the Supreme Court. The
lawsuit itself remains pending, a fact that
ordinarily would lead the Supreme Court
to turn down an appeal, as Mr. Olson's
brief stressed.
At issue in the case is what is known as
the "family care" provision of the Family
and Medical Leave Act, in contrast to the
provision that grants individuals the rigit
to 12 weeks of unpaid personal sick leave.
Because individual illness does not fall
disproportionately on men and women,
this provision is not related to Congress's
interest in eradicating sex discrimination,
the government told the court. But the
burden of caring for sick family members
historically, and currently, falls
disproportionately on women, Mr.
Olson's brief said.
Alabama and 11 other states filed a brief
urging the court to take the case. An
unusually large array of lawyers for Mr.
Hibbs is another signal of the case's
significance.
Copyright 0@ 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Federalism and the Supreme Court
State Legislaturs
October 10, 2001
David G. Savage
When it comes to the Supreme Court, it's
hard to tell how they'll decide issues
concerning states.
In each annual term of the U.S. Supreme
Court, the states win some big cases and
lose a few, as well. But in recent years,
some states have been winning regularly,
while others have been on the losing end
just as often.
Consider a tale of two states: Alabama and
Massachusetts.
Alabama emerged as the winner in two of
the just-completed term's major rulings.
The first shielded states from being sued
by their employees with disabilities
(Alabama vs. Garrett), while the second
bars civil rights lawsuits that allege the
states are enforcing policies that have a
"discriminatory effect" on racial
minorities. Both were decided by the same
5-4 vote of the high court, with chief
Justice William H Rehnquist and Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas siding with Alabama.
Meanwhile, Massachusetts was rebuffed in
its effort to ban the advertising of
cigarettes within 1,000 feet of schools and
playgrounds. Its lawyers had argued that
the states have broad power to protect the
health of their citizens, especially children,
from known dangers. They also noted that
selling cigarettes to minors is illegal in
every state, so Massachusetts authorities
said they should be able to shield children
from the lure of cigarette ads.
But the Supreme Court disagreed in
another 5-4 ruling, and said the states
have almost no authority to restrict the
advertising and promotion of cigarettes,
cigars or smokeless tobacco. The cigarette
makers have a free speech right to
advertise their products, the Court said, a
decision that could also doom efforts to
limit billboard advertising of beer, liquor
or gambling. And beyond that, the federal
law that sets the warning labels on
cigarette packs "precludes states or
localities from imposing any requirement
or prohibition based on smoking and
health with respect to the advertising and
promotion of cigarettes," wrote justice
O'Connor. The five justices who sided
with Alabama in the discrimination cases
ruled against Massachusetts in the
cigarette advertising case (Lorillard
Tobacco Co. vs. Reilly, attorney general of
Massachusetts).
A year ago, Massachusetts suffered a
similar rebuff after its legislature voted to
boycott companies that did business with
the repressive military regime in Burma
(Myanmar). These companies could
continue to do business in the Bay State,
but state agencies were barred from
buying products or services from then
These corporate boycotts were widely
used during the 1980s as a successful
means to pressure South Africa to end its
apartheid policies. In the 19 90s, cities such
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as New York, Los Angeles and
Philadelphia adopted similar ordinances
targeted at Burma. But the Supreme Court
struck down the Massachusetts "Burma
law" on the grounds that it infringed on
the federal govern. ment's power to
control international trade (Crosby vs.
National Foreign Trade Council).
California, like Massachusetts, had
adopted a law restricting tobacco
advertising, but it too has had a losing
record of late in the Supreme Court. Its
voters adopted a state law that allows
people who are seriously ill to obtain
marijuana to ease their pain or nausea.
Seven states, most of them in the West,
have similar measures. But the Supreme
Court sided with federal regulators and
ruled the federal law allows no exceptions
for the medical use of marijuana (United'
States vs. Oakland Cannabis Club).
ONE STATE TWO SIDES
Sometimes, state lawyers find themselves
on opposite sides of the same case. Last
year, the attorneys general from 38 states,
including Massachusetts and California,
filed a brief in the court in support of the
Violence Against Women Act. This
measure gives victims of rapes and other
sexual assaults a right to sue their attackers
for damages in federal court. Its
proponents pointed out that cases of
battered women or abused spouses often
go unprosecuted in the criminal courts,
and the states' attorneys said the federal
law gave them another weapon in the
fight against sexual violence. In the case
that came before the high court, Virginia
Tech freshman Christy Brzonkala had
sued a football star for alledgedly raping
her in a dormitory room.
Standing alone, Alabama's
general William Pryor filed
attorney
a brief
opposing the law. He argued that it
intruded on the state's turf and violated
the principles of federalism. In the end,
the Supreme Court sided with Pryor's
argument by the same 5-4 vote and struck
down the federal law as unconstitutional
(United States vs. Morrison). In a wry
dissent, Justice David H Souter
commented that the "states will be forced
to enjoy this new federalism whether they
want it or not."
The disability discrimination case from
Alabama was the major federalism
decision of the 2000-2001 term, and it
extends the principle that Congress
cannot subject the states to damage suits
by its employees, except for constitutional
violations. Until the mid-1990s,
constitutional law scholars had assumed
Congress has broad power to regulate
"commerce" and that employment was a
type of commercial arrangement.
Therefore, employers who violated the
rights of workers as set by Congress could
be sued.
But the Supreme Court in a series of
rulings has changed all that for the states
and state employees. In 1996, the justices
held that the heretofore obscure 11th
Amendment gave the states a "sovereign
immunity' from private commercial
lawsuits that were authorized by Congress.
The decision, in Seminole Tribe vs.
Florida, blocked the tribes from hauling
state officials into federal court over
gaming disputes, but its reach went much
further. For example, state employees
who are not paid overtime as required by
federal labor law cannot sue to obtain the
money (Alden vs. Maine).
CIVIL RIGHTS RULINGS
Going beyond commerce, Congress has
special powers under the 14th
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Amendment to enforce civil rights,
including against the states. The high
court focused on that issue twice in the
past two years and again shielded the
states from federal claims. The first case,
decided on Jan. 11, 2000, ruled that age
discrimination was not outlawed by the
14th Amendment itself, and therefore,
Congress could not subject state agencies
to lawsuits for discriminating against their
older workers. The 5-4 decision, in Kimel
vs. Florida, threw out a bias claim filed by
J. Daniel Kimel, a Florida State University
physics professor, but the immunity rule
affected the nearly 5 million state workers
nationwide.
This year's case from Alabama extended
the rule to state employees who are blind,
deaf or otherwise disabled. The
Constitution may forbid the states from
discriminating against people based on
their race or sex, but it does not forbid
discrimination based on a person's
disability, said Chief Justice Rehnquist.
"States are not required to make special
accommodations for the disabled ... They
could quite hardheadedly-- and perhaps
hardheartedly--hold to job qualification
requirements that do not make allowance
for the disabled," he said.
Because this kind of discrimination is not
covered by the 14th Amendment,
Congress cannot use its power to enforce
the 14th Amendment as grounds for
subjecting states to lawsuits under the
Americans with Disabilities Act,
Rehnquist reasoned. Patricia Garrett, a
nursing supervisor at the University of
Alabama Hospital, had sued for
discrimination because she was demoted
after being treated for breast cancer.
The second decision from Alabama
limited the reach of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and it too could have a wide impact.
From the beginning, Justice Department
lawyers had maintained the landmark law
prohibited not only intentional
discrimination by states, cities, schools or
colleges, but also the use of policies that
"have the effect of subjecting individuals
to discrimination" because of their race,
sex or national origin.
These so-called "disparate impact" claims
have been many and controversial. The
University of California at Berkeley was
sued on this theory because the use of
SAT scores was said to have a
discriminatory effect on blacks and
Hispanics. Advocates of "environmental
justice" have also brought claims against
state agencies alleging that they permitted
the siting of waste treatment plants in
low-income black neighborhoods. In the
case that reached the high court, the
Southern Poverty Law Center had sued
Alabama on behalf of Martha Sandoval, a
Spanish speaking resident, after the state
became the first to offer its drivers' exam
in English only. She won in two lower
federal courts, but the Supreme Court
ruled the law never intended to allow such
lawsuits in the first place.
"We hold that no such private right of
action exists," Justice Scalia said, thereby
sweeping aside all the lawsuits that
challenge the "discriminatory effect" of
state policies.
WHAT'S AHEAD
It is not clear where the Supreme Court
will go next in the area of federalism. The
justices have turned away claims from
states seeking a shield from the Equal Pay
Act or other sex discrimination charges.
Unlike bias based on a person's age or
disability, the 14th Amendment does
forbid sex discrimination, the Court has
said. Therefore, by this logic, Congress
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can subject states to damage suits for sex
discnmnation.
The justices have also not reconsidered
Congress's nearly unlimited power to use
federal funds as a means to force its will
on the states. Some advocates of
federalism have predicted this will be the
next frontier in the court's campaign to
rein in Washington's power over the
states. But Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor have said they are unwilling to
make radical changes in the federal-state
balance. And without their votes, Chief
Justice Rehnquist lacks a majority to push
ahead further.
In May, however, Rehnquist succeeded in
mustering a 5-4 majority to shield states
from having to pay some lawyers' fees.
Congress has authorized judges to force
states to pay the fees of lawyers who are
the "prevailing party" in civil rights cases.
This phrase has been interpreted broadly
to include instances where a lawsuit was
the "catalyst" for a state agency to change
its policies. But Rehnquist rejected the
catalyst theory and held lawyers are
entitled to win fees in civil rights cases
only if they win a final court order
(Buchannon Board & Care Home vs.
West Virginia). West Virginia had been
sued by several elderly residents of group
homes over a rule that required residents
to be able to reach the fire escape on their
own, but the Legislature repealed the rule
after it became the subject of litigation.
LAND USE SETBACK
The states did not fare as well in the area
of land use law. The justices revived a
Rhode Island's landowner's claim against
the state for having blocked him from
building homes in a tidal area near the
ocean. When Anthony Palazzolo bought
his 20-acre parcel, most of it had already
been designated as wetlands by Rhode
Island's coastal management council.
Nonetheless, when his development plans
were rejected, Palazzolo sued for $3
million in compensation. His claim was
filed under the 5th Amendment's
guarantee that private property shall not
"taken for public use without just
compensation.
Until this year, most courts had said that
buyers who purchased land that was
subject to development restrictions cannot
sue for compensation if their
development plans are rejected later. But
the Supreme Court overturned that shield
for the government and said owners such
as Palazzolo can seek compensation on
the grounds that the development ban was
extreme and unreasonable (Palazzolo vs.
Rhode Island). Experts in land use law
said the decision opens the courthouse
door to more compensation claims, but
they also doubted that many property
owners would win in the end.
In the fall, the justices will take up a new
property rights case that could have a
broad impact. At issue is whether land use
agencies can be forced to pay
compensation for having imposed a
temporary moratorium on development.
If the answer is "yes," state and local
planning agencies would have the threat
of huge money claims hanging over them
whenever they blocked a development,
even temporarily. The case before the
court began as a suit by landowners near
Lake Tahoe, who were blocked from
building vacation homes (Tahoe Sierra
Preservation Council vs. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency).
The term's rulings on the 4th Amendment
were decidedly mixed from the view of
both law enforcement and civil
libertarians. The justices rejected two
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novel means of searching for illegal drugs.
First, they struck down the use of
narcotics checkpoints, saying too many
innocent motorists would be stopped and
searched (City of Indianapolis vs.
Edmonds). And they rejected the use of
thermal imagers that can scan homes from
the street and spot those that might
contain a hothouse for growing marijuana
(Kyllo vs. United States). Justice Scalia
said the 4th Amendment was intended to
protect the privacy of homes from the
prying eyes of law enforcement, including,
he said, high-tech devices that can look
inside a home.
But in a third case, the Supreme Court
refused to limit police from arresting
people for minor offenses committed in
their presence. Lawyers for a Texas
mother, who was arrested and taken to jail
for not wearing a seat belt, had urged the
high court to rule such arrests were
"unreasonable seizures" (Atwater vs. City
of Lago Vista).
Lawyers for the Colorado Republican
Party also failed in their effort to knock
down the federal limits on how much the
parties can spend to promote their
candidates. These limits go back to the
post-Watergate era of the 1970s, but they
were seen as vulnerable to a free speech
challenge.
Five years ago, the high court struck down
the limit on "independent expenditures"
on a 7-2 vote, saying parties should be
free to espouse their message. But in June,
the Court reversed course a bit and
upheld the limits on party spending that is
"coordinated" with the candidate (FEC vs.
Colorado Republicans). Speaking for the
5-4 majority, Justice Souter said these
expenditures could be seen as disguised
contributions to a candidate. Under
current law, individuals can give $1,000
per election to a candidate for federal
office, and $20,000 to a party. If the
parties could spend unlimited amounts for
their candidates, the parties could be
"used as a funnel" for money flowing
from rich donors to candidates, he said.
ERISA'S REACH
Meanwhile, the federal pension law, not
state divorce law, was held to govern the
proceeds of a divorced employee who dies
without a will. David Egelhoff, who was
employed by the Boeing Company, had
listed his second wife Donna as the
beneficiary of his life insurance and
pension. But they were divorced in 1994,
and he was killed shortly afterward in an
automobile accident. Under Washington
law, his children from his first marriage
were entitled to the money, but the Court
ruled that the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
preempts the state law (Egelhoff vs.
Egelhoff).
The reach of ERISA remains a source of
legal dispute. In the fall, the Court will
consider its reach again in a case involving
HMOs. At least 38 states have set up
independent review boards that are
empowered to force HMOs to pay for
treatments that are deemed medically
necessary. But a U.S. appeals court in
Texas ruled these state requirements are
preempted by ERISA's exclusive control
over the area of employee benefits. Other
courts have come to the opposite
conclusion and upheld the state boards.
The justices will decide the issue in an
Illinois case known as Rush Prudential
FIMO vs. Moran.
The fall session of the Court features two
other issues sure to attract public
attention. In a North Carolina case, the
justices will decide whether executing a
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The Rehnquist Court. (Cases, Controversy, and the Court)
Social Education
January 1, 2002
Erwin Chemerinsky
When historians look back at the
Rehnquist Court, they will undoubtedly
say that its greatest changes in
constitutional law were in the area of
federalism. Over the past decade,
particularly the last five years, the
Supreme Court has dramatically limited
the scope of Congress's powers and
greatly expanded the protection of state
sovereign immunity. All such recent
Supreme Court cases have been 5-4
decisions, with the majority comprised of
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas. The major cases in which
such a trend is evident follow.
Limiting the Scope of the Commerce
Power
From 1937 until 1995, no federal law was
invalidated as exceeding the scope of
Congress's commerce clause authority.
But in the past several years, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that the judiciary
will enforce strict limits on Congress's
power under this provision.
In United States v. Lopez, (1) the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
the Gun Free School Zone Act, a federal
law that made it a crime to have a firearm
within 1,000 feet of a school. The Court
held that Congress can regulate under the
commerce clause only in three
circumstances: 1) the channels of
interstate commerce; 2) the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce
and persons or things in interstate
commerce; and 3) activities that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The Court found that the federal law
prohibiting guns near schools met none of
these requirements and thus was
unconstitutional.
In United States v. Morrison, (2) the
Court declared unconstitutional the civil
damages provision of the Violence
Against Women Act. The provision
created a federal cause of action for
victims of gender-motivated violence. The
United States government and the
plaintiff,, Christy Brzonkala, defended the
law on the grounds that violence against
women has a substantial effect on the
national economy. The Supreme Court
expressly rejected this argument as
insufficient to sustain the law. Chief
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that
Congress was regulating non-economic
activity that has been dealt with
traditionally by state laws. Moreover, the
Court stressed that no jurisdictional
requirement in the statute necessitates
proof of an effect on interstate commerce.
Unlike the law struck down in Lopez,
Congress made detailed legislative
findings about the economic impact of
violence against women. The Supreme
Court expressly found these findings to be
inadequate to sustain the law under the
commerce clause. The Court concluded,
"We accordingly reject the argument that
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Congress may regulate non-economic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct's aggregated effect on
interstate commerce. The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is
truly national and what is truly local."
Lopez and Morrison open the door to
constitutional challenges to countless
federal laws, especially those that regulate
non-economic activities. Federal
environmental laws, such as the
Endangered Species Act, (4) are likely to
be challenged on the grounds that the law
regulates conduct that does not involve
the channels of interstate commerce, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or activities with a substantial economic
effect. Similarly, federal gun laws, such as
those prohibiting possession of a firearm
while subject to a domestic violence
protection order, (5) are likely to be
challenged.
Narrowing the Scope of Congress's
Powers: Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment
Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorizes Congress to enact
laws to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. In City of Boerne v. Flores,
(6) the Court imposed a significant new
limit on Congress's power under this
provision. The Court held that Congress,
under Section Five, may not expand the
scope of rights or create new rights;
Congress may only provide laws to
prevent or remedy violations of rights
recognized by the courts, and these laws
must be narrowly tailored. In City of
Boerne, the Court declared
unconstitutional the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, which sought to enhance
protection of the free exercise of religion.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, ruled that Congress was
impermissibly expanding the scope of
rights and thus usurping the Court's
authority to determine the content of
religious freedoms. This dramatic new
limit on federal powers puts the
constitutionality of many federal civil
rights laws in doubt.
The Expansion of Sovereign Immunity
Another key change in the law from the
Rehnquist Court has been the Supreme
Court's significant expansion in the scope
of state sovereign immunity. In Alden v.
Maine, (7) the Court held that because of
state sovereign immunity, a state
government may not be sued in state
court, even on a federal claim, without its
consent. Additionally, in a series of cases,
the Court has greatly limited the ability of
Congress to authorize suits against state
governments in federal courts.
In 1996, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the
conservative majority of the Court held
that Congress may authorize suits against
states only pursuant to laws enacted under
Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which empowers Congress
to adopt statutes to enforce that
Amendment. (8) As I described
previously, in 1997, in City of Boerne v.
Flores, the Court limited Congress's
Section Five powers in preventing or
remedying violations of fights recognized
by the Supreme Court; Congress cannot
expand the scope of rights or create new
fights.
The combination of Seminole Tribe and
City of Boerne already has had a
devastating effect on many types of
claims. In Florida Prepaid v. College
Savings Bank, (9) in 1999, the Court held
that state governments cannot be sued for
patent infringement. In Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, (10) the Court decided
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that state governments may not be sued
for violating the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. In University of
Alabama v. Garrett, (11) in February 2001,
the Court ruled that state governments
may not be sued for employment
discrimination in violation of Section One
of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In
each case, the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
concluded that Congress was expanding
the scope of rights and that the laws could
not be justified as narrowly tailored to
prevent or remedy constitutional
violations.
These decisions mean that state
governments cannot be sued when they
violate federal law. How can the
supremacy of federal law be ensured and
vindicated if states can violate the
Constitution or federal laws and are not
held accountable?
At oral argument in Alden, the Solicitor
General of the United States Seth
Waxman quoted to the Court from the
supremacy clause of Article VI,
contending that suits against states are
essential to ensure the supremacy of
federal law. Justice Kennedy's response to
this argument is astounding:
The constitutional privilege of a State to
assert its sovereign immunity in its own
court does not confer upon the State a
concomitant right to disregard the
Constitution or valid federal law. The
States and their officers are bound by
obligations imposed by the Constitution
and by federal statutes that comport with
the constitutional design. We are unwilling
to assume the States will refuse to honor
the Constitution or obey the binding laws
of the United States. The good faith of the
States thus provides an important
assurance that '(t)his Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States, which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.' U.S. Const.,
Art. VI. (12)
What, then, ensures that state
governments will comply with federal law?
Trust in the "good faith" of state
governments. Is it possible to imagine that
thirty or forty years ago, at the height of
the Civil Rights movement, the Supreme
Court wood have issued such a statement-
-that state governments simply could be
trusted to voluntarily comply with federal
law? Justice Kennedy's words in Alden
reflect both the Rehnquist Court's strong
faith in state governments and its desire to
limit federal legislative and judicial power.
Revival of the Tenth Amendment
A final aspect of the Rehnquist Court's
federalism revival has been its use of the
Tenth Amendment as a limit on federal
power. In the first third of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court held that the
Tenth Amendment reserves a zone of
activities for exclusive state control. In
Hammer v. Dagenhart, for example, the
Court struck down a federal law
prohibiting child labor on the grounds
that it violated the Tenth Amendment.
(13) After 1937, however, the Court
rejected this view; no longer was the
Tenth Amendment seen as a limit on
federal power. It instead became a
reminder that Congress could not act
without express or implied constitutional
authority.
Professor Laurence Tribe remarked that
"[f]or almost four decades after 1937, the
conventional wisdom was that federalism
in general--and rights of states in
particular-- provided no judicially
enforceable limits on congressional
power." (14) In 1976, the Court appeared
to revive federalism as a limit on
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Congressional powers in National League
of Cities v. Usery, where the Court
invalidated a federal law that required state
and local governments to pay their
employees a minimum wage. (15) The
Court, in an opinion by then Justice
Rehnquist, held that Congress could not
regulate states in areas of "traditional" or
"integral" state responsibility. But nine
years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court
expressly overruled National League of
Cities. (16) Justice Rehnquist, in a short
dissent, said that he believed that his view
would again triumph in the Court.
In two decisions, the Rehnquist Court has
done just that and revived the Tenth
Amendment as a constraint on Congress's
authority. In New York v. United States,
the Court--for only the second time in 55
years and for the first since the overruled
National League of Cities decision--
invalidated a federal law as violating the
Tenth Amendment. (17) A federal law, the
1985 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act, (18) required states to
provide for the safe disposal of
radioactive wastes generated within their
borders. The act provided monetary
incentives for states to comply with the
law and allowed states to impose a
surcharge on radioactive wastes received
from other states. Additionally, and most
controversially, to ensure effective state
government action, the law provided that
states would "take title" to any wastes
within their borders that were not
properly disposed of by January 1, 1996,
and then would "be liable for all damages
directly or indirectly incurred."
The Supreme Court muled that Congress,
pursuant to its authority under the
commerce clause, could regulate the
disposal of radioactive wastes. By a 6-3
margin, however, the Court held that the
"take rifle" provision of the law is
unconstitutional because it gives state
governments the choice between "either
accepting ownership of waste or
regulating according to the instructions of
Congress." Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court, said that it was impermissible
for Congress to impose either option on
the states. Forcing states to accept
ownership of radioactive wastes would
impermissibly "commandeer" state
governments, and requiring state
compliance with federal regulatory
statutes would impermissibly impose on
states a requirement to implement federal
legislation. The Court concluded that it
was "dear" that because of the Tenth
Amendment, "[t]he Federal Government
may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program."
(19)
A few years later, in Printz v. United
States, (20) the Court applied and
extended New York v. United States.
Printz involved a challenge to the federal
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act.
(21) The law required that the "chief law
enforcement officer" of each local
jurisdiction conduct background checks
before issuing permits for firearms. The
Court, in a 5-4 decision, found that the
law violated the Tenth
Amendment.Justice Scalia wrote for the
majority and revived the phrase "dual
sovereignty" to explain the structure of
American government. The Court
concluded that Congress violated the
Tenth Amendment by compelling states
to implement federal mandates.
These federalism decisions are the
Rehnquist Court's most important
changes in constitutional law. They are a
dramatic departure from the approach
that the Court had followed for the prior
half-century.
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Federalism's Benchmarks
The Washington Times
June 30, 2002
Terry Eastland
Last week the Supreme Court ended its
current term by sustaining the
constitutionality of an Ohio program
using vouchers at church-related
schools. The outcome could not
confidently have been predicted, since the
court is narrowly divided on church-state
questions.
But what wasn't hard to guess was that the
"conservative" position favoring the
program that had been advanced by the
Bush administration would be embraced
by most if not all five of the
"conservative" justices they being Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Associate
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy and Clarence
Thomas. [As it happened, all five voted to
support the program.] The reason this
prediction was easy to make is that the
conservative justices have often supported
conservative positions on church and
state. The same is likely to occur when
two other subjects that sharply divide the
court race and abortion are brought
before it. In such cases, you can anticipate
that the Bush administration will advance
a "conservative" position and that most if
not all of the five conservatives will agree
with it.
The model breaks down, however, when
it comes to federalism, the last of the four
big subjects often decided by the vote of
single justice.
Consider the case handed down in late
May pitting the South Carolina State Ports
Authority against the Federal Maritime
Commission. The issue was whether state
sovereign immunity barred the
commission from deciding a private
complaint brought against the ports
authority. The court, with the five
conservatives constituting the majority,
ruled in favor of South Carolina. It did so,
having been told by the Bush
administration to decide the case exactly
opposite the way in did in favor of the
commission. And lo, the administration's
position was taken by the four dissenters
Associate Justices John Paul Stevens,
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer.
Rarely does the administration strike out
entirely with the conservatives and win the
votes of only the liberals. But the South
Carolina case didn't produce an odd
voting pattern. The court divided exactly
as it has in a series of federalism
controversies dating back to 1995. Nor
was the administration's position an
exception to what it can be expected to
advance in federalism cases.
Bear in mind that the solicitor general's
office represents a particular government -
the federal government. If [in a given
case] it can't defend the government in
good conscience, someone else will be
assigned the job. Rarely does that happen,
however. It didn't in the South Carolina
case, and it is hard to imagine many
federalism cases down the road where it
might.
The irony is that President Bush upon
advice from the Justice Department,
whose fourth-ranking officer is the
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solicitor general is nominating judges
likely to rule against the federal
government in federalism cases. That is so
in part because lower-court judges are
obligated to follow what the Supreme
Court says and it has said much in favor
of the states. But it also is true that the
administration is looking to appoint
judges and justices whose approach to
federalism is likely to resemble that
articulated by the five conservative justices
who now control the issue.
If you think the administration is of two
minds on federalism, think again, for
much depends on where one sits. Not
long before he became a justice, Robert
Jackson was solicitor general and took
positions on executive power that
changed once he was asked to decide
cases. If the current solicitor general,
Theodore Olson, were sitting on the
Supreme Court, he probably would join
the pro-federalism majority.
An additional irony is that President Bush
says he wants judges who are "strict
constructionists." But strict
constructiornism, if by that is meant
adherence to the literal text of the
Constitution, doesn't support the decision
in the South Carolina case or the previous
federalism cases. Nor does constitutional
history. More persuasive are arguments
grounded in the structure of the
Constitution a point recognized by
justices Scalia and Thomas. Whether the
president will advance a more
sophisticated understanding of his judicial
philosophy is doubtful, if only because no
president in modem times has.
Be that as it may, it is good that federalism
has friends in high judicial places. The
Framers divided government in order to
limit government and thus better secure
liberty. But the federal government, biased
as it is in favor of national power,
naturally will tend to erase those divisions
to the detriment of liberty. Difficult
questions of interpretation duly noted,
only the federal courts are in a position to
enforce federalism. Led by the Supreme
Court though not urged on by the Bush
administration they are attempting to do
just that.
[Terry Eastland is a columnist and former
Reagan administration official.]
Copyright © 2002 News World
Commuruications, Inc.
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Will the Court Reassert National Authority?
The New York Times
September 30, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
For the last decade, the court, under Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, has engaged
in a far-reaching reappraisal of the scope
of Congressional authority and the
balance of powers between the national
government and the states. In case after
case, the court, which begins its new term
tomorrow, invoked broad theories of the
sovereignty of the individual states and a
limited view of Congress's authority --
creating a new federalism jurisprudence
that has become the hallmark of the
Rehnquist court. Not since the Supreme
Court's resistance to the New Deal
crumpled in the late 1930's has the court
been so hostile to the exercise of federal
power.
It is no coincidence that this federalism
revival flourished in a post-cold-war
atmosphere of tranquility, when it was
easy to regard the federal government as
superfluous at best. To many, it seemed a
blundering and costly intruder into
matters properly rooted at the state and
local level. That attitude vanished three
weeks ago, as suddenly and completely as
the twin towers.
"Federalism was a luxury of peaceful
times," said Walter E. Dellinger, who as
the Clinton administration's acting
solicitor general in 1997 fought a losing
battle at the Supreme Court to preserve
the Brady gun control law. The court
ruled 5 to 4 that Congress had violated
core principles of state sovereignty by
requiring local law enforcement officials
to conduct background checks of
prospective gun purchasers.
To pick up that opinion today, a paean to
the states as "independent and
autonomous," in the words of Justice
Antonin Scalia, is like unearthing an
artifact from a bygone era. The majority
opinion in Printz v. United States speaks
from a consciousness far removed from a
world in which a Republican president
now proposes to give a new Homeland
Security Agency authority over state and
local as well as federal agencies engaged in
domestic defense.
Reflecting on the Brady Act case, Mr.
Dellinger said, "One of the things I
thought then was that we wouldn't be so
casually discarding the authority of the
national government in this way if the
cold war was still going on." He added he
had the same reaction to another defeat
that year, the court's rejection of
presidential immunity in the Paula Corbin
Jones case.
The Supreme Court's attachment to
federalism and disaffection from it has
often tracked changes in the nation's
mood and circumstances. "Whenever you
see a national emergency, federalism
disappears," explained Robert C. Post, a
law professor at the University of
California at Berkeley who has examined
the rise of nationalism during World War
I. "In a national emergency, you give the
national government the power to get
done what needs to get done," he said.
Professor Post said the court has a
"dialectical relationship with the mood of
the country" -- at different times playing
the role of leader, consolidator or
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follower. "But when something intense,
momentary and vivid sweeps the country
in the middle of responding to a crisis, it
takes a very strong-willed court to buck
that."
Another scholar of the court, Prof.
Sanford Levinson of the University of
Texas Law School, said when the public
turned to the federal government for
solutions, federalism lost its "motive
force," which was "a fundamental
mistrust, a disdain for a national
government that is seen as distant,
probably corrupt and in any event as not
reflecting the 'real America.' " Now, by
contrast, "suddenly it becomes very, very
important to trust national leadership," he
added.
While both professors are critics of the
court's federalism rulings, even strong
supporters offer, if regretfully, a similar
analysis. The events of Sept. 11 "struck at
the heart of the federalism revival," said
John 0. McGinnis, a professor at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at
Yeshiva University. "We all experience it
as Americans," he continued. "It brings
the country together, and federalism,
whatever its intellectual claims, doesn't
speak to that."
The court responds not only to the
domestic mood but to the justices'
perception of what message the court
needs to send to the wider world,
according to Mary L. Dudziak, a legal
historian at the University of Southern
California, who has proposed a foreign-
policy-based explanation for the Supreme
Court's shift on racial equality at the
height of the cold war. In her book, "Cold
War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of
American Democracy," she asserts that
the court's landmark desegregation
decision, Brown v. Board of Education,
can be seen as a reflection of the justices'
belief that official racism at home was
damaging the image of the United States
and giving the Soviet Union ammunition
in the worldwide struggle for dominance,
an argument the federal government made
in its brief to the court.
"As the ground shifts under us now, the
justices can't take themselves out of their
cultural moment," Professor Dudziak
said. "Federalism jurisprudence might
have felt anachronistic and quaint in an
era of globalization, but after Sept. 11 it
feels dangerous."
While there are cases on the court's
docket for the new term that raise
tangential federalism questions, none
appear to provide raw material for a basic
reappraisal. And, certainly, the justices are
unlikely to repudiate what they have
accomplished so far, said Michael S.
Greve, director of the federalism project
at the American Enterprise Institute, a
conservative public policy organization.
"It will be more subtle and nuanced, hard
to trace," Mr. Greve said, predicting that
the court will sidestep occasions to apply
and extend the recent precedents. "It's too
big not to have an effect," he said. "To
sustain ancient constitutional doctrines at
a time like this becomes impossible."
THE end of the federalism revolution
raises another question: will the court
follow another of its historical patterns
and overcompensate in favor of the
federal government, accepting the
government's claims about the need to
restrict individual liberties for the sake of
national security.
In 1987, one of the court's great civil
libertarians, Justice William J. Brennan Jr.,
offered a sober warning on this point that
now sounds particularly timely. Brennan
said America's record in protecting civil
liberties in times of war was "shabby," in
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part because the country had so little
experience with threats to its security that
it was not sufficiently practiced at sorting
out real security risks and needs from
exaggerated claims.
"The episodic nature of our security
crises" left the country and its judges
vulnerable to being "swept away by
irrational passion" when the
unaccustomed threat arrived, Brennan
said. "A jurisprudence capable of braving
the overblown claims of national security
must be forged in times of crisis by the
sort of intimate familiarity with national
security threats that tests their bases in
fact, explores their relation to the exercise
of civil freedom, and probes the limits of
their compass."
It is a hard proposition: that only
prolonged and intimate exposure to
danger can develop the necessary wisdom
to deal with it. By Brennan's measure,
both the court and country are seriously
out of practice. Both are now confronted
by the end of a peaceful period that
appeared, just days ago, to have no end in
sight.
So often in recent years, this court has
seemed to have its eye on the past. Now,
with the nation, it has been abruptly
propelled into an unappealing future
where the search for the right balance
between order and liberty may well
present the Rehnquist court with its
greatest test.
Copyright @ 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Stephen Breyer Restrains Himself: Modest Proposal
The New Republic
January 3, 2002
Jeffrey Rosen
The Supreme Court has not yet indicated
how it will respond to September 11, but
the judicial philosophy that the
conservative majority had embraced
before the Twin Towers fell seems hard to
sustain in a new and anxious age. The
conservatives had planted their flag on
principles of federalism and states' rights;
today both parties appreciate the need for
a national response to international terror.
The conservatives had displayed contempt
for Congress as a policy-making body,
today Congress enjoys renewed public
respect. They had embraced a high-
handed doctrine of judicial supremacy that
asserted the exclusive ability of judges to
decide complicated questions of national
policy on topics ranging from crime to
voting rights; today it is obvious to
Republicans as well as Democrats that the
enormous complexity of the challenges
that face us--requiring elaborate
coordination between federal, state, and
local authorities--must be resolved by the
president and Congress, rather than by the
courts.
Although the Court as a whole hasn't had
the opportunity to reconsider its direction,
one justice recently offered a bold vision
of how his colleagues might redefine their
role in the post-September 11 world. At
the end of October, Justice Stephen
Breyer delivered the James Madison
Lecture at New York University. In his
lecture, entitled "Our Democratic
Constitution," Justice Breyer referred only
indirectly to September 11, noting that
"trust in government has shown a
remarkable rebound in response to last
month's terrible tragedy." Far from being
intentionally topical, the lecture
represented his considered reflections
about his own pragmatic approach to
constitutional interpretation after nearly
eight years on the bench. But in his
insistence that courts should defer to
Congress, in his transparency and candor,
and above all, in his embrace of judicial
modesty, Breyer offered a powerful case
for the resurrection of a tradition of
liberal judicial restraint that seems more
relevant today than at any time since the
New Deal.
If Holmes's contempt for idealistic visions
of democracy came from his experience
during the Civil War, Breyer's far sunnier
view of legislatures came from his own
upbringing in the Bay Area. His father was
a lawyer for the San Francisco school
board who emphasized the importance of
participating in the political life of the city.
And Breyer took this lesson to heart as
chief counsel to the Judiciary Committee
under Senator Ted Kennedy from 1979 to
1980, where he worked on airline
deregulation and federal sentencing
reform. Each morning Breyer would meet
for breakfast with his Republican
counterpart, the chief counsel for Senator
Strom Thurmond, and that experience
convinced him that when legislative staff
meet, rather than being prisoners of
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ideology, both sides are often trying to
achieve practical results that will help the
country. While recognizing that Congress
wasn't perfect, Breyer concluded that it
worked pretty well, and he left the job
even more optimistic about the
possibilities of bipartisan legislative
cooperation than when he began.
Breyer's optimistic view of Congress is
most apparent in his approach to
federalism. Before September 11 the
federalism debate had seemed eye-
glazingly esoteric, as cases about the limits
of Congress's authority focused on
obscure questions, such as whether
Congress had the power to protect red
wolves that didn't cross state lines. After
September 11, however, the question of
whether there are limits to Congress's
power to respond to health and
environmental threats suddenly has
dramatic practical consequences. For
example, when they struck down part of
the Brady gun control law in 1997, the
five conservative justices held that
Congress may not "commandeer" state
officials by forcing them to run
background checks on potential gun
buyers to see whether they have criminal
records. In a prescient dissenting opinion,
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the
"threat of an international terrorist, may
require a national response before federal
personnel can be made available to
respond.... Is there anything [in the
Constitution] that forbids the enlistment
of state officials to make that response
effective?" Expanding on Stevens's
example after September 11, Breyer insists
that by enlisting the participation of local
and state officials to combat terrorism,
Congress could "help both the cause of
effective security coordination and the
cause of federalism." By contrast, now
that the Court has prohibited Congress
from setting up cooperative schemes for
law enforcement, the only alternative may
be to create a cumbersome and inflexible
federal enforcement bureaucracy.
Ironically, because of the Brady bill case
and others like it, the new Office of
Homeland Security may find it harder to
delegate regulatory power to state and
local governments.
Or consider another challenge in the wake
of September 11: Congress's ability to set
up a regulatory scheme to respond to
threats of biological weapons. Breyer
notes that the regulation of toxic
chemicals demands a level of expertise to
which the federal government may have
better access than state governments have.
Federal regulators, he suggests, may be
better equipped to decide complicated
factual questions, delegating to state
authorities questions of value, such as
what level of risk is acceptable. But the
Supreme Court's federalism decisions
might prevent Congress from enlisting
state and local officials to check
compliance with federal minimum
standards for biological safety. This sort
of anti-federalism may have seemed
quaint before the Twin Towers fell, but
the possibility that the Court might
hamper Congress from responding to a
serious threat to public health is now no
laughing matter.
During the past decade the case for
judicial restraint has had little political
resonance among liberals. In the
Progressive and New Deal eras,
conservative judicial activism provoked a
backlash when judges struck down laws
that had broad political constituencies. By
contrast, the laws that the conservative
justices struck down in the 1990s often
seemed too obscure for anyone except
scholars to care. Perhaps it took the
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trauma of September 11 to remind all
Americans, liberal as well as conservative,
that national action is necessary in times
of national emergency, and that the
federal government needs broad
discretion to respond to complicated
international challenges. It's not yet
obvious whether the conservative justices
will follow the logic of their previous
decisions and try to thwart the federal
government's flexibility in a post-
September 11 world. But if they do,
Breyer's consistently modest view of
judicial power will no longer seem like a
historical artifact. It will be recognized as a
national imperative.
Copyright a 2002 The New Republic
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01-0706 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
Ruling Below: (Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, Ill Sup.Ct., 197 Ill. 2d 112, 757 N.E.2d 75,
2001 Ill. Lexis 1039, 258 Ill. Dec. 690)
The court held that the Coast Guard's decision, made in consultation with the National
Boating Safety Advisory Council, to not require propeller guards impliedly preempted state
common law tort claims against boat manufacturer's who did not include such guards.
Question Presented: Does the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 preempt state common
law causes of action based on a manufacturer's failure to install propeller guards on boat
engines?
Rex . SPRIETSMA. Adm'r of the estate of Jeanne Sprietsma, Deceased, Appellant,
V.
MERCURY MARINE, a Division of Brunswick Corporation, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Illinois
Decided August 16, 2001
GARMvAN, Justice:
The issue in this case is whether the
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 (FBSA)
(46 U.S.C 5 4301 et seq. (1994)) preempts
state common law causes of action based
on the manufacturer's failure to install
propeller guards on boat engines. In July
1995, while boating in Tennessee,
plaintiffs decedent, Jeanne Sprietsma, fell
from a motor boat and was struck by the
motor's propeller blades. As a result, she
suffered serious injuries that resulted in
her death. The boat was equipped with a
115-horsepower outboard motor, which
did not contain a propeller guard. The
motor was designed, manufactured, and
sold by Mercury Marine.
[Jeanne Sprietsma's husband filed a
wrongful-death suit. Mercury Marine filed
a motion to dismiss because Sprietsma's
clan-is were expressly and impliedly
preempted by the FBSA.]
A. The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971
and the Coast Guard's Decision Regarding
Propeller Guards
[Congress passed the FBSA to improve
boating safety. Minimum safety standards
were promulgated by the US. Coast
Guard in consultation with the National
Boating Safety Advisory Council
(NBSAC). Propeller guards were
specifically considered by the Coast Guard
and NBSAC in 1988, and the resulting
study found that greater problems and
dangers would result from requiring the
guards.]
B. Federal Preemption
Federal law can preempt state law under
the supremacy clause in three
circumstances: (1) where Congress has
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expressly preempted state action (express
preemption); (2) where Congress has
implemented a comprehensive regulatory
scheme in an area, thus removing the
entire field from state realm (implied field
preemption); or (3) where state action
actually conflicts with federal law (implied
conflict preemption). Czpdore, 505 U.S. at
516, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 422-23, 112 S. Ct. at
2617; Engish u Geeral Eletic Co, 496
U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 L. Ed. 2d 65, 74, 110
S. Ct. 2270, 2275 (1990). Our focus in this
case will deal with express and implied
conflict preemption.
The parties dispute whether our analysis
should begin with a presumption that
federal law does not preempt Sprietsma's
common law tort claims against Mercury
Marine. Sprietsma contends that there is a
strong presumption against preemption
here because federal preemption would
displace state police powers that protect
the health and safety of its citizens.
Conversely, Mercury Marine argues that
this case does not involve the historic
police powers of the state but derives
from federal maritime jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court has
stated that "an 'assumption' of nonpre-
emption is not triggered when the State
regulates in an area where there has been a
history of significant federal presence."
Unitd States u Lake, 529 U.S. 89, 108, 146
L. Ed. 2d 69, 88, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1147
(2000). However, an assumption of
nonpreemption is triggered when the state
regulates health and safety matters which
have traditionally come within the
jurisdiction of the state through its police
powers. Medtroa Inc v. Labr, 518 U.S.
470, 474, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700, 709, 116 S.
Ct. 2240, 2245 (1996). We recognize that
Sprietsma's claim that Mercury Marine
designed a defective motor by failing to
install a propeller guard relates to health
and safety concerns. However, the claim
also encompasses maritime activity, which
is traditionally within the realm of federal
regulation. Southem Paafc Ca v. Jermse 244
U.S. 205, 215, 61 L. Ed. 1086, 1098, 37 S.
Ct. 524, 528 (1917) ("Congress has
paramount power to fix and determine the
maritime law which shall prevail
throughout the country"); Lady v Neal
GlaserMannVE Inc, 228 F.3d 598, 607 (5th
Cir. 2000).
Section 4301(a) states that the FBSA and
its regulations apply "to a recreational
vessel and associated equipment carried in
the vessel on waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States and, for a
vessel owned in the United States, on the
high seas." 46 U.S.C. 4301(a) (1994).
Furthermore, the FBSA's "general
jurisdictional applicability is to vessels
within the historic federal maritime
jurisdiction." S. Rep. No. 92-248 (1971),
ninled in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1333, 1338.
In deciding whether the claims in this case
relate to federal maritime activity, we note
that the United States Supreme Court has
held that a collision between two pleasure
boats on navigable waters had a sufficient
nexus to traditional maritime activity to
come within the admiralty jurisdiction of
the federal courts. Forerrnst Insurarxe Ca v
Ridhrdson, 457 US. 668, 674, 73 L. Ed. 2d
300, 306, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2658 (1982).
Thus, Sprietsma's claims bear upon an
area historically regulated by the federal
government. When "state laws *** bear
upon national and international maritime
commerce, there is no beginning
assumption that concurrent regulation by
the State is a valid exercise of its police
powers." Loke, 529 U.S. at 108, 146 L.
Ed. 2d at 88-89, 120 S. Ct. at 1148.
Although Sprietsma's claims bear upon
state and federal concerns, we believe the
federal concerns predominate in this case.
Therefore, in deciding whether
Sprietsma's claims are preempted by the
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FBSA, we will not apply a presumption
against preemption.
C. Express Preemption
Keeping in mind the preceding
preemption principles, we first address
whether the FBSA expressly preempts
Sprietsma's common law tort claims
against Mercury Marine. Because
Congress has demonstrated its intent to
preempt some aspects of state law under
section 4306 (46 U.S.C 5 4306 (1994)), we
must determine the scope of preemption
under that provision by focusing on its
text.
Section 4306 preempts state laws or
regulations that are not identical to the
regulations promulgated under the FBSA.
Although the FBSA does not define "law
or regulation," the phrase clearly indicates
an intent to include common law claims.
Cipdw, 505 U.S. at 522, 120 L. Ed. 2d at
426, 112 S. Ct. at 2620 (state law includes
common law as well as statutes and
regulations); Leuis v. Bmmidk Op., 107
F.3d 1494, 1501 (11th Cir. 1997) (language
demonstrates intent to include common
law claims); Farr u Brmmuek COp., 239
Ill. App. 3d 885 at 891, 607 N.E.2d 562,
180 Ill. Dec. 493. We also note that both
state and federal courts have held that the
preemption provision of the FBSA
expressly preempts common law tort
claims. [citations omitted].
However, we must examine section 4306
in conjunction with the FBSA's savings
clause provision of section 4311(g) (46
U.S.C. 5 4311(g) (1994)), which states:
"compliance with this chapter or
standards, regulations, or orders
prescribed under this chapter does not
relieve a person from liability at common
law or under State law." 46 U.S.C. 5
4311(g) (1994). Although section 4306,
the preemption provision, evinces
Congress' intent to expressly preempt
state laws or regulations not identical to
those promulgated in the FBSA, this
provision prevents us from finding
express preemption.
[D. Implied Conflict Preemption]
The United States Supreme Court has
found implied conflict preemption where
it is "impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal
requirements" ( English, 496 U.S. at 79,
110 L. Ed. 2d at 74, 110 S. Ct. at 2275), or
where state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress"
(Hins vDaziduitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68, 85
L. Ed. 581, 587, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404 (1941);
see also FEthdirer, 514 U.S. at 287, 131 L.
Ed. 2d at 392, 115 S. Ct. at 1487). Since
it is not impossible for a manufacturer to
comply with a state common law rule
requiring propeller guards and the Coast
Guard's decision not to require them, we
will address whether a state common law
tort claim based on failure to install the
guards stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the purposes and
objectives Congress sought to achieve in
enacting the FBSA
In contrast to F&ghdirer, where the lack
of federal regulation was not the result of
an affirmative decision not to regulate,
here, the Coast Guard did make an
affirmative decision to refrain from
promulgating a propeller guard
requirement.
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In Geier, the Supreme Court determined
whether Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard 208 (Safety Standard 208)
preempted a common law tort action
based on the failure to install a driver's
side airbag. The Department of
Transportation stated that the purpose of
Safety Standard 208 was to provide auto
manufacturers with a choice of whether or
not to install airbags with a gradual phase-
in of passive restraint devices. Geier 529
U.S. at 878-79, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 930, 120
S. Ct. at 1924. Under an implied conflict
preemption analysis, the Court stated that
Geier's tort action depended upon her
claim that auto manufacturers had a duty
to install an airbag in her car when it was
made. Geir, 529 U.S. at 881, 146 L. Ed. 2d
at 931-32, 120 S. Ct. at 1925. This alleged
duty would have required other auto
manufacturers to install airbags in similar
cars rather than other safety restraint
systems, such as automatic seatbelts or
passive interiors. Geier, 529 U.S. at 881,
146 L. Ed. 2d at 932, 120 S. Ct. at 1925.
This claim "would have presented an
obstacle to the variety and mix of devices
that the federal regulation sought ***
[and] also would have stood as an obstacle
to the gradual passive restraint phase-in
that the federal regulation deliberately
imposed." Geier, 529 U.S. at 881, 146 L.
Ed. 2d at 932, 120 S. Ct. at 1925. The
Court thus concluded that Safety Standard
208 preempted Geier's tort claim because
of the obstacle it presented to the
accomplishment of federal objectives.
Geer, 529 U.S. at 881, 146 L. Ed. 2d at
932, 120 S. Ct. at 1925.
Mercury Marine maintains that we should
apply Geier's ruling that Safety Standard
208 preempted conflicting state laws to
this case in order to preempt Sprietsma's
tort claim. Sprietsma, on the other hand,
argues that there is no regulation by the
Coast Guard with which his claim could
conflict, only a decision not to prescribe a
standard. According to Sprietsma, the
absence of a regulation does not in itself
constitute a regulation. See Frihdinr,
514 U.S. at 286, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 392, 115
S. Ct. at 1487. However, the Supreme
Court has stated that "a federal decision to
forgo regulation in a given area may imply
an authoritative federal determination that
the area is best left unregulated, and in
that event would have as much pre-
emptive force as a decision to regulate."
(Emphases omitted.) Arkamas Eleic
Gxperatie Corp. vA kansas Public Seruce
Comm'r 461 U.S. 375, 384, 76 L. Ed. 2d 1,
10, 103 S. Ct. 1905, 1912 (1983) * ** The
Supreme Court has also concluded that"
'where [the] failure of ... federal officials
affirmatively to exercise their full authority
takes on the character of a ruling that no
such regulation is appropriate or approved
pursuant to the policy of the statute,'
States are not permitted to use their police
power to enact such a regulation." Ray v
AtlanticRidfiei Ca, 435 U.S. 151, 178, 55
L. Ed. 2d 179, 201, 98 S. Ct. 988, 1004-05
(1978), quoting Bethlem Steel Ca u New
York State Labor Relatiom Bardr 330 U.S.
767, 774, 91 L. Ed. 1234, 1246, 67 S. Ct.
1026, 1030 (1947).
We believe that the Coast Guard's failure
to promulgate a propeller guard
requirement here equates to a ruling that
no such regulation is appropriate pursuant
to the policy of the FBSA. The Coast
Guard made an informed decision that no
regulatory action should be taken to
require propeller guards after studying the
findings and recommendations of the
Advisory Council and the Propeller Guard
Subcommittee. A damage award would, in
effect, create a propeller guard
requirement, thus frustrating the
objectives of Congress in promulgating
the FBSA.
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In considering the federal decisions on
this matter, we find the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Lady persuasive and agree that:
"where the Coast Guard has been
presented with an issue, studied it, and
affirmatively decided as a substantive
matter that it was not appropriate to
impose a requirement, that decision takes
on the character of a regulation and the
FBSA's objective of national uniformity
mandates that state law not provide a
result different than the Coast Guard's."
Lady, 228 F.3d at 615.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the
two state court decisions that have held
that federal law does not preempt state
law in this type of case. See Moore u
Bnrsuick Bozing & Billiard Cop., 889
S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994); A nd v Jere 996
S.W.2d 594 (Mo. App. 1999). As these
cases represent the minority view on this
matter, we believe a finding of preemption
is warranted here in order to continue the
line of uniformity laid down by the federal
courts that have found preemption under
the FBSA. Therefore, based on the
preceding analysis, we find that
Sprietsma's common law tort claims are
impliedly preempted by the FBSA.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
appellate court's judgment that the FBSA
preempts Sprietsma's common law claims
for failure to install propeller guards. [...
HARRISON, Chief Justice, dissenting:
My colleagues go to enormous lengths to
uphold a finding of preemption when they
should be doing exactly the opposite.
Preemption is disfavored. As our court
has previously held, a presumption exists
in every preemption case that Congress
did not intend to supplant state law.
Schdters u Sdneider 173 Ill. 2d 375, 379,
219 Ill. Dec. 490, 671 N.E.2d 657 (1996).
In ascertaining congressional intent, our
inquiry necessarily begins with an analysis
of the language of the statute. Sdters,
173 Ill. 2d at 380. The language employed
by Congress here could not be more clear.
Section 4311(g) of the FBSA expressly
provides:
"Compliance with this chapter or
standards, regulations, or orders
prescribed under this chapter does not
relieve a person from liability at common
law or under State law." 46 U.S.C.
4311(g) (1994).
If we are to give this provision its plain
and ordinary meaning, as we must,
Mercury Marine's compliance with the
standard adopted by the Coast Guard,
which was not to require propeller guards,
clearly does not bar the common law tort
claims asserted against it by Sprietsma in
this case. Indeed, it is difficult to see how
Congress' intention to preserve such tort
claims could have been expressed any
more explicitly.
While allowing common law tort claims to
go forward may seem to create a tension
with the Coast Guard's policy against
propeller guards, that is a circumstance we
must assume Congress considered when it
adopted section 4311(g). If section
4 3 11(g) ultimately proves unworkable
when applied as written, that is a matter
for Congress and not this court to
remedy.
[... ] I therefore dissent.
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Boat Propeller Lawsuits to be Considered by U.S. Supreme Court
Bloomberg News
January 22, 2002
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide
whether boat engine manufacturers can be
sued when their propellers injure or kill
people.
The justices will review a lower court's
decision favoring Brunswick Corp., the
world's largest maker of recreational boats
and marine engines, in a fight with the
husband of a woman killed in a 1995
accident in Tennessee.
Lower courts have disagreed about the
legal impact of a decade-old Coast Guard
decision not to require propeller guards
on recreational vessels. Most judges who
considered the issue have concluded that
the Coast Guard's stance means accident
victims can't sue. The issue is especially
important for Brunswick, the subject of
repeated propeller-related lawsuits in
recent years. In 1998 Brunswick settled a
suit raising the same issue just weeks
before the Supreme Court was expected
to rule on it.
The justices will hear arguments during
their 2002-03 term, which begins in
October and runs through the following
June.
The case before the high court involves
Jeanne Sprietsma, who died shortly after
falling from a motorboat and being struck
by the propeller blades. Her husband Rex
sued Brunswick's Mercury Marine
division, which made the outboard engine,
in Illinois state court.
The Illinois Supreme Court threw out the
suit, concluding it was pre-empted
because it would conflict with Coast
Guard policy.
The Coast Guard decided not to require
propeller guards after studying the issue in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. The agency
concluded the devices would hamper boat
performance and wouldn't necessarily
improve safety because they would create
other potential hazards.
Safety Hazards
"Its decision not to require them reflected
not indifference, but a thorough analysis
of the regulatory issues and a conclusion
that they were technologically infeasible,
economically unjustified and likely to
increase safety hazards,"
Brunswick argued.
The Lake Forest, Illinois, company urged
the nation's highest court not to get
involved.
In his appeal, Sprietsma argued that a
federal agency's decision not to regulate
isn't enough to pre-empt suits under state
law.
There is "no evidence that the Coast
Guard intended to restrict the ability of
victims of propeller accidents to seek
compensation through the common-law
tort system," the appeal argued.
The Supreme Court in 2000 sided with
business groups in an important product-
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liability pre-emption case. In that case, a5-4 court said a federal policy that phased
in air bag requirements for cars shielded
automakers from suits claiming they
should have moved more quickly to install
the lifesaving devices.
The case is Sprietsia v. Mercury Marine,
01-706.
Copyright @ 2002 Bloomberg LP.
The Supreme Court Term That Was and the One That Will Be
Federalist Outlook
July/August 2002
Michael S. Greve
[... ] The place where the spirit of
federalism meets the fear of balkanization
is federal preemption-that is, the question
of when and to what extent federal law
trumps contravening state law.
Preemption will prove the central
federalism question during the coming
term--and beyond.
The most important preemption cases of
the coming term arise over state tort law
rather than state legislation. That reflects
the fact that tort actions, not statutes, now
generate the most serious state
impositions on interstate commerce and
on sister states. Nationwide class actions
and arbitrary punitive damage awards,
often in a handful of hellhole state court
jurisdictions, provide the most familiar
illustration. Even so, state tort cases rarely
appear on the Supreme Court's docket;
the general presumption is that tort law is
the near exclusive province of the states.
For the coming term, though, the
Supreme Court has already agreed to
decide no fewer than six tort cases.
* Two cases on the docket present
statutory preemption questions. The more
important of them, Sprietsrm v Menury
MariM, concerns the question whether a
manufacturer's failure to install a propeller
guard for outboard motors is a product
design defect for which the manufacturer
may be held liable under state tort law.
The defendants argue that the Federal
Boat Safety Act, which grants the U.S.
Coast Guard exclusive authority to
establish boat safety standards, preempts
such lawsuits. The plaintiffs argue that
preemption requires an actual Coast
Guard rule; the agency's mere decision not
to require propeller guards should have no
preclusive effect.
Foni Motor Ca v McCauley goes to the
seemingly arcane but enormously
important question of "diversity"
jurisdiction in class actions--that is, the
question whether class actions
involving parties from different states
are to be heard in state or federal
court. Plaintiffs' lawyers prefer state
courts, where parochial judges and
juries have every incentive to maul
out-of-state manufacturers. Corporate
defendants prefer a more impartial
federal forum. Diversity cases may be
removed to federal court only if the
amount in controversy for each
member of a class exceeds $75,000.
Trial lawyers argue that the amount
should be determined by the plaintiff's
expected benefit (which the lawyers
can manipulate to keep the case in
state court); the corporate defendants
claim that the cost to the defendant,
which may exceed the plaintiff's
benefits, should also satisfy the federal
amount- in-controversy requirement.
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* The Supreme Court will wade back
into the out-of-control thicket of
asbestos litigation. The justices have
agreed to review a state court verdict,
under the Federal Employers Liability
Act, awarding $5.8 million in
emotional distress damages to six
retired railroad workers who showed
neither asbestos-related symptoms nor
a physical manifestation of their
emotional injury (No~fdk & Wstem
Railway Ca v Ayrs).
It is just possible that the outcome of
those and the other tort cases on the
Court's docket--including State Fann v
Czrrpb4 a $145 million punitive damage
case from the Utah Supreme Court-will
fail to indicate a clear direction. Still, the
sheer number of cases cannot be a
coincidence. It signals a judicial
recognition that we have a federalism
problem with torts and state court class
actions. No kidding.
The Stakes
Three considerations render preemption,
and in particular the federal preemption of
state tort law, the most serious federalism
issue on the horizon. First, plaintiffs'
lawyers and state attorneys general
constitute a serious threat to a functioning
economy--more serious than state
legislatures and far more serious than
creative accountants. (The exploits of the
attorneys general and the trial lawyers are
technically legal.) Second, the Supreme
Court's doctrines on the federal
preemption of state law, including and
especially tort law, are confused and
incoherent. (No lawyer, judge, or legal
scholar would contest the point.) Third,
the doctrines-such as they are-are on a
collision course with the rest of the
Supreme Court's federalism, in spirit and
in point of doctrine. Sooner or later,
something will have to give, and
preemption will be it.
Extant preemption law, for example,
encompasses something called "implied
preemption," meaning that the intent to
preempt need not be stated explicitly.
(The scope of implied preemption is a
central issue in next term's Spnetnn u
Menry Manne) We know, however, on
the excellent authority of a slew of
precedents, that Congress may not impose
regulatory obligations under federal
entitlement statutes unless those
obligations are clearly stated in the law.
The obligations may not be implied. Why
then should Congress or federal agencies
be allowed to preempt state regulation
without a comparably clear statement?
The Supreme Court has never articulated
a clear answer to that question. Waffling
and indecision at this front, though, will
eventually have fateful consequences.
Were the Court's "clear statement" rule, as
applied in entitlement cases, to spill over
into preemption, almost no federal statute
would preempt much of anything at all.
That result will obtain whenever one or
more of the Federalist Five conclude that
state impositions on interstate commerce
are the price we must pay for "states'
rights" and, on those grounds, defect to
the four regulation maximizers. (Justice
O'Connor's defection in Rush Prudential
illustrates the point.) And there you have
it: the menace of federalism as a charter
for commercial balkanization.
Averting that threat will ultimately require
a set of preemption-related constitutional
and interpretive doctrines that are
consistent with the Supreme Court's
federalism, zzhiut laying waste to
interstate commerce in the process. In
going about that daunting enterprise, thejustices would greatly benefit from outside
assistance-specifically, parties and lawyers
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right cases and the right
consistency and force.
help may not be
Helpless
The importance of supply-side guidance is
illustrated by the Court's coherent and
principled entitlement jurisprudence.
Among the reasons for that salutary
development is the fact that those cases
have a ready-made constituency--the
states and in particular state attorneys
general. The attorneys general are repeat
players in case after case, and they
coordinate their litigation activities (for
example, through the National
Association of Attorneys General). So the
cases keep coming, and they tend to reach
the Court in roughly the right order--one
incremental step after another toward the
well-defined federalism objective of state
immunity against private lawsuits.
Preemption litigation presents an entirely
different picture. Here, too, the states are
repeat players. But they (and their trial
lawyer clientele) will insist on their
parochial advantages. Balkanization suits
them just fine, and they will actively resist
any move toward legal doctrines that
forestall that result. Corporations, for
their part, rarely look beyond the
immediate case at hand and are in any
event compelled to argue within the
confines of the extant, confused law. To
expect coordination and strategic sense
from that quarter is to hope against
evidence and logic.
The one institution that could provide
guidance and a broader view is the U.S.
Department of Justice--specifically, the
Office of the Solicitor General. The
solicitor general participates in every
preemption case, and since those cases
turn on the interpretation of federal
who present the
arguments with
Unfortunately,
forthcoming.
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statutes, his views are accorded special
weight. Lo, the Bush administration has
taken a somewhat consistent stand on
federalism issues. Unfortunately, though,
it is a shade to the left of Justice Souter.
In entitlement and sovereign immunity
cases, the solicitor general's office has
often taken a remarkably nationalist
position. In Gonzaga Uniesity u Do, for
example, the office pointedly distanced
the administration from the states' brief
and articulated a minimally federalist,
plaintiff-friendly position that the
Supreme Court held a decade ago--and
has since modified, in a more state-
friendly direction in case after case
(including, as it turned out, in Gonzaga
Uniwsity). One might attribute that stance
to the solicitor general's traditional duty
and institutional inclination to defend
federal supremacy and, to that end, to
afford congressional statutes a broad
sweep. But that fails to explain why the
administration has, in preemption cases,
defended an exceedingly narrow view of
federal authority.
In Rush Pnwientral the administration's
antipreemption position was too
expansive even for Justice Souter, who
wrote for the antipreemption Supreme
Court majority in that case. The
administration's brief in Sprietsrn avows
that the Coast Guard never intended to
preempt design defect suits under state
tort law and moves on to a preemption
doctrine that amounts to a trial lawyers'
bill of rights. A mealy-mouthed solicitor
general brief in PhRMA conceded that the
lower court "almost certainly" erred in
finding the Maine Rx program consistent
with the federal Medicaid statute--and still
urged the Court to let the lower court's
ruling stand. Now that the Court has
agreed to hear the case--despite the
administration's urging to deny review--
the solicitor general may well disavow his
earlier qualms and endorse Maine Rx.
(Call it an 8 on the prediction scale.) In
the Kentucky "all willing provider" case,
the administration's brief observes that
the wisdom of such legislation "can
certainly be debated" and urges "that the
permissible scope and limits of state
authority in this area be defined." Instead
of assisting in that task, however, the brief
proposes to urshadle state authority from
ERISA preemption.
While the administration will occasionally
get a case right (for example, when the
feds' own money, rather than the states' or
corporate America's, is on the table),[7]f
the administration has on the whole
adopted litigation positions that promote
nationalization and regulatory
balkanization at the same time. No
plausible reason explains why a
probusiness administration would throw a
case like Sprietsnu--of potentially
enormous precedential value in a large
number of regulatory contexts--to the trial
lawyers. In other instances, a possible
explanation can be found--outside the
solicitor general's office, in White House
policy.
To wage war against terrorism, the
administration believes that it must avoid
undue strife and challenges at the
domestic front. That often means
pacifying noisy constituencies, especially
those that might swing closely contested
states and districts. That is how we got an
education "reform" written by Senator
1 [Some footnotes have been omitted, the
remaining have been renumbered, Ed.] A
proplaintiff outcome in Norfolk & Wtem Railway
v Ans (the asbestos emotional distress case on
next term's docket) might expose the federal
government to substantial liabilities.
The government's brief in support of the
defendant petitioner prominently mentions that
consideration.
Edward Kennedy and the National
Education Association, a farm bill of
European proportions, and a steel tariff.
Like John Wayne, the administration
protects its back by sitting up against the
wall--except it never shoots the evildoers
who barge in through the barroom door.
It buys them a drink.
Against that backdrop, the
Department's take on the health
Justice
care and
pharmaceutical cases makes sense.
Powerful constituencies, including the
states, holler for more benefits at lower
costs. An insistence on the states'
Medicaid obligations and on traditional
preemption doctrines under ERISA
would increase political pressure on
Congress and on the administration to
"do something" about prescription drug
prices and HMOs. That would force the
administration to underwrite yet another
expensive program or else explain to the
voters why the answer is no--at a political
cost that is deemed intolerable. The path
of least resistance is to let the rapacious
interests run not in the states. The
solicitor general is just the guy to perform
that maneuver--because he can and
because nobody notices when he does.
That calculus would be irresponsible, even
if nothing more than the small matter of
the nation's health care system hung in the
balance. Preemption, however, ultimately
involves the larger question whether we
really want to hand the trial lawyers--and
the state judges and politicians they have
bought and paid for--the keys to the
national economy. The answer should be
obvious. The solicitor general's office is
no place to launch a federalism or any
other revolution. Neither, however, need
the tenth justice limp behind, let alone
impede, the constitutional procession that
may at long last be getting on its way. [... ]
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Michael S. Greve is the director of the Federalism Project at AEI.
Federal Boating Law Kills State Suit over Accident
Chicago Daily La w Bulletin
August 16, 2001
Daniel C. Vock
A man whose wife died in a boating
accident is precluded by federal law from
bringing a wrongful-death action against a
boat motor manufacturer in state court,
the Illinois Supreme Court decided
Thursday.
The woman, Jeanne Sprietsma, was riding
in an 18-foot ski boat in Tennessee in July
1995, when she fell out of the boat and
was struck by the propeller blades of a
115-horsepower outboard motor.
The motor was manufactured and sold by
Mercury Marine, a division of the
Brunswick Corp. She died as a result of
the injunes.
Sprietsma's husband sued Mercury
Marine, alleging that the motor was
defectively designed because it did not
include propeller guards. Mercury Marine
argued successfully before a Cook County
trial judge and an appeals court panel that
Rex R Sprietsma was barred from
bringing an action in state court under the
Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971.
In its decision Thursday, the high court
also found that the federal law preempts
Sprietsma's common-law claims.
Justice Rita B. Garman wrote for the five-
justice majority that the claims were
impliedly preempted, because allowing the
claim would stand "as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the purposes and
objectives Congress sought to achieve in
enacting the FBSA"
Under the act, Congress gave the Coast
Guard the authority to make rules
governing boat safety. In 1988, the year
when the motor was manufactured, the
Coast Guard considered whether to issue
a rule requiring propeller guards.
The Coast Guard decided against issuing
such a rule because the available data did
not support the need for that regulation.
The majority on the high court relied on a
1983 U.S. Supreme Court case that stated
"a federal decision to forego regulation in
a given area may imply an authoritative
federal determination that the area is best
left unregulated, and in that event would
have as much preemptive force as a
decision to regulate." Arkansas Electric
Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public
Service Commission, 461 U.S. 375, 76
L.Ed.2d 1, 103 S.Ct. 1905 (1983).
The majority also emphasized that federal
courts were unanimous in barring other
propeller guard cases after finding the
federal law preempted state actions.
"Uniformity of decision is an important
consideration when state courts interpret
federal statutes," Garman wrote for the
majority.
"Uniformity is particularly important
where, as here, the federal statute relates
to a product that is inherently mobile and
thus likely to move from state to state ...
Boats also frequently navigate in lakes or
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rivers that mark the boundary between
two states. Thus, it is essential that a
uniform body of law be developed," she
wrote.
Chief Justice Moses W. Harrison II
dissented. He claimed the majority's
analysis gave too much deference to
federal appeals courts and placed too high
a priority on uniformity. "Uniformity is no
virtue if it means being uniformly wrong,"
he wrote.
Harrison also claimed that the savings
clause in the FBSA allowed claims like
Sprietsma's to go forward in state courts.
Similar cases were allowed to go forward
in Texas and Missouri, he noted.
"Indeed, it is difficult to see how
Congress' intention to preserve such tort
claims could have been expressed any
more explicitly," Harrison wrote.
Justice Robert R. Thomas took no part.
Chicago attorney John B. Kralovec of
Kralovec, Jambois & Schwartz
represented Sprietsma in the case.
Mercury Marine's local attorneys included
Stephen M. Shapiro of Mayer, Brown &
Platt, Michael J. Cucco of Cassidy, Schade
& Gloor and Gary W. Klages of Thomas
& Persin.
None of the attorneys could be reached
immediately for comment Thursday
afternoon.
The case is Rex R Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, No. 89492.
Copyright © 2001 Law Bulletin
Publishing Company
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Case Summary: Justice Department, ATLA Say Boat Motor Claim Not Preempted
Pwducts Liability Litigation Reporter
May 24, 2002
A man seeking to sustain a state law
design defect suit against the
manufacturer of an outboard boat motor
has received support from the U.S. Justice
Department, the American Trial Lawyers
Association and several state attorneys
general in his attempt to have the U.S.
Supreme Court rule that the action is not
federally preempted by the Boating Safety
Act of 1971. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
et al., No. 01-706, amicus curiae briefs
filed (U.S., 29-MAR-02).
In three separately filed amicus briefs,
each argued that Rex R Sprietsma should
be allowed to pursue his common-law
negligence suit against Mercury Marine
and parent Brunswick Corp. in Illinois
state court, rejecting the defendants' claim
that the action is preempted because the
authority to regulate outboard motor
design rests with the U.S. Coast Guard.
Sprietsma filed suit claiming that his wife's
death in a 1995 boating accident was
largely due to the failure of Mercury
Marine to include a propeller guard on the
motor powering the pleasure boat from
which she fell. Although the
manufacturers successfully obtained an
Illinois Supreme Court decision that the
action was impliedly preempted by the
Boating Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C.
Section 4301, Sprietsma succeeded in
getting the U.S. Supreme Court to accept
the question.
In his petition, Sprietsma said the high
court had previously accepted the
question in 1997 in a case that settled
before a ruling was issued: Lewis v.
Brunswick Corp., 522 U.S. 978 (1997).
As it did in Lewis, the Justice Department
has again submitted an amicus brief in
support of the plaintiff's position that the
case should proceed because Sprietsma's
claims are not preempted by either the
BSA or the Coast Guard's 1990 decision
not to promulgate a regulation requiring
propeller guards. That sentiment was
echoed in the anicus briefs entered on
Sprietsma's behalf by ATLA and the
attorneys general from 17 states, including
California, Missouri and Hawaii.
In its brief, the Justice Department
observed that while the BSA "categorically
preempts state prescriptive laws and
regulations establishing recreational vessel
performance and safety standards unless
[federally authorized] or identical to an
existing federal standard," a saving clause
permits common-law actions. That clause,
the agency said, "makes clear that
petitioner's suit is not foreclosed either by
the act's express preemption provision or
by principles of field preemption."
Sprietsma's suit is also not foreclosed by
implied conflict preemption principles, the
Justice Department said.
"The fact that the Coast Guard focused
upon the issue and made a considered
decision not to take regulatory action to
require propeller guards in 1990 does not,
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in and of itself, give rise to an inference
that state law is preempted," the agency
said.
It describes as "lacking merit" Mercury
Marine's claims that the imposition of
common-law damages liability here would
be inconsistent with the Coast Guard's
reasons for declining to adopt a propeller
guard requirement after extensively
researching the issue.
ATLA told the Supreme Court that
"congressional intent to pre-empt state
positive law or regulation does not
ordinarily extend to preemption of
product liability actions in the absence of
a plain statement of intent to do so."
The state attorneys general added that the
presumption against federal statutory
preemption of state common-law claims
plays a "critical federalism role in
protecting the police powers of the
states."
Copyright @ 2002 Andrews Publications
422
01-1229 Pierce County v. Guillen
Ruling Below: (Guillen v. Pierce County, Wash. Sup.Ct., 144 Wn.2d 696, 31 P.3d 628,
2001 Wash. Lexis 622)
The court found that Guillen had standing as the sovereignty of states is protected for the
benefit of the people, not the state governments. The court held the state law at issue did
not prevent release of the documents during pretrial discovery. It also held that the 1995
amendment to the federal statute prohibited the release of the same documents at any point,
including pretrial discovery, and thus was unconstitutional because the amendment had no
grounding in any Congressional power.
Questions Presented: (1) Does a federal statute that protects information collected in
connection with federal highway safety programs from being brought out in discovery or
trial a valid exercise of Congress' power?
(2) Do private plaintiffs have standing to assert Tenth Amendment claims in the name of
state's rights when the state itself accepts the Federal statute at issue.
Ignacio GUILLEN, as legal guardian for Jennifer GUILLEN and Alma GUILLEN,
minors; et al., Respondents,
V.
PIERCE COUNTY, a municipal corporation; et al., Petitioners.
Supreme Court of Washington
Decided September 13, 2001
BRIDGE, Justice:
FACTS
[Guillen's wife was killed in an automobile
accident at an intersection that had been
identified by the county as especially
dangerous. The county filed for federal
hazard elimination funds to fix the
intersection, but the request was denied
until after Guillen's accident.
Guillen requested access to documents
recording the accident history of the
intersection. His attorney made clear that
they were seeking only documents
containing facts, not official opinion
about the safety of the intersection. The
county denied the request on the grounds
that the materials were privileged under 23
U.S.C. § 409 and state law.
Guillen appealed the decision, and filed a
separate tort action against the County for
negligence leading to his wife's death.
The county again invoked federal and
state law to declare the information
privileged.
Another case before the court, Whitrrr,
had a similar fact pattern and was
consolidated with the Guillen case.]
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ANALYSIS
[The court first addressed the state law
issue. It held that the accident reports
were not subject to public disclosure
solely on the basis of the state's Public
Disclosure Act. The records were made
confidential (with some exceptions) by
state law. State law also precludes the use
of these records as evidence at trial.
However, the court held that there was no
state law exempting these records from
pretrial discovery - the time at which the
records in this case were requested.]
II
Secondly, we examine petitioners' claim
that the accident reports and other
materials and data in Cuilen and Whitn-Er
were "compiled or collected" pursuant to
23 U.S.C. 5 152 such that they would be
covered by the federal privilege
established by 23 U.S.C. § 409 as amended
by Congress in 1995. The burden of
showing that a privilege applies in any
given situation rests entirely upon the
entity asserting the privilege. Odlen u
Knudizon, 65 Wn.2d 157, 396 P.2d 148
(1964).
[23 U.S.C. 409 provides that data
collected for improving roads which may
utilize Federal funds for construction shall
not be subject to discovery or used as
evidence by state or federal courts for
issues ansing out of damages at such
locations.
Congress had required states to assess
dangerous roads in written reports, with
the unintended effect of providing
ammunition for plaintiffs filing tort
actions against local governments.
Congress enacted 5 409 in 1987 to remedy
the situation. Courts construed this
narrowly to apply only to reports created
solely for the purpose of applying for
federal funding. Congress amended § 409
in 1995 to prohibit the use of any raw data
that might go into such a report. Most
state courts have accepted Congress'
amendment, though some have still
sought to find ways around it.]
Based upon these sworn declarations in
the record, the accident reports, photos,
collision diagrams, and other related
materials and "raw data" sought by the
respondents in these consolidated cases
would appear to be waied by 5 409 as
amended in 1995. We simply cannot
accept the Court of Appeals' distinction in
Guilen between collections of traffic and
accident related materials and raw data "as
held" by Pierce County's Public Works
Departrrent, a local government agency
involved in "section 152 activity," and
collections of traffic and accident related
materials and raw data "as held" by Pierce
County's Sherfs (fiue, which the court
presumed was in no way involved in
"section 152 activity." 96 Wn. App. at 871.
We find such a distinction unsound in
principle and unworkable in practice.
Applying § 409 only to accident reports
"as held" by one agency of a local
government but not "as held" by another,
and only to copi of a report but not to
ongials, is also unsound and unworkable
given the fact that such legal distinctions
are already being rendered meaningless by
the electronic revolution underway.
Under the Court of Appeals' approach, * *
information technology would soon
create a situation that the Court of
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Appeals itself recognized as "absurd,"
namely, "giv[ing] the County carte blanche
to render immune from discovery every
accident report related to a public road
within its territory[.]" Gui/en, 96 Wn. App.
at 872.
III
[W]e consider whether the 1995
amendment to 23 U.S.C. 5 409 is
constitutional and thus enforceable in
state and federal courts, a question
requiring analysis of federal preemption of
state law, private parties' standing to raise
federalist challenges, and the limits of
Congressional power.
(a) Express Preemption: There is a strong
presumption against federal preemption
of state police powers [... ] Still, "that
presumption can be overcome if Congress
intends that the federal law preempt state
law." All- Pure Chem Ca v White, 127
Wn.2d 1, 5, 896 P.2d 697 (1995).
Here, Congress clearly intended that the §
409 privilege preempt state laws and court
rules governing pretrial discovery and the
admissibility of evidence at trial.
** *
However, state law cannot be preempted
by an unconstitutional federal law.
* * *
(b) Standing: We next consider the issue
of standing. Several courts have
recognized, explicitly or implicitly, that
private parties have standing to challenge
the constitutionality of federal laws on
federalist grounds, even when not joined
by a state government.
The Constitution does not protect the
sovereignty of States for the benefit of the
States or state governments as abstract
political entities, or even for the benefit of
the public officials governing the States.
To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of
individuals.
Where Congress exceeds its authority
relative to the States, therefore, the
departure from the constitutional plan
cannot be ratified by the "consent" of
state officials. * * [We therefore] hold
that private respondents are not deprived
of standing to challenge the
constitutionality of a federal law on
federalism grounds simply because state
officials oppose the challenge.
(c) Enumerated Powers:
[The court recounted the history of the
federalist system in the United States.]
While duly enacted federal legislation is
presumed constitutional, that presumption
can be rebutted "upon a plain showing
that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds." Unitd State u
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 120 S. Ct.
1740, 146 L. Ed. 2d 658 (2000). We
therefore evaluate whether Congress acted
outside its enumerated powers when it
amended 23 U.S.C. 5 409 in 1995. The
petitioners argue that Congress had the
power to enact the 1995 amendment
under the Spending Clause, the
Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and
Proper Clause.
(1) Spending Clause: The Spending Clause
entitles Congress "to pay the debts and
425
provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States." U.S.
Const. art. I, 5 8, cl. 1. Over the years,
Congress has often sought to influence
state behavior by conditioning the receipt
of federal funds upon behavioral changes.
The United States Supreme Court has
declared such a practice constitutional, se
Unitd States u Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66, 56 S.
Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477 (1936), pnided
Congress' conditions are "relevant" and
"reasonably related" to a valid federal
interest in a speafrc national project or
program. South Dakota u Dde, 483 U.S.
203, 208, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 97 L. Ed. 2d
171 (1987).
[First,] the exercise of the spending power
must be in pursuit of "the general
welfare." In considering whether a
particular expenditure is intended to serve
general public purposes, courts should
defer substantially to the judgment of
Congress. Second, we have required that
if Congress desires to condition the States'
receipt of federal funds, it "must do so
unambiguously . . . ." Third, our cases
have suggested (without significant
elaboration) that conditions on federal
grants might be illegitimate if they are
unrelated "to the federal interest in
particular national projects or programs."
Massachusetts v United States, 435 U.S. 444,
461[, 98 S. Ct. 1153, 1164, 55 L. Ed. 2d
403] (1978) (plurality opinion).
The petitioners rely on the Spending
Clause as a source of congressional
authority to enact 23 U.S.C. § 409. In
Matindid, cited supra, 2001 Wash. LEXIS
622, *34, the Louisiana Court of Appeals
applied the Dde Court's four-part test and
concluded that 5 409 was authorized
under the Spending Clause:
A state's regulation of its court system is
in our opinion as fundamental a function
of its sovereignty as the normal exercise
of its police power even in matters
concerning the health and safety of its
citizens. Congress' intrusion, in this
instance, however, is constitutionally
permissible because Louisiana's
participation in the federal funding
scheme is voluntary-, because the
improvement of state highways with
federal funds is in pursuit of "[providing]
for the general welfare" as provided in
U.S. Const. Art. I, S 8, cl. 1 ("spending
power"); because it is clear that
participation in the funding program
requires acquiescence to the intrusion;
and, finally, because the intrusion is
related to a valid federal interest
(inasmuch as 23 U.S.C. 5 409 encourages
participation in a scheme that ensures, by
priontization, deliberative spending of
federal funds).
Martindich, 532 So. 2d at 438 (citing Dde,
483 U.S. at 207-08). The Martindich court,
though, was asked to analyze Congress'
power to enact 23 U.S.C. 5 409 in its p&-
1995 form, when by its own terms the
privilege applied only to materials
specifically "corpila" or created, pursuant
to 55 130, 144, and 152. The connection
to a federal purpose was therefore clear:
but-for the federal mandates, such materials
would not exist. Here, by contrast, we
must decide whether the Spending Clause
authorizes Congress to bar state courts
from permitting discovery of accident
reports and other traffic and accident
materials and data prepared for state and
local purposes, simply because those
publicly held materials are also "collected"
and used for federal purposes. We
conclude that it does not.
While the Spending Cause entitles
Congress to offer states the option of
accepting federal funds "with strings
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attached"--even when those "strings"
interfere with the basic functioning of
state government, as they do here--the
United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that Congress may do so only if
those "strings" are also firmly "attached"
to a legitimate federal interest in a specific
federal project or program. See Dde, 483
U.S. at 208. We find that no valid federal
interest in the operation of the federal
safety enhancement program is reasonably
served by barring the admissibility and
discovery in state court of accident reports
and other traffic and accident materials
and "raw data" that were originally
prepared for routine state and local
purposes, simply because they are
"collected," for, an"rg other rasom,
pursuant to a federal statute for federal
purposes.
(2) Commerce Clause:
[The court reviewed the evolution of the
Commerce Clause doctrine in the
Supreme Court. The court set forth the
nexus requirement from United State5 u
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), as granting
Congress the power to regulate activities
having a substantial relation to (i.e., a
substantial effect on) interest commerce.]
Certainly, a sufficient nexus exists
between interstate commerce and the
Federal-aid highway system to justify the
"regulatory scheme when considered as a
whole." Halel, 452 U.S. at 329 n.17.
However, under Halel, we must also
determine whether the "challenged
provisions are an integral part of the
regulatory program." Id As discussed
above, § 409 in its pre-1995 form was
evidently designed to protrte adnistratiw
candor in the application for, and
implementation of, federal safety
enhancement funds, Coniker, 695 N.Y.S.2d
at 495; Roxtson, 954 F.2d at 1435, and to
prevent federal mandates "from providing
an additional, virtually no-work tool, for
direct use in private litigation." Light, 560
N.Y.S.2d at 965 (emphasis added). It is
therefore entirely reasonable that the
privilege should cover "reports,"
"surveys," "schedules," "lists" and "data"
that would not exist bt-for 23 U.S.C.
130, 144, and 152. See YarnlrE, 890 P.2d at
614. However, we fail to see how those
vital federal purposes are reasonably
served by also barring the discovery and
admissibility in state court of routinely
prepared state and local traffic and
accident materials and data that would
exist even had a federal safety
enhancement program never been created,
such as collision photographs, traffic
counts, citizen complaint letters, and "raw
data" relating to the history of a local
traffic intersection. Such a broad privilege
lacks the requisite nexus to 5 409's raison
d'etre and cannot reasonably be
characterized as an "integral part" of the
Federal-aid highway system's regulation.
Hael, 452 U.S. at 328 n.17-
* *L *
[(3) Necessary and Proper Clause: ]
Pierce County claims that Congress had
the power to amend 5 409 as it did in
1995, "because, in order to encourage
states to identify roads in need of Hazard
Elimination funds, it deemed it necessary
to protect raw data collected or compiled
in making that evaluation from being used
against municipalities in highway accident
litigation." Pierce County's Suppl. Br.
(Guillen) at 12. But while the federal
government enjoys authority to require
state courts to enforce a federal privilege
protecting materials that would not have
been created but-for federal mandates
suck as those in S5 130, 144, and 152, we
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conclude that it was neither "necessary"
nor "proper" for Congress in 1995 to
extend that privilege to traffic and
accident materials and raw data created
and collected for state and local purposes,
simply because they are also collected and
used for federal purposes.
Unconstitutional Violation of State
Sovereignty While Congress was
authorized under its enumerated powers
to enact 23 U.S.C § 409 in its p-1995
form, we find that its 1995 amendment of
that statute cannot be characterized as a
valid exercise of any power
constitutionally delegated to the federal
government. Absent a valid and
compelling federal interest, which
petitioners have not identified here,
Congress fundamentally lacks authority to
intrude upon state sovereignty by barring
state and local courts from admitting into
evidence or allowing pretrial discovery of
routinely created traffic and accident
related materials and "raw data" created
and held by state and local governments
and essential to the proper adjudication of
claims brought under state and local law,
simply because such collections also serve
federal purposes.
We therefore hold that the federal
privilege created by § 409 lawfully applies
only to "reports," "surveys," "schedules,"
"lists" and "data" that are ongially
"compiled"--i.e., created, composed,
recorded--for the spefic purpose of
identifying, evaluating, or planning the
safety enhancement of potential accident
sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or
railway-highway crossings, pursuant to
sections 130, 144, and 152 of this title, or
for the purpose of developing any
highway safety construction improvement
project which may be implemented
utilizing Federal-aid highway funds.
CONCLUSION
While RCW 46.52.080 bars Guillen from
securing public disclosure of accident
reports prepared by persons involved in
prior accidents at the same intersection,
the statute does not prohibit their pretrial
discovery. Moreover, only publicly held
materials and data that were originally
vatd for the identification, evaluation,
planning, or development of federally
funded safety enhancement projects under
23 U.S.C §5 130, 144, or 152 are lawfully
privileged under 23 U.S.C 5 409, and thus
also exempt from public disclosure under
RCW 42.17.310(). Because the record
contains insufficient facts to apply this
standard to all of the disputed items, we
vacate the lower courts' rulings and
remand for supplementation of the record
and further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
MADSEN, Justice; concurring:
Privileges are the exception, not the rule,
and therefore, they are "not lightly created
nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for the truth."
Unital State v Nixan, 418 U.S. 683, 710,
94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974 ) .
Today our court sidesteps this admonition
and construes 23 U.S.C. 5 409 in a
sweeping manner, far beyond that
intended and, most importantly, dictated
by Congress. While I concur in the result
of the majority, I do so only because the
majority, not entirely comfortable with its
own result, determined that its oun
interetation of 5 409 exceeds Congress'
authority under the Tenth Amendment,
and therefore, refused to enforce its own
expansive interpretation.
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In 1995, Congress added the term
"collected" to 5 409, thus making
inadmissible in court, those materials
"compiled or collected" for purposes of 5
152. Congress was clear in its intent
regarding this amendment:
This section amends section 409 of title
23 to clarify that data "collected" for
safety reports or surveys shall not be
subject to discovery or admitted into
evidence in Federal or State court
proceedings.
This clarification is included in response
to recent State court interpretations of the
term "data compiled" in the current
section 409 of title 23. It is intended that
raw data collected prior to being made
part of any formal or bound report shall
not be subject to discovery or admitted
into evidence in a Federal or State court
proceeding or considered for other
purposes in any action for damages arising
from any occurrence at a location
mention[ed] or addressed in such data.
H.R. Rep. 104-246 § 328, at 59 (1995) .
I agree with the majority that this
amendment was intended to make a
"change" in 5 409. Majority at 22; Sw
Hore Indem Ca v McClellan Motom, Ic, 77
Wn.2d 1, 3, 459 P.2d 389 (1969 ).
However, I disagree with the majority as
to the import of that change. Under the
majority's holding, original police reports
prepared for purposes unrelated to 5 152,
become privileged, even in the hands of
the party that created them, once they
have been "collected" by any entity for
purposes of § 152. Majority at 22.
Contrary to the majority's assertions, this
was not the result intended by Congress,
nor is it a holding dictated by any
decisional law.
[The concurrence asserted that the
purpose of 5 409 was to encourage candid
evaluation of highway safety hazards
without giving civil plaintiffs the benefit
of federally required documentation for
any litigation. The concurrence argued
that the 1995 amendment was aimed at
unduly narrow court rulings that limited §
409 specifically to materials already in
reports, not even extending the privilege
to materials collected in preparation of
filing an application. The plaintiffs in
these cases were not seeking information
or reports from their original sources.]
By preventing a litigant from gaining
access to information that has been
"collected" for purposes of securing
federal funding, Congress has made the
litigant no better off than they would have
been had the State not participated in the
funding program, which is the obvious
goal of 5 409. However, if, as the majority
suggests, Congress has prevented a litigant
from having access to original reports
from their original sources, prepared for
purposes unrelated to securing federal
funding, then a litigant would be in a far
worse position than if the State did not
participate in the funding program. I do
not believe that was the result intended by
Congress, nor do I believe it is dictated by
the language of 5 409.
A narrow construction of 5 409 is also
supported by several rules of statutory
interpretation. The first is that there is a
strong presumption against federal
preemption, requiring a showing that this
is "the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Rie v Santa Fe E/zutor Cop.,
331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 91 L.
Ed. 1447 (1947). Second, privileges are to
be narrowly construed, as they stand in
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"derogation of the search for truth."
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710; see Trarnnl uv
United State, 445 U.S. 40, 51, 100 S. Ct.
906, 63 L. Ed. 2d 186 (1980) .
Finally, this Court should be mindful that
"where a statute is susceptible of more
than one interpretation, some of which
may render it unconstitutional, the court
will adopt a construction which sustains
the statute's constitutionality, if at all
possible." State ec ni Faulk u CSG Job
Ctr, 117 Wn.2d 493, 500, 816 P.2d 725
(1991) . The majority holds that Congress
does not have the authority, as a result of
the Tenth Amendment, to enact a
provision as sweeping as the majority
believes § 409 and its subsequent
amendment were intended to be.
Because the record before this Court does
not permit us to accurately determine
whether the disputed documents would
be privileged under the correct
interpretation of § 409, like the majority, I
would remand for further proceedings.
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Supreme Court to Clarify Privacy Rights in Wash State Case
Associated Press
April 29, 2002
Gina Holland
The Supreme Court said Monday it will
decide whether states can keep secret
information about traffic accidents
collected as part of a federal highway
safety law.
[The] Justices will decide if a county in
Washington state has to turn over records
to families suing over serious accidents.
The ruling, expected next year, will affect
governments in every state and determine
if officials have to admit they knew an
intersection might be dangerous. The
records are being sought mainly as part of
lawsuits over wrecks.
The Washington Supreme Court had said
a federal law allowing the withholding of
records is unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court blocked the ruling earlier this year,
until it could look at arguments from all
sides.
Lawyers for Pierce County, Wash., said if
the state ruling is not overturned, "the
state's federal funding for elimination of
roadway hazards and its citizens' safety
both (will be) jeopardized, and bedrock
principles of federalism dangerously
undermined."
A dozen states, including Washington,
argued that they need to be able to know
that information collected about
dangerous intersections will not be later
used in lawsuits against them. If they
don't, they may not gather the
information, the court was told.
Information required by the Federal
Highway Act "has spawned a kind of tort
litigation against states that is enabled
almost solely by this data," Washington
Attorney General Christine Gregoire told
the Supreme Court in a separate filing.
The case involves two car accidents at
different busy intersections in Pierce
County, which is home to Tacoma. In one
of the accidents, a woman was killed, and
two sisters suffered brain injuries in the
second.
Pierce County refused to release
information on the intersections, as part
of lawsuits over the wrecks, and said the
federal law allowed them to withhold
information on traffic accidents and
complaints about the intersections.
The county had identified the fatal
accident site as a dangerous intersection
but had been turned down for federal
funds to improve it. Funding was
approved three weeks after the 1996
wreck
Besides Washington, the other states
urging the court to take the case were
Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana,
Louisiana, Ohio, Oregon, Nebraska,
Nevada, Vermont, and West Virginia.
Lawyers who want the information told
the Supreme Court that some of the
contested information was collected under
state laws. They also said Washington
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La. Appealing Ruling Ordering Disclosure in Road Hazard Suits
The Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.)
April 24, 1994
Bruce Schultz
The state is asking the U.S. Supreme
Court to consider a challenge of the
Louisiana Supreme Court's controversial
interpretation of a federal law that has
stirred up a legal firestorm.
The law under scrutiny is aimed at limiting
the use of government-compiled safety
information for plaintiffs who sue the
state in accident cases involving highways,
railroads and bridges.
Government officials contend the statute,
Title 23, Section 409 of the U.S. Code,
was intended to allow candid
administrative evaluations of traffic safety
problems in federally required programs.
Personal injury attorneys argue that the
law shields state governments and railway
companies from liability by preventing
discovery of damaging information.
In November, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, ruling on appeals from Livingston
and Calcasieu parishes, concluded that the
law prevents the state from having to
provide its conclusive studies and reports
on safety problems, but that raw data used
in those reports had to be released to
plaintiffs. The court's ruling was made in
what is commonly referred to in legal
circles as the Wiedeman case, named after
one of the Livingston Parish plaintiffs.
The state Supreme Court decided that
accident reports, traffic counts and other
raw data collected by DOTD are
admissible. The court determined that
plaintiffs' attorneys cannot obtain or use
survey results identifying hazardous
railroad crossings, bridges and highways,
nor can they get information about
recommended improvements and
applications for federal funds for bridge
rehabilitation and "other compilations
made for developing highway safety
construction projects which would utilize
federal aid funds. "
State attorneys are appealing that decision
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Baton Rouge attorney Ronald Seale, an
assistant attorney general who filed the
writ with the U.S. Supreme Court earlier
this month on the state's behalf, said he
isn't sure when the high court will decide
if it will consider the case. The high court
has the option of not considering the case,
allowing the state Supreme Court's
decision to remain intact.
Seale believes the state Supreme Court
erred by allowing plaintiffs access to raw
data. In other states where the federal law
was challenged, courts determined that the
data was off-limits, he said.
"We believe the great majority of the cases
look to the front end," he said. He said
the state contends that data are off limits
if gathered by DOTD to comply with the
requirements to conduct safety surveys
under federal mandates.
Plaintiffs' attorneys Tim Breaux of
Lafayette and Leonard Davis of New
Orleans learned about the workings of 23
USC 409 during efforts to get information
from the state in a lawsuit filed on behalf
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of an Acadian Ambulance Service
emergency medical technician, Pat Landry.
While speeding to an emergency call in
November 1988, the ambulance Landry
was riding in ran into the path of a Union
Pacific train in rural Acadia Parish. The
plaintiff's attorneys contended that
vegetation growing along the track
obscured motorists' view of an oncoming
train.
After the suit was filed, Landry's attorneys
tried to get information from the state and
railroad company through the routine
legal process of discovery, asking for a
number of items, including accident rates
at the crossing, and records of grass
cutting at the site. The state and railroad
company refused.
"The answer I got: 409," Davis recalled.
"It's just a cavalier attitude: We're the
government, and we don't have to give
you anything.
"Just think, if we never knew Pintos
exploded, Ford would still be selling
Pintos," he said.
Davis had to appeal lower courts'
decisions to the state Supreme Court,
which agreed that the material should be
accessible to the plaintiff, based on a
previous ruling of Martinolich vs.
Southern Pacific.
The issue of whether the data could be
used in trial was not before the court in
the Landry case, however. That came later
in the Wiedeman case, which also
expanded what plaintiffs could obtain
from the state.
Breaux said the federal law frustrates
attorneys, but more importantly it also has
the potential of preventing their clients
from getting justice.
"People lose sight that those who are
injured are our fellow human beings,"
Breaux said. "What you're up against there
is this bureaucracy hiding behind 409. It's
just not fair.
"Go look at my client and tell me he's not
entitled to know about that crossing,"
Breaux said.
Breaux said his client suffered massive
head injuries and he is classified as an
incomplete paraplegic with no chance of
ever walking again. He has lost the use of
his left arm, is legally blind and was able
to stop using a feeding tube only after
getting into a New Orleans rehabilitation
center last year, according to Breaux, who
is amazed that Landry didn't die from the
injuries.
"How he survived I'll never know,"
Breaux said.
Landry's attorneys settled with the railroad
company recently for $ 11 million. A
settlement with the state is pending.
Charles Soileau, a Rayne attorney who
defends the state in highway and railroad
litigation, said 23 USC 409 was enacted
after highway departments in several
states complained that the federally
required studies imposed on states to
receive federal highway funds opened the
door to litigation.
"They said, 'Look, if you're going to
mandate that we do these studies, we
don't want to be hit over the head with
them,' " he said.
"It's designed to promote an earnest effort
to locate hazards," he said. "It's designed
to create an atmosphere where the state
can freely go in and make an honest
assessment. "
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Soileau said the law has been under attack
in 11 other states.
"To me, from reading decisions from the
other 11 jurisdictions, the state Supreme
Court's ruling is an anomaly," he said. "It
is certainly the least restnictive
interpretation I have seen. "
Lafayette attorney Barry Sallinger became
acquainted with the federal law during a
trial involving an accident in downtown
St. Martinville. He represented a plaintiff
involved in an accident at the intersection
of Bridge and Main streets, also two state
highways, that killed one teen-age boy and
injured three girls in 1989.
The plaintiffs contend the intersection is
unsafe because of limited visibility.
Plaintiffs' attorneys went through the
discovery process to obtain information
to support their arguments, getting much
of what they wanted from DOTD, but at
trial the state's attorneys asked the court
to prevent the use of the DOTD data,
based on 23 USC 409.
"It was like an ambush," Sallinger recalled.
"They knew about (the federal law) at
least a year and a half before our case, and
they never brought it up. "
"What they're doing is using a federal
statute to limit liability," he said.
The state sought to prevent the plaintiffs
from using police reports of accidents
occurring at the intersection, as well as
traffic counts. And the state also tried to
prevent introduction of a letter from
former state Sen. Oswald Decuir of New
Iberia to the DOTD asking for
investigation of the intersection for
possible improvements. Decuir wrote in
the letter, 18 months before the accident,
that numerous accidents have occurred at
the site.
State District Judge Paul deMahy
determined that the intersection is not
unreasonably dangerous. The 3rd Circuit
Court of Appeal disagreed, and
determined that the state is liable for a
third of the plaintiffs' damages. The case
is now on appeal to the state Supreme
Court.
Copyright @ 1994 Capital City Press
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00-1471 Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller
Ruling Below: (Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner of the
Kentucky Department of Insurance, 6th Cir., 227 F.3d 352, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 22528,
2000 FED App. 0304P (6t Cir.), 24 E.B.C 2665)
Plaintiff HMOs and a non-profit association argued that Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. %§ 304.17A-
110(3) and 304.17A-171(1)-(8) (1995) should be found preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and sought injunctive relief from their
enforcement. The court affirmed the district's judgment that the state statutes met the
common sense test in that the laws regulated insurance, and therefore were saved from
federal preemption.
Question Presented: Whether Kentucky's "any willing provider" law, which requires each
health maintenance organization (HMO) in the State to make available to its, subscribers the
services of any medical provider in its geographical region that agrees to the terms and
conditions offered by the HMO, is saved from preemption as a law that "regulates
insurance" under ERISA Section 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. 1144(b)(2)(A)?
KENTUCKY ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH PLANS, INC.; Advantage Care, Inc.;
Aetna Health Plans of Ohio, Inc.; Choicecare Health Plans, Inc.; FHP of Ohio, Inc.;
HMPK, Inc.; HPLAN, Inc.; Humana Health Plan, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
George Nichols, III, in his official capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit
Decided September 7, 2000
HOLSCHUI-H, District Judge.
I. The State Statutes
In 1994, the Kentucky General Assembly
enacted the Kentucky Health Care
Reform Act (the "Act"). The Act
contained an "Any Willing Provider"
provision that stated: "Health care benefit
plans shall not discriminate against any
provider who is located within the
geographic coverage area of the health
benefit plan and is willing to meet the
terms and conditions for participation
established by the health benefit plan."
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 5 304.17A-110(3)
(Banks-Baldwin 1995). [... ]
In April of 1997, [seven health
maintenance organizations (HMOs)] filed
suit in the Eastern District of Kentucky,
requesting that 5 304.17A-110(3) and 5
304.17A-171 (for convenience we will
collectively refer to 304.17A-110(3) and
5 304.17A-171(2) as Kentucky's "AWP"
laws) be declared, among other things,
preempted by 5 514(a) of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. 5 1144(a). Plaintiffs moved for
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partial summary judgment on the issue
and Commissioner Nichols cross-moved
for partial summary judgment as well. The
district court determined that while the
Kentucky AWP laws were related to
employee benefit plans under ERISA 5
514(a), they regulated the business of
insurance and therefore fell under the
saving clause of § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. 5
1144(b)(2)(A). The court thus granted
partial summary judgment in favor of
Commissioner Nichols and determined its
order to be final and appealable. This
appeal followed.
II. Preemption
We are required by this appeal to define
the boundaries of preemption under
ERISA § 514 (a) and (b), 29 U.S.C. 5
1144(a) and (b). Section 514(a), the
preemption provision, reads:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title
and not exempt under section 1003(b) of
this title (emphasis added).
Section 514(b) (2) (A), the "savings"
provision, reads:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B),
nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person
from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking or securities.
Section 514(b)(2)(B), the "deemer"
provision, reads:
Neither an employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title,
which is not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title (other than a plan
established primarily for the purpose of
providing death benefits), nor any trust
established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company or to be engaged in
the business of insurance or banking for
purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance
companies, insurance contracts, banks,
trust companies, or investment
companes.
The federal courts have addressed the
scope of ERISA's preemption of State law
on numerous occasions; however, the
wording of the Act combined with the
obvious federalism concerns involved
have made it difficult to discern clear
boundaries. Many courts, including the
Supreme Court, have commented on the
vexingly broad and ambiguous nature of
the provisions. [...]
[In sorting out ERISA's preemption
provision, the Supreme Court has
concluded that 5 514(a) preempts all state
laws that relate to an employee benefit
plan.] [T]o determine whether a law
"relates to" an employee benefit plan, the
Court has formulated a two part test,
under which a "law 'relates to' a covered
employee benefit plan for purposes of 5
514(a) if it [1] has a amctzion with or [2]
rence to such plan." Dillinghan 519 U.S.
at 324, 117 S. Ct. at 837, 136 L. Ed. 2d at
799 (internal quotations and citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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The district court in the case at bar relied
on the Supreme Court's decision in
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &
Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 828 n.2, 100 L.
Ed. 2d 836, 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988) in
determining whether Kentucky's AWP
statutes referred to an ERISA plan. The
district court first observed that under
Kentucky's statute, "health benefit plans"
were defined to include, among other
things, "a self-insured plan or plan
provided by a multiple employer welfare
arrangement, to the extent permitted by
ERISA." Based on this language, the court
concluded that "it is clear that the AWP
statutes 'refer to' ERISA employee benefit
plans."
While the fact that the Kentucky statutes
"refer to" ERISA employee benefit plans
is enough to potentially preempt them on
that basis alone, their "connection with"
such plans offers an alternative basis for
such preemption. [...]
Using the [Supreme Court's] "connection
with" analysis, the district court in the case
at bar determined that Kentucky/s AWP
laws had a connection with ERISA plans.
The court found that while the law did
not operate directly on ERISA plans, it
effectively required benefit plans to
purchase benefits of a certain structure,
thereby bearing indirectly but substantially
on all insured plans. As a result, the court
concluded that the AWP statutes did
more than just indirectly affect the cost of
ERISA plans; the AWP statutes mandated
benefit structures.
[We agree. The] district court in this case
was correct in finding that former 5
304.17A-110(3) (now S 304.17A-270) and
present $ 304.17A- 171 were both
"connected with" ERISA covered plans.
They not only affect the benefits available
by increasing the potential providers, they
directly affect the administration of the
plans.
The Kentucky statutes in question meet
both prongs of the "relation to" analysis
and thus are preempted, unless found to
be statutes that regulate insurance under
the savings clause of S 514(b) (2)(A).
III. Insurance Savings Clause
Having concluded that Kentucky's AWP
laws relate to ERISA covered employee
benefit plans, and are thus within the
scope of ERISA's preemption provision,
the Court must then determine whether
the laws fall within ERISA's savings
clause. The savings clause states that,
"except as provided in subparagraph (B),
nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person
from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking or securities.
" ERISA 5 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. $
1144(b)(2)(A). [... ]
The Supreme Court has endeavored to
provide guidance on what it means to
"regulate insurance." [... ] Specifically, in
determining whether Kentucky's AWP
laws are saved from preemption by
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), one must first ask
whether as a matter of common sense
they regulate insurance, and then look to
the McCarran-Ferguson factors as
checking points or guideposts to aid the
analysis. These factors are "first, whether
the practice has the effect of transferring
or spreading a policyholder's risk; second,
whether the practice is an integral part of
the policy relationship between the insurer
and the insured; and third, whether the
practice is limited to entities within the
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insurance industry." (internal citations
omitted).
The Kentucky Act meets the common
sense test in that it clearly does regulate
insurance. The fact that it includes within
its reach HMOs as well as traditional
insurance companies does not take it out
of the realm of insurance regulation. [... ]
The Kentucky AWP laws deal directly
with the relationship between insurers and
insureds under health benefit plans. They
affect restrictions by the insurers on the
number of health care providers available
to the insureds under such plans; they
increase benefits to the insureds by giving
them greater freedom to choose health
care providers under the plans; and they
are aimed at regulating this insurance
relationship. They are part of a
comprehensive subtitle of Kentucky's
insurance code regulating health benefit
plans, and they are, in our view, clearly
laws which, in a common sense view of
the matter, "regulate insurance" and thus
are saved from preemption.
Consideration of the three McCarran-
Ferguson factors used in the second step
of the analysis as "checking points" or
"guideposts" does not require a different
result. First, although certainly a debatable
issue, we [think.. ] that the first factor
"transferring or spreading the
policyholder's risk" is satisfied:
[The provision under the Kentucky
statutes in question enabling access to
providers who are willing to meet the
network's terms and conditions is a
benefit that spreads the cost component
of risk among all the insureds. Plaintiffs
rely on Group Life and Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 99 S.- Ct.
1067, 59 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1979) to
demonstrate that the first factor is not
present in this case. In Royal Drug, the
issue centered on the financial agreement
between the insurance provider and
participating pharmacies, an arrangement
which would not directly concern
policyholders. In contrast, in the case at
bar, policyholders would be concerned
with limitations on their choice of
provider. The Kentucky statutes regulate
the relationship between the insurance
company and its policyholders and,
therefore, are laws regulating the business
of insurance and the Kentucky AWP
laws.]
* * *
The second McCarran-Ferguson factor is,
in our view, unquestionably present in this
case. The ability of an insured to select a
physician of his or her choice to treat a
medical condition covered by the
insurance is an integral part of the policy
relationship between the insurer and the
insured. [...]
In Plaintiffs' view, the second factor is not
satisfied because the AWP provisions
leave the contract terms between the
insurer and the insured unaltered, the
medical risks remain the same, and even if
an insured's provider decides to join the
insured's network, the medical coverage
remains the same. While it is admittedly
true that the AWP laws do not change the
substantive terms of the insurance
coverage, it is not necessary that the
statutes do this before they can be found
to be statutes regulating insurance.
Kentucky's AWP laws do, however,
directly impact the insurer-insured
relationship because they affect
restrictions on the network of providers
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available for treatment under the plan and
they directly affect the administration of
the plan. [... ]
We also conclude that the third factor
the statute's limitations to entities within
the insurance industry - is satisfied. For
reasons stated earlier, we believe that
entities such as HMOs and self-insurers
are engaged in the business of insurance
along with the more widely recognized
and more traditional commercial
insurance companies, and that entities
acting solely as plan administrators and
not as "health insurers" are not within the
scope of the statute. [...]
IV. Conclusion
With respect to Kentuckys AWP statute,
Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated 5
304.17A-270 (Banks-Baldwin 1999), and
Kentucky's chiropractic AWP statute,
Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated 5
304.17A-171(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1999), the
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
[ ... I
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I write separately with respect to Part III
of the majority's opinion to dissent from
the majority's conclusion that Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. 5 304.17A-270 and 304.17A-
171(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) fall within
ERISA's insurance savings clause. 'I
believe that Kentucky's any willing
provider laws have little to do with
insurance and are not saved from
preemption by ERISA's Insurance Savings
Clause as they do not regulate insurance as
a matter of common sense and fail all
three of the McCarran-Ferguson factors.
I. Insurance Savings Clause
[... ] I conclude that the Kentucky AWP
laws do not meet the common sense test
because they are directed at the contracts
between benefit plans and third parties,
rather than being specifically directed at
the insurance industry. [Citation omitted.]
The laws do not change the relationship
between the insurer and insureds, as the
same medical conditions are covered after
the AWP laws as were insured before the
passage of these provisions. The
underwriting of risk, the traditional
earmark of insurance, see Group Life &
Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440
U.S. 205, 211-12, 99 S. Ct. 1067, 1073-74,
59 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1979), is in no way
affected. Insureds are not free to attend
the provider of their choice, as the AWP
laws merely require employee benefit
plans to accept previously excluded
doctors that are qualified, willing to join
the plan, and agree to abide by its terms.
Contrary to the majoritys assertions, I
believe it is also apparent that Kentucky's
AWP laws clearly target more than just
members of the insurance industry. By
their terms, Kentucky's AWP laws apply
to non-ERISA covered self-insured plans
by defining health benefit plans to include
"a self-insured plan . . . to the extent
permitted by ERISA." 5 304.17A-
100(4)(a) and 304.17A-170(1). This
definition includes self-insured plans not
regulated by ERISA, such as government
plans and church plans, which ERISA
excludes from its coverage. See 29 U.S.C.
5 1003 (b). The result is that these self-
insured plans, which, as a matter of
common sense ought to be considered as
operating outside the insurance industry,
are subject to Kentucky's AWP laws.
[Citation omitted.]
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Significantly, the AWP provisions also
apply to third parties that a self-insured
ERISA plan hires to administer its plan
benefits. [... ]
Appellees argue, and the majority agrees,
that the district court was correct in
finding that Kentucky's AWP laws spread
policyholder risk [... ]
* *
Although HMOs, HSCs, and Insurance
Companies may accept risk in some
situations, as third party administrators
they would merely be contracting to
handle paperwork and plan administration
for a self-insured ERISA plan. While
handling such administrative duties,
however, these entities would be forced
by Kentucky's AWP laws to accept any
willing provider into the plan, even
though they were not underwriting any
risk. The only risk underwritten is that
accepted by the ERISA self-insured plan,
which under the "deemer clause" of
ERISA 5 514 (b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
1144(b)(2)(B), cannot be treated as an
insurance company for the purposes of
state regulation. See FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61, 111 S. Ct. 403,
409, 112 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1990); Texas
Pharmacy Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 1039. The
common sense conclusion that can be
drawn from the AWP statute's coverage
of entities clearly operating outside of the
business of insurance is that the statute is
concerned generally with regulating
provider access to networks rather than
specifically regulating the business of
insurance. [Citation omitted.]
[...]The McCarran-Ferguson factors only
serve to reinforce my conclusion that
Kentucky's AWP laws are not saved from
preemption by ERISA 5 514(b). [...] I
begin by considering whether Kentuckys
AWP laws have the effect of transferring
or spreading policyholder risk.
I disagree with the district court's
attenuated risk spreading analysis[...]
Rather than shifting risk from
policyholders to insurers, Kentucky's
AWP statutes merely prohibit benefit
plans from excluding qualified providers
who want to join the plan's provider
network and are able to meet the plan's
requirements. The risk assumed by the
benefit plan under its policy, that the
policyholder will require medical
treatment, remains unaltered. The statute's
passage in no way alters the terms of the
policyholder's policies. The only contracts
affected are those between the benefit
plan and the providers already in the plan
network [...]
While doctors who meet the plans
qualifications may independently decide to
join the plan and the plan must accept
them, many doctors may not meet the
plan's qualifications or may have no desire
to join that particular plan. [... ] The
result is that although Kentuckys AWP
laws make it marginally more likely that a
policyholder's benefit plan network will
contain their preferred doctor, they will
still be restricted to the doctors in their
benefit plan network regardless of the
membership or nonmembership of their
preferred doctor.
Similarly, Kentucky's AWP laws have
almost no effect on the policyholder risk
that insurers must underwrite. Like Blue
Shield's unchanged obligation to cover a
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policyholder's prescriptions after entering
into the pharmacy agreements, Kentucky
insurers must cover the same medical
procedures after the AWP law as they
would have to if the AWP provision had
not been enacted. [...]
[...] The critical issue with respect to the
risk spreading prong, as well as whether
the law regulates insurance as a matter of
common sense, is whether or not the law
is related to the risks underwritten by the
insurer. * Because Kentucky's AWP
laws seek to merely regulate the "business
of insurers" by dictating how they
structure their provider networks,
irrespective of the risks they underwrite,
they should not qualify for savings clause
protection.
Moving to the second McCarran-
Ferguson factor, I consider whether
Kentucky's AWP laws affect an integral
part of the policy relationship between the
insurer and insured. The majority asserts
that the district court was correct in
finding that Kentucky's AWP laws dictate
a substantive term of the contract
between the insurer and insured and are
thus an integral part of this relationship.
As support for this proposition, the
majority again cites Stuart Circle, which
concluded that because Virginia's AWP
law affected treatment and cost (through
the same attenuated manner in which the
court concluded risk was spread) it was
integral to the insurer-insured relationship.
995 F.2d 500 at 503.
Again I find Stuart Circle unconvincing.
The effect of Kentucky's AWP laws
center on the insurer-provider
relationship. The terms of the insurer-
insured relationship are only affected in a
very indirect manner, making it difficult to
see the AWP laws as integral to that
relationship. [Citations omitted.] [... ]
[... ] Kentucky's AWP provisions leave the
contract terms between the insurer and
insured unaltered. [... ] Kentucky's AWP
laws do not force the insurer to offer a
benefit to insureds that was not available
before the law. Rather, Kentucky's AWP
laws merely force insurers to potentially
make additional contractual arrangements
with providers they might otherwise
exclude. The medical conditions covered
remain unaffected and the insureds are
still limited to the plan's network of
providers. Therefore, I must conclude that
Kentucky's AWP law is not integral to the
insured-insurer relationship.
Finally, I consider whether the Kentucky
AWP laws are limited to entities within
the insurance industry. As discussed under
the common sense test, I do not believe
this to be the case. The law not only
regulates entities that fall outside the
traditional definition of insurer, it also
extends to include entities in no way
involved in underwriting risks. In fact, a
review of the statute shows that while it
may affect the way that some insurance
companies run their business, it has
nothing to do with the underwriting of
risk, the traditional earmark of insurance.
See Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211-12, 99 S.
Ct. at 1073-74. Accordingly, I believe that
Kentucky's AWP laws fail the third prong
of the McCarran-Ferguson test as well.
In sum, I am forced to conclude that 55
304.17A-110(3) and 304.17A-171(2),
Kentucky's AWP laws, are not saved from
preemption as laws that regulate the
business of insurance, because under
ERISA 5 514(b), they fail to meet not only
the common sense test, but also all of the
McCarran-Ferguson factors. While
federalism concerns prohibit federal
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ERISA.- Health Benefit Plans Discriminating Against Providers
Joumal ofLa w, Medicine &Ethics
2000
Mary A. Zendran
In Kentucky Association of Health Plans,
Inc. v. Nichols, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit held that (1) any
willing provider (AWP) provisions were
both connected with, and had reference
to, an employee benefit plan and,
therefore, were potentially subject to
preemption under ERISA as state laws
relating to an ERISA plan, but (2) the
provisions sought to regulate insurance
and, therefore, came within the savings
clause of ERISA's preemption provision.
Respondents--seven health maintenance
organizations (HMOs) licensed in
Kentucky and a non-profit association
organized to promote business interests of
HMO members--filed this action against
the Comn-inssioner of the Kentucky
Department of Insurance arguing that
Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated
[subsections] 304.17A-171(1)-(8) (Banks-
Baldwin 1995) should be found
preempted by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
In 1994, the Kentucky legislature enacted
the Kentucky Health Care Reform Act
containing an "any willing provider"
provision that prohibited health benefit
plans from discriminating against any
provider located within the plan's
geographic area. The legislature later
added a provision regulating the
interaction between health benefit plans
and chiropractors and requiring
chiropractic benefits.
The Sixth Circuit considered whether the
Kentucky statute related to employee
benefit plans covered under ERISA.. The
court employed a two-part test to do so,
considering if the statute has (1) a
connection with or (2) a reference to such
plan. The court reasoned that Kentucky's
AWP statute relates to ERISA plans
because the statute references an ERISA
plan and singles it out for different
treatment by excluding self-insured
ERISA plans from its coverage. The
Kentucky statute sought to include self-
insured ERISA plans and multiple
employer welfare arrangements, only to
the extent permitted by ERISA.
The court concluded that, in order to
determine whether the normal
presumption against preemption has been
overcome, it is necessary to go beyond the
text and difficulty of defining [sections]
514(a)'s key term. Rather, the court looks
to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a
guide to what Congress intended for state
law. ERISA attempts to avoid a plethora
of regulation and permit a "nationally
uniform administration of employee
benefit plans". The Kentucky statute
meets the "in connection with" standard
because the AWP plan required benefit
plans to purchase benefits of a certain
structure and specifically prohibits health
organizations from offering networks with
limited chiropractic providers. The
statutes affected benefits because the
number of potential providers increased
and directly affected the administration of
the plans. Therefore, the statute affected
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and mandated the structure of all insured
plans.
However, the Court held that the statute
fell within [sections] 514(b)(2)(A), the
ERISA savings clause, therefore saving
the statute from preemption. This clause
serves as an exception to preemption by
saving state laws that relate to ERISA
plans as long as they regulate insurance.
The Court begins its analysis by
determining the meaning of the "regulate
insurance" phrase in the savings clause.
First, the Court asks, from a "common
sense view of matter," whether the
contested provision regulates insurance
and, second, considers three factors to
determine whether regulation fits within
the business of insurance as used in
McCarran Ferguson Act. These three
factors are (1) whether the practice has
effect of transferring or spreading a
policyholder's risk; (2) whether the
practice is integral part of the policy
relationship between insurer and insured;
and (3) whether the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance industry.
While these three factors must be
weighed, they are not determinative.
The Kentucky Act meets the common
sense test because it clearly regulates
insurance even though it reaches HMO's
and traditional insurance companies.
HMOs just happen to provide medical
services directly. The fact that the
Kentucky statute reaches self-insurers
who are not protected by ERISA's deemer
clause does not mean it cannot be
characterized as a statute regulating
entities engaged in business of health
insurance.
The statute meets the first factor of the
McCarran-Ferguson test. It transfers or
spreads the policyholder's risk because the
policyholders in Kentucky benefit from
increased availability of providers. The
ability of a policyholder to choose a
physician to treat a medical condition
covered by insurance is an integral part of
the policy relationship between insurer
and insured, thus meeting the second
prong. HMOs and self-insurers are
engaged in the insurance business along
with traditional insurance companies,
thereby satisfying the third factor of the
McCarran-Ferguson test.
The Appeals Court upholds the AWP
statute and chiropractic statute. The
district court, however, did not discuss
additional requirements dealing with
chiropractors and health benefit plans.
The Court, therefore, remands this case to
the district court for consideration of
these issues of preemption by ERISA.
The effect of this ruling is that the
standard definition of the "business of
insurance" is to be abandoned. Some
health law attorneys do not understand
how a self-insured plan can be insurance
because the critical element of insurance,
the transfer of risk, never occurs. They
worry that health plans will be vulnerable
to having forced open-ended networks.
But on a positive note, AWP laws can
apply to commercial insurers in states
governed by the ruling circuits.
Copyright 0 2000 Gale Group Inc.
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Justices Accept Case on Maine's Drug Discount Program
The New York Times
June 29, 2002
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court today added two
important cases on health care to the
docket for its next term, including a
closely watched case from Maine on the
state's effort to force drug manufacturers
to reduce their prices to Maine residents.
Both new cases reflect efforts by state
governments to move ahead with health
care policy in the absence of action by
Congress. The second case is a challenge
to a Kentucky law, similar to laws on the
books in half the states, that requires
managed care plans to accept any doctor
who meets their qualifications and who
wants to join.
Last October, the justices sought the Bush
administration's views on the case. The
administration took until May 31 to
respond with a brief urging the Supreme
Court to deny the industry's appeal.
The brief's fine print, however, may have
led the justices to take a hard look at the
appeal. The First Circuit's conclusion that
the Maine law did not conflict with the
Medicaid law "may well have been
incorrect," the brief said, while
nonetheless urging the justices to sidestep
the case because of the preliminary nature
of the ruling and the absence of
conflicting decisions.
By contrast, the administration did urge
the court to grant a second health care
case today, a challenge by the managed
care industry to Kentucky's "any willing
provider" law, which gives any qualified
doctor the right to become a participating
provider in a health plan.
Doctors have lobbied for such laws,
which have been passed by 25 states, as
protection against dismissal by health care
plans for recommending too many
treatments or complaining about
conditions.
But health plans have strenuously resisted
the laws on the ground that a limited pool
of doctors is essential to holding down the
costs of managed care, because the
doctors' willingness to offer discounts
depends on a big enough patient load for
doctors to earn an acceptable income.
Challenges to the laws around the country
have been based on a 1974 federal law,
the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, known as E[RISA]. E[RISA] pre-
empts state laws that "relate to" employee
benefit plans, except for state laws
regulating insurance. So the question on
the validity of the "any willing provider"
laws, to which federal courts around the
country have given different answers, is
whether the laws fall within a state's
regulation of insurance.
In this case, Kentucky Association of
Health Plans v. Miller, No. 00-1471, the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, held that laws
like Kentucky's were "clearly laws which,
in a common-sense view of the matter,
regulate insurance."
The Supreme Court deferred action on
the case for more than a year while
deciding a related question raised by
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another managed care case on the docket.
The question in that case, Rush Prudential
H.M.O. v. Moran, was the validity under
E[RISA] of state laws requiring outside
review of a health plan's refusal to
authorize a particular treatment. The court
ruled on June 20 that such laws were an
aspect of insurance regulation and were
not pre-empted by E[RISA].
The plaintiffs in the Kentucky case filed a
supplemental brief this week saying that
the Rush Prudential decision did not really
answer the insurance question in their
case. The question in the Rush Prudential
case concerned a health plan's relationship
with its patients, the brief said, while the
Kentucky case involved a health plan's
relationship with its doctors -- less directly
related to the concept of insurance, the
brief said.
Copyright 0 2002 The New York Times
Company
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Court Backs Patient Appeals in Battle Over HMO Coverage
The Wall StrretJournal
June 21, 2002
Sarah Lueck, Robert S. Greenberger and Rhonda Rundle
The Supreme Court decided that states
can challenge health-maintenance
organizations' coverage decisions,
affirming a potent weapon for consumers
while roiling the debate in Congress over
whether to pass a federal "Patients' Bill of
Rights."
Forty-two states and the District of
Columbia have set up independent review
boards to which patients can appeal when
H1MOs deny coverage for certain
procedures and treatments. Such avenues
of appeal, set up in recent years in
response to patient complaints, aren't
widely used by consumers, but patients'
advocates predicted the court ruling could
change that. These advocates plan to use
the ruling to press for a federal patients'
rights bill that would establish minimum
standards for state review boards and
provide other consumer protections.
The issue before the high court was
whether the state laws setting up such
boards are pre-empted by the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (E[RISA) of 1974. The state laws
typically force HMOs to submit to what is
in effect a second-opinion process, which
gives patients who prevail a major
advantage in federal court if health-care
providers continue to deny coverage. The
issue stemmed from a 1995 case in which
Debra Moran, then a 24-year-old Chicago-
area speech pathologist, spent nearly
$95,000 of her own money for
reconstructive surgery that her HMO,
Rush Prudential HMO Inc., which was
acquired by WellPoint Health Networks
Inc. in 2000, refused to cover.
Over the objections of the HMO industry
and employer groups, the Supreme Court
upheld the power of the states in a 5-4
decision issued by Justice David Souter
and backed by the court's more-moderate
wing. The decision applies to up to 70
million people whose employers buy
private health insurance. Unaffected by
the decision are another 60 million people
whose employers, mainly large
corporations, are self-insured and
therefore exempt from state insurance
laws. Most Americans with health
insurance are covered through their
workplaces.
Private health plans and companies that
provide health insurance to employees
complained that forcing -lMOs to
contend with a patchwork of state review
processes will drive up costs and prompt
some employers to consider abolishing
their insurance plans. "Employees in
different states covered by the same
health contract could have far different
rights depending on where they live," said
Paul Dennett, a vice president at the
American Benefits Council, which
represents employers.
"The great danger is that with costs
already skyrocketing, employers navigating
varying state laws may be forced to
reconsider whether they will offer health
insurance for their employees," added
Donald Young, president of the Health
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Insurance Association of America, a trade
association.
Patients' rights advocates, medical
associations and state health officials
applauded the decision as a victory, albeit
a narrow one. "This decision validates
every state that has passed independent
review laws protecting patient's rights,"
said Donald J. Palmisano, president-elect
of the American Medical Association,
which filed a brief backing the patient in
the case.
Stocks of the nation's largest managed
care companies slipped after the high-
court ruling. In 4 p.m. New York Stock
Exchange composite trading, WellPoint
Health Networks shares sank $1.93 to
$84.27, Aetna Inc. was off 29 cents at
$51.47, Cigna Corp. was down $1.43 at
$99.25 and UnitedHealth Group Inc.
dropped $1.16 to $96.14.
"We inherited this case when we acquired
Rush Prudential in 2000," said a
spokesman for WellPoint Health
Networks, Thousand Oaks, Calif. "We
have a history of supporting independent
review in our company and we will
continue to do so."
When consumer groups began pushing
external review systems in the mid-1990s,
such systems were opposed by most
health plans. But as consumer outcry
against abuses spread, more and more
health plans embraced the idea as a way to
placate critics and, more importantly, to
avoid lawsuits. State review boards have
only accepted a few thousand cases in the
several years since such boards came into
vogue, overturning or modifying plan
decisions about half the time.
Daniel Zingale, director of California's
department of managed care, said the
review boards also serve to prevent
abuses. "Thousands of people have been
able to get a quicker resolution of their
problem because HMOs know that the
independent review is looming over
them," he said.
The court's decision puts employer groups
and insurers in a quandary as they
continue fighting a tough federal patients'
bill of rights, now stalled in Congress. On
the one hand, they argued in the Supreme
Court that they preferred uniformity. The
patients' bill of rights would afford the
most likely vehicle for imposing
uniformity on the system. But that's a
risky option, because the bill's biggest
advocates favor tough standards and
greater access to other avenues of appeal,
including the courts.
Patients' rights advocates favor federal
action. They say the state appeal process is
too complicated and too little-known to
be of much help. And in the eight states
that lack external review boards, patients
"will get no benefit from state hearing
rights," says Ron Pollack, president of
consumer-advocacy group Families USA.
"They will still need to appeal to their
HMOs, and the HMOs will continue to
act as the judge, jury and prosecutor of
those appeals." Moreover, because the
decision doesn't apply to employees
whose companies are self-insured, "it's a
complete crapshoot for workers," said
Sara Rosenbaum, a law professor at
George Washington University's School
of Public Health.
Both chambers of Congress have passed
competing patients' rights bills, with the
Republican-controlled House favoring a
more industry-friendly bill backed by the
White House and the Democratic Senate
favoring a tough bill sponsored by Sen.
John McCain (R, Ariz.) and Sen. Edward
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Kennedy (D., Mass.). Negotiations on the
bill, which would make it easier for
patients to sue their health plans, have
broken down, mainly over limits on
damages patients could receive if they sue.
State review systems "are no substitute for
strong, federal action," said Sen. Kennedy.
"If the proponents of an expansive
'Patients' Bill of Rights' think that today's
decision will induce employers to seek
enactment of a federal patients' rights bill,
they are sorely mistaken," responded
American Benefits Council President
James A. Klein.
In the Supreme Court case, Ms. Moran
said she started in 1995 experiencing
relentless pain and weakness in her right
hand and shoulder. Various treatments
and conventional surgery approved by her
HMO provided no relief. Ms. Moran then
underwent microreconstructive surgery in
February 1998, paying $94,841.27 of her
own money for the procedure and post-
operative care. "By July, after a lot of
physical therapy, I was water-skiing," Ms.
Moran said.
Ms. Moran had sought an independent
review of her case under Illinois law. The
case eventually moved to federal court,
which ruled in the HMO's favor. But the
U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago reversed
that ruling in October 2000, and the
Supreme Court upheld that decision
yesterday. Ms. Moran said yesterday that
she was paid by the HMO after the U.S.
Appeals court ruling -- but she has kept
the money in the bank, awaiting the
Supreme Court's decision.
At issue before the Supreme Court was
what sorts of benefits E[RISA] covers.
The law states that all disputes over
employee benefits must be handled by
federal courts, following a single national
procedure. So states, for example, couldn't
set up boards to judge pension disputes.
But health insurance is a trickier question
-- it is clearly an employee benefit, but it is
also insurance. E[RISA] says state laws
that regulate certain kinds of businesses --
insurance, banking or securities -- are
"saved" from the E[RISA] pre-emption.
The question for the court was: Is an
HMO an insurer? Justice Souter said that
a thorough reading of the legislative
history of the E[RISA] law clearly shows
Congress recognized that HMOs operate
partly like insurance companies.
Peter Landers contributed to this article.
Copyright a 2002 Dow Jones &
Company, Inc.
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01-1420 Washington Dept. of Social and Health Services v. Keffeler
Ruling Below: (Keffeler v. Dept. of Soc. & Health Services, Wash. Sup. Ct., 145 Wn.2d 1,
32 P.3d 267, 2001 Wash. Lexis 675)
The court found that the department is required by state law to pay for a foster child's care
regardless of whether it is the representative payee or not. The department only serves as
representative payee of the child's social security benefits so that the state will be reimbursed
for its costs. Thus, the court held that the Department is acting in violation of federal law
prohibiting confiscation of such benefits.
Question Presented: Does a state agency acting as the representative payee appointed to
receive the Social Security benefits of the state's foster children violate 42 U.S.C. 407(a) of
the Social Security Act when the agency uses the benefits to pay for the costs of children in
foster care?
Guardianship Estate of Danny KEFFELER, Respondents,
V.
State of Washington DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES;
Lyle QUASIM, Director of the Department of Social and Health Services; and
Michael R. Hobbs, Program Manager for the Department of Social and Health
Services, Appellants.
Supreme Court of Washington
Decided October 11, 2001.
SANDERS, J., Justice:
The plaintiff class asks us to hold the
Washington State Department of Social
and Health Services (DSIS) violated that
provision of the Social Security Act (the
Act), 42 U.S.C. 407(a) which forbids
creditor access to Social Security benefits.
Here DSIS acts as a representative payee
under 42 U.S.C. 405() for foster children
and then applies the Social Security
benefits to reimburse the state budget for
payments made to foster parents for the
basic needs of those children. We are also
asked if DSHS's actions deprived the
foster children of their property absent
due process and abridged their right to
equal protection of the laws. Lastly the
plaintiff class asserts entitlement to an
award of reasonable attorney fees.
We hold DSHS as a representative payee
violates 407(a) of the Act when it applies
Social Security benefits to the current
maintenance needs of foster children for
whom it acts as representative payee.
Given this disposition we find it
unnecessary to consider the due process
and equal protection claims. We remand
for further proceedings, including further
consideration of the reasonable attorney
fee award.
FACTS
[The Department of Social and Health
Services (DSHS) provided care to all
children who needed it. The DSHS
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attempted to recover the costs of caring
for the child from the natural parents. If
unable to do so, the DSHS was allowed by
state law to reimburse itself from other
funds in its possession, such as Social
Security Benefits of the child. The DSHS
could obtain the Social Security benefits
of a child in foster care by applying to
become the representative payee.
DSHS provided the current maintenance
for a child in foster care by paying the
foster parent a fixed amount. Special
expenditures (such as computers, summer
camps, etc.) were also authorized by
DSHS. If the maintenance for a child
could not be covered solely by that child's
Social Security benefits, the payment
would be supplemented by other funds.
Children who did not receive similar
Social Security benefits, or whose benefits
went to another payee, were still eligible
for and received state-supported foster
care. They also received funding for
special expenditures, if the money was
available in the budget.
In this case, a DSHS employee tried to
remove Keffeler's grandmother and
guardian removed as representative payee.
Keffeler's case eventually became a class
action suit, though the DSHS asserted this
was the only time such an action was
taken.]
The gravamen of the class action is that
DSHS's actions violate the antialienation
provision of 42 U.S.C. 407(a) where
DSHS, as representative payee, uses a
foster child's Social Security benefits to
reimburse the state for the costs of foster
care. The class also presents several
constitutional causes of action. First, the
class alleges DSHS has acted irrationally,
invidiously, and arbitrarily and capriciously
in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. Second, the
class alleges DSHS's actions violate the
due process clauses of the Washington
Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Third, the class alleges the
state discriminates against the class
members 'by subjecting them to a lower
standard of living than children who are
not so situated.' Finally, the class alleges
the state 'maliciously, recklessly and
wantonly is invading federally protected
funds for its own improper advantage, to
the detriment of Plaintiff and all other
foster children's financial and emotional
well-being.' CP at 13-14.
In its prayer for relief, the class seeks (i) a
permanent injunction enjoining DSHS
from using Social Security payments to
offset the cost of foster care; (ii)
reimbursement to class members of all
Social Security payments used by DSHS
for reimbursement; and (iii) an award of
attorney's fees.
The trial court held DSHS's use of Social
Security benefits to reimburse the cost of
foster care violates 42 U.S.C 407(a), and
DSHS violates procedural due process by
failing to provide notice, beyond that
required by federal law and regulation, of
the 'intended result' of the appointment of
DSI-iS as representative payee. The trial
court did not address the class' remaining
constitutional arguments, nor did it
specifically conclude DSHS was liable for
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C.
1983.
ANALYSIS
A. DSHS's actions as representative payee
violated 42 U.S.C. 407(a).
Simply put, if DSHS is appointed
representative payee for a foster child it
will confiscate the child's SSI money to
benefit the state. However, if anyone else
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is appointed, the state will bear the cost of
foster care, and the child's SSI will be
available to benefit the child in addition to
the state-funded foster care program. The
issue is whether this confiscation violates
federal law. For the reasons which follow
we believe it does.
DSHS admits it would probably not even
apply to be a representative payee if it
could not rely on the child's SSI benefits
to reimburse the cost of care. By the same
token, DSHS admittedly cannot actively
seek reimbursement from benefits paid to
private representative payees because
Congress specifically protects Social
Security benefits from transfer,
assignment, execution, levy, attachment,
garnishment, or other legal process under
42 U.S.C. 407(a).' Thus, DSHS receives
reimbursement for foster care only if it
serves as a representative payee, and it
only serves as representative payee so it
can confiscate the child's money.
This scheme stands in stark contrast to 20
C.F.R. 404.2021 which expressly provides,
'Our primary concern is to select the
payee who will best serve the beneficiary's
interest.' (Emphasis added.) Obviously the
child is better off with any payee other
than the state because DS-S must
provide foster care under state law
regardless of whether it receives a
[Some footnotes have been omitted; the
remaining footnotes have been renumbered - Ed.]
The federal code provides, in pertinent part, The
right of any person to any future payment under
this subchapter shall not be transferable or
assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the
moneys paid or payable or rights existing under
this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or
to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency
law.42 U.S.C. 407(a). This section was made
applicable to Title XVI benefits by 42 U.S.C
1383(d) (1).
reimbursement. DSHS's self-
prioritization is extremely disquieting in
the face of a regulatory mandate that we
consider these disenfranchised children
before enriching government coffers.
1. DSHS as a creditor
Whether DSHS acts as a creditor when it
reimburses itself for foster care costs out
of the foster children's Social Security
Administration (SSA) entitlements is the
crucial question. If DSHS's
reimbursement scheme is that of a
creditor, the antiattachment provisions of
407(a) apply and DSHS's cost recovery
policy runs afoul of a federal statute which
preempts state law under the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
[The court examined the rulings in a series
of related cases. The Supreme Court said
a state's efforts to obtain reimbursement
from a welfare recipient by taking his
Social Security disability benefit was
barred by 407. Philpctt v Essex Camty
Wdfa Bcard, 409 U.S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590,
34 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1973). Nor could a
state reimburse itself for incarcerating
inmates from the inmates' Social Security
benefits. Benrett vA rkaas, 485 U.S. 395,
108 S. Ct. 1204, 99 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1988).
The Ninth Circuit held that states could
not reimburse themselves by taking Social
Security benefits from mental health
patients committed to state hospitals.
Binknn u Rahmn 878 F.2d 263 (9th Cir.
1989); Crazefondv Gau" 56 F.3d 1162 (9th
Cir. 1995).]
These cases evince an expansive
interpretation of the protections of 407.
The thrust of the case law is that Social
Security benefits are, for all intents and
purposes, beyond the reach of the state,
however clever or subtle its attempt to
seize them. Philpatt and the cases in its
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line, including Crabfow are on point and
persuasive.
The state claims King u Sdxfer, 940 F.2d
1182 (8th Cir. 1991) justifies DSHS's
position, particularly because DSHS acts
as a representative payee under 42 U.S.C.
405(j) for the foster children in this case.
In King the State of Missouni, as
representative payee, received SSA
benefits due involuntarily committed
mental patients and reimbursed itself for
the care and maintenance costs expended
out of public funds for the patients. The
patients argued the state's application to
become the patient's representative payee
to accept the patients' SSA benefits
violated the 'other legal process' provision
of 407(a). However the King court
disagreed, noting the illogic of presuming
407(a) would outlaw a procedure
(applying to become representative payee)
expressly authorized by 405(j).
In light of King, and the fact that DSHS
enjoys the status of representative payee
(for most) of the foster children under
405(j) and 20 C.F.R. 404.2001(a), the
significance of the state's representative
payee status requires further discussion.2
The King plaintiffs challenged the state's
procedure for applying to become
representative payee, arguing that
procedure (incident to which the state
seized the mental health patient's SSA
benefits) violated 407(a) as 'other legal
process.' However here it is not DSHS's
procedure to apply to become the foster
children's representative payee that is
under attack, rather it is DSHS's practice
2 Apparently DSHS is not the representative payee
for Danny Keffeler, the class representative.
Keffeler's grandmother apparently remained his
representative payee, despite DSHS's zealous
efforts to remove her. [... ]
of reimbursing itself from the foster
children's SSA benefits once it becomes
representative payee.
The difference is subtle, but the
distinction is crucial. There is nothing ipso
facto wrong with DSHS applying to
become the representative payee for
certain foster children, as 405(j) and the
SSA's accompanying regulations explicitly
contemplate. We may even agree the
representative payee application is not
'other legal process.' But it is equally clear
the reimbursement process is 'other legal
process[.]'
** *
The state also claims CG.A., 824 P.2d
1364 supports its position. But C.G.A.
only said the state may apply to become a
representative payee. CGA., 824 P.2d at
1366. The court did not hold the state
could reimburse itself but deferred that
determination to the Social Security
agency under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. Id. at 1370. Like King, CG.A.
stands for no more than the uncontested
proposition DSHS may apply to become a
representative payee.
DSHS reimbursement is barred by 407(a)
because despite DSHS's status as
representative payee it performs the role
of creditor when it takes the foster child's
SSA entitlement to reimburse itself for
moneys spent on the child.
Furthermore, the bare logic of
reimbursement also implies a creditor-
debtor relationship. If the Legislature and
DSHS did not hold the costs of foster
care were somehow 'owed' back to the
taxpayers, it would not claim the right of
DSHS to 'reimburse' itself on the
taxpayer's behalf.
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DS-JS's representative payee status
further undercuts the legality of its
reimbursement process because a
representative payee is charged under SSA
regulation, 20 C.F.R. 404.2035, with the
responsibility to '[u]se the payments he or
she receives only for the use and benefit
of the lefiary in a manner and for the
purposes he or she determines, under the
guidelines in this subpart, to be in the best
interests of the benefary.' Id. 404.2035(a)
(emphasis added). We seriously doubt
using the SSA benefits to reimburse the
state for its public assistance expenditure
is in all cases, or even some, 'in the best
interests of the beneficiary.'
B. The trial court award of attorney fees is
not sufficiently specific.
[The court found that neither the parties
nor the trial court adequately expressed
the grounds for the award of attorney fees
to the plaintiff. The award must rest upon
statutory or equitable grounds.]
CONCLUSION
We therefore hold DSHS violated 407(a)
of the Act when acting as the
representative payee under 4056) of the
Act by reimbursing itself for foster care
payments, contrary to the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution.
We therefore affirm the trial court's result,
remanding for further appropriate
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The class shall recover its statutory costs
on appeal without prejudice to a further
award of reasonable attorney fees to be
determined on remand.
ALEXANDER, C.J., and SMITH,
JOHNSON, and MADSEN, JJ., concur.
BRIDGE, Justice, concurring n part,
dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the
Washington State Department of Social
and Health Services (DSHS)
impermissibly used social security funds to
reimburse itself for past due foster care
payments. However, the majority goes too
far in concluding that any use of social
security funds by DSHS violates the
antiattachment rule. Under a fair reading
of the controlling federal statute and
regulatory authority, DSHS is entitled to
use the funds to pay for current
maintenance costs, provided that any
special needs of the children are satisfied
first.
[The dissent argued that federal law
allowed DSHS to become custodian as
long as it was not compensated out of the
funds in question. State law similarly
allowed DSHS only to spend the fund on
the personal needs of the child or to
reimburse the state for funds spent on the
child.
The mere fact that DSHS may have been
a creditor would not prevent it being
named as a representative payee. The
decision of the Social Security
Administration that the DSHS acceptable
to serve as representative payee should
have been controlling. The issue revolved
instead around the conflict between the
role of DSHS as creditor and as
representative payee.]
Specifically, a representative payee has a
responsibility to '[u]se the payments he or
she receives only for the use and benefit
of the beneficiary in a manner and for the
purposes he or she determines, under the
guidelines in this subpart, to be in the best
interests of the beneficiary.' 20 C.F.R.
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416.635(a). Current rmintenance, including
the cost of food, shelter, clothing, medical
care, and personal comfort items, is
deemed to be for the use and benefit of
the beneficiary. 20 C.F.R 416.640(a).
[The four cases cited by the majority to
argue that the DSHS may not use the
funds for current maintenance] are readily
distinguished from the DSHS practice at
issue here. Critically, none of the cited
federal cases involve the expenditure of
social security benefits by a state that was
designated as a representative payee. In
fact, the class certified in Brinknun
specifically excluded patients for whom
the state served as representative payee.
Binnun, 878 F.2d at 264. As explained
above, under federal regulations a
representative payee has considerable
authority to spend the funds entrusted to
its control, provided the expenditures are
for the best interests of the beneficiary. 20
C.F.R. 416.635(a).
Thus, the issue as I see it is not whether
DSHS may spend the funds for current
maintenance, provided it gives pnonty to
special needs of the foster children, but
whether it may use those funds to
reimburse itself for past maintenance or
for its own administrative services, such as
mileage reimbursements for social
workers. The fact that DSHS in the
context of reimbursing itself for past care
of the beneficiary puts its need for
reimbursement ahead of the needs of the
foster children further demonstrates the
fundamental conflict between its roles as
representative payee and creditor.
DSHS receives the payments not on its
own behalf, but on behalf of the
beneficiaries, and is not permitted to
assign pending (i.e., future) payments to
the reimbursement of its expenditures on
behalf of the foster children. Where an
agency puts reimbursement to itself ahead
of the best interests of the child, ignoring
the policy expressed in the federal
regulations to prioritize the child's special
needs, it effectively transfers the payments
to its own use. This transfer from the state
in its role as representative payee to the
state in its role as guardian of the public
purse is contrary to 407(a). Where the
agency pursues that policy to the extent of
double reimbursement, the conflict of
interest is egregious.
To the extent that RCW 74.20A.010
encourages the state to 'sweep' a child's
benefits into the treasury to repay past-
due foster care, I agree with the majority
that the statute is incompatible with
4056), which forbids any 'substantial
conflict of interest' between the payee. * *
* It is also incompatible with 407(a),
which prevents transfer of the benefits.
Under the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, federal law
takes precedence. Thus, any use of social
security funds for purposes other than
current care and maintenance is unlawful,
as is giving pnonty to maintenance over
the children's special needs.
Remedies
I would remand this matter to the trial
court with directions to modify the
injunction to prevent DSHS from using
social security payments to reimburse the
costs of past due foster care or other
expenses not directly related to current
maintenance, and to require DSHS give
special needs a higher priority than current
maintenance.
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Orphan Takes DSHS to Task: Supreme Court Agrees to Review State's Claim to
Social Security Payments
The Spokesman Review
May 29, 2002
Jonathan Martin
Dan Keffeler graduates from college next
week.
He survived the tragic death of his
mother, forced separation from his
brothers and sister, and at least seven
foster homes before becoming a student-
athlete at Central Washington University.
"My whole life has taught me to survive,"
said Keffeler, 23. "I'm good at it.
Sometimes I had to be real good at it."
Aside from a good brain and a tough will
to live, Keffeler became a foster care
success story, his lawyers say, because he
had a little extra financial help from his
late mother's Social Security payments.
The U.S. Supreme Court on Tuesday
accepted for review a class- action suit on
behalf of Keffeler and 1,500 other foster
children who get Social Security payments,
either as orphans or for a disability.
Unlike Keffeler, few of those 1,500 foster
children see those Social Security checks,
which range in size from $250 to $545 per
month.
Most of those payments a total of $7
million per year are taken by
Washington's Department of Social and
Health Services, to reimburse itself for
foster care.
Keffeler's lawyers say that practice robs
foster children of extra help, stripping
them of savings that could be used to go
to college.
The Washington State Supreme
ruled in Keffeler's favor last
prompting an appeal by the state.
Court
year,
State lawyers say taking the payments is a
legal way of defraying foster care costs.
Both sides agree the case is about money.
Should the Supreme Court rule for
Keffeler, the DSHS would lose $7 million
of its $134 million annual budget to
provide foster care to 10,000 children.
It also would be forced to repay up to $80
million to children whose payments have
been collected for the past 20 years, a
potential budget hit that has DSHS
sweating.
The Supreme Court's decision, expected
by next June, could have wider
consequences.
Every state in the nation has some way of
collecting those payments;, 26 states and
several large child welfare groups have
filed "friend of the court" briefs
supporting the DSHS.
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Florida officials estimated the cost of
repaying Social Security at several hundred
million dollars.
Social Security payments to children,
Washington officials say, are intended to
provide food and shelter, so collecting the
payments is justified.
"We do spend money on the special needs
of these children," said Tammi Erickson,
a DSHS official who oversees the Social
Security payments.
"It's both fiscally prudent we tap as
many of the federal funding sources as we
can but it's also a good thing for the
children."
But Keffeler's lawyers, Richard Price and
Rodney Reinhold, say taking Social
Security payments from children is little
more than stealing from society's most
vulnerable.
"This practice is simply a way for the state
to balance its budget," Price said. "We're
lightening our tax burden with kids who
have the least."
Although the Social Security payments are
intended to provide "extra items" for
"special needs," a 1998 federal audit found
that fewer than 5 percent of children
getting the payments received any extra
help.
One girl, receiving Social Security for both
a parent's death and a disability, got
$49,597 while in foster care, yet no money
was spent to provide her with special help,
according to the audit.
The DSHS doesn't have
how the money should
said. Nor does it tell
guidelines about
be spent, Price
foster children
getting Social Security they're eligible for
''extra items."
If children or their caseworkers knew of
that eligibility, they'd likely be tapping the
Social Security payments, Reinhold said.
"The only thing that keeps this program
going is ignorance," he said.
There are conflicting federal rules
regarding Social Security payments to
children in foster care, said Bill Collins, a
senior assistant attorney general working
on the case.
One law allows the appointment of a
payee, to disburse Social Security
payments to cover a child's living costs.
The DSHS routinely steps in to have itself
appointed as payee.
The second bars those payments from
being garnisheed. That law is intended to
shield children from having to pay their
parents' debts, Collins said.
Keffeler's grandmother, Wanda Pierce,
saw it differently. Keffeler's mother, a
laborer at an Omak mill, died in a car
accident in 1990, when her son was 12.
Pierce, unable to care for Keffeler herself,
was appointed as guardian to oversee her
grandson's Social Security benefits as he
entered foster care.
Over the next four years, the DSHS twice
tried to get Keffeler's payments, and filed
a creditor's claim to recover the money.
Reinhold, a family friend, stepped in. He
soon realized the DSHS routinely took
Social Security payments, and filed the
class-action suit.
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Keffeler kept his payments because of the
suit, using the money to buy cleats and a
Mazda RX-7 to get back and forth from
sports practices and work
The money also paid for college
applications, and gave him a nest egg of
support while he played linebacker and
fullback for Central's football team.
"I'm not saying that every kid is going to
turn out great if they get this money," said
Keffeler, who is working at a Yakima
athletic club. "I do believe the kids with
ambition and desire to move on with their
lives, it would be a great tool for them."
Reinhold agrees. "If you look at this from
the taxpayer's perspective, they'll get way
more by Danny graduating from college
than collecting these payments."
Copyright © 2002 Cowles Publishing
Company
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Supreme Court to Consider System for Taking Foster Childrens' Benefits
The Associated Prss
May 28, 2002
Gina Holland
The Supreme Court said Tuesday it would
decide if states can control the federal
benefits of orphaned and abused children.
Justices will review Washington state's
practice of applying for benefits on behalf
of foster children, then using the money
to reimburse foster parents for things like
food and clothing.
The ruling, likely sometime next year, will
have far-reaching implications because
every state has a system of collecting
Social Security payments on behalf of
children in state custody, the court was
told.
Justices will look at a technical question
involving Washington state's mechanism
for inserting themselves as the money
collectors for children, then deciding how
to use it. But the more basic issue is: Are
poor children in state care being
shortchanged or helped by the
intervention?
The case was brought over benefits of a
foster child whose mother was killed in a
car crash. As the guardian of his estate, his
grandmother, Wanda Pierce, received the
benefits and put them in a college fund.
The state sought to get the money, and
she filed a class action lawsuit.
One of Pierce's lawyers, Teresa Wynn
Roseborough, told the court that the
money belongs to the children, not the
government, and that states do not always
use the cash in youths' best interest.
Roseborough urged the court not to use
the Washington system to address the
issue, calling it a "muddled mess."
On the other side were two dozen states
and a group of children's advocates who
want the court to make clear that states
can continue the practice.
The case turns on whether the state youth
department acts as a creditor, billing
children for their care then using the
Social Security benefits to pay the bills.
Federal law protects Social Security from
creditors.
There are more than a half million
children in foster care in America, and
about 25 percent of those are disabled and
may be eligible for Social Security, the
court was told.
Groups including the Children's Defense
Fund and Catholic Charities told the court
that states are "the last line of defense for
children in foster care." If states aren't
allowed to seek benefits for children "it is
likely that no one will," the groups said in
a filing.
If the Washington state foster children
win, states could be required to pay back
the money. In Florida alone, that could be
hundreds of millions of dollars, Attorney
General Robert A- Butterworth told the
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court. Nationwide, it could cost billions,
he said in court papers.
In addition to Florida, urging the court to
take the case were Alaska, Colorado,
Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wyoming.
Washington State has about 10,000
children in foster care, and about 1,500 of
them receive benefits under Social
Security either because they are disabled
or they are entitled to benefits of their
deceased parents.
The state social services agency handles
the paperwork for benefits.
The state Supreme Court ruled last year
that the system was illegal.
"However worthy cost recovery might be,
DSHS cannot violate federal law at the
expense of foster children to accomplish
it," Washington Supreme Court Justice
Richard Sanders wrote for the majority in
the 5-3 ruling.
Pierce's dispute with the state dates back
to 1990. The state never took over the
benefits for her grandson, Danny
Keffeler, and he went on to attend college
with the money she saved.
The case is Washington State Department
of Social and Health Services v.
Guardianship of Danny Keffeler, 01-1420.
Copyright © 2002. The Associated Press.
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01-0188 Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Concannon
Ruling Below: (Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 1" Cir., 249 F.3d 66, 2001
U.S. App. Lexis 9324)
In finding the Maine prescription drug statute constitutional, the court held that the state act did
not preempt the federal Medicaid program because plaintiff did not show that Medicaid
recipients would be harmed by the price regulation of prescription drugs. Also, the court
concluded that the regulation did not violate the Commerce Clause because it did not have an
extraterritorial reach, it was not discriminatory, and it did not excessively burden interstate
commerce through regulation of a legitimate state interest.
Question Presented: Whether a Maine statute providing for affordable prescription drugs (1) is
preempted by the Supremacy Clause and federal Medicare laws or (2) violates the dormant
Commerce Clause by reaching beyond the state, discriminating against interstate commerce or
incidentally affecting interstate commerce?
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
V.
Kevin CONCANNON, Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services, and
Maine Attorney General, Defendants, Appellants.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Decided May 16, 2001
BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
In this case, we consider whether a Maine
statute providing for affordable
prescription drugs can survive facial
constitutional challenges. On October 26,
2000, the district court issued a
preliminary injunction preventing the
implementation of the statute on the
ground that it is preempted by the
Supremacy Clause and violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. We reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 11, 2000, the Governor of Maine
signed into law an Act to Establish Fairer
Pricing for Prescription Drugs, 2000 Me.
Legis. Ch. 786 (S.P. 1026) (L.D. 2599) (the
"Act"), which establishes the "Maine Rx
Program" (the "Program"). The statute
was enacted because of the Maine
Legislature's concern that many Maine
citizens who were not Medicaid recipients
could not afford necessary prescription
drugs. It is predicated on the economic
reality that volume buying of prescription
drugs by Medicaid administrators,
insurance companies and health
maintenance organizations ("HMOs")
resulted in substantially lower prices for
these entities than for individual
purchasers. A minority staff report for the
United States House Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight
found that the average retail price for
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individual elderly purchasers was 86
percent higher than the price charged to
the federal government and other favored
customers, such as HMOs.
The Program is open to all State residents,
and allows enrollees to purchase
prescription drugs from participating
Maine pharmacies at a discounted price.
The discount offered by the pharmacies is
reimbursed by the State out of a dedicated
fund created with the money raised from
"rebate payments" collected from
participating drug manufacturers. Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, 5 2681. The
obligation to pay the "rebate" is triggered
by the retail sale of the manufacturer's
drugs to a Program enrollee through a
participating pharmacy.
The Act directs the Commissioner of
Maine's Department of Health Services to
negotiate rebate agreements with
manufacturers... and to use his or her
"best efforts" to obtain an initial rebate in
the same amount [as the rebate amount
calculated under the federal Medicaid
Rebate Program.] Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
22, § 2681(4)(A)-(q) [ ... ]
In order to create an incentive for
manufacturers to enter rebate agreements
with the Commissioner, the Act provides
that names of manufacturers who do not
enter into agreements be released to
health care providers and the public. Id. 5
2681(7). More importantly, the drugs of
all noncompliant manufacturers are
required to be subject, "as permitted by
law," to the "prior authorization
requirements" in the State Medicaid
program. Id. 5 2681(7). When subjected to
prior authorization, a drug may not be
dispensed to a Medicaid beneficiary
without the approval of the State
Medicaid administrator.
The plaintiff-appellee, Pharmaceutical
Research & Manufacturers of America
("PhRMA"), brought an action in the
United States District Court in the District
of Maine against defendant-appellants
Commissioner of the Maine Department
of Human Services and the Maine
Attorney General, challenging the
constitutionality of the Act. PhRMA
claimed that the Act violated the dormant
Commerce Clause and was preempted by
the federal Medicaid statute under the
Supremacy Clause, and moved for a
preliminary injunction to prevent the
implementation of the Act.
The district court issued the preliminary
injunction and found the Act
unconstitutional on the two asserted
grounds. First, the district court held that
the Act had an impermissible
extraterritorial reach by regulating the
revenues out-of-state pharmaceutical
manufacturers receive when selling to out-
of-state pharmaceutical distributors,
thereby violating the dormant Commerce
Gause. As to those distributors located in
the State of Maine, the district court held
that the Act was preempted under the
Supremacy Clause because it conflicted
with the federal Medicaid program.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
"The criteria for the grant of a preliminary
injunction are the familiar four- likelihood
of success, risk of irreparable hari, the
balance of equities and the public
interest." [citations omitted.]
The district court concluded that
PhRMA's likelihood of success on the
merits of most of its constitutional
challenges was "overwhelming."
Accordingly, it dealt only cursorily with
the remaining preliminary injunction
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factors. Our review also focuses on
PhRMA's likelihood of success on the
merits of its challenges under the
Supremacy Clause and the Commerce
Clause. See Weaver v. Henderson, 984
F.2d 11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that the
"sine qua non" of preliminary injunction
analysis is whether plaintiff is likely to
succeed on merits of claim).
B. Standing
The initial question we face is whether
PhRMA has prudential standing to
challenge the prior authorization
provision of the Act. PhRMA contends
that Maine's standing argument was not
briefed to the district court, and therefore
was waived. We assume, without deciding,
that Maine may assert this standing
challenge on appeal, and hold that
PhRMA falls within the relevant "zone of
interest."
PhRMA has not asserted an action to
enforce rights under the Medicaid statute,
however, but rather a preemption-based
challenge under the Supremacy Clause. In
this type of action, it is the interests
protected by the Supremacy Clause, not
by the preempting statute, that are at
issue. St. Thomas-St. John Hotel &
Tourism Ass'n v. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d
232, 241 (3d Cir. 2000)...
Thus, regardless of whether the Medicaid
statute's relevant provisions were designed
to benefit PhRMA, PhRMA can invoke
the statute's preemptive force. Cf. Burgio
& Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of
Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1006 (2d Cir. 1997)
(concluding that the Supremacy Clause
creates an implied right of action for
injunctive relief against state officers who
are threatening to violate federal law).
Given that PhRMA has prudential
standing grounded in the Supremacy
Clause, we think it may fairly assert the
rights of Medicaid recipients for purposes
of this action. Where a party has
established a concrete injury in fact, and
otherwise has standing to challenge the
lawfulness of the statute, it is "entitled to
assert those concomitant rights of third
parties that would be 'diluted or adversely
affected' should [its] constitutional
challenge fail and the statute [] remain in
force." [Citations omitted.]
C. Preemption
Having decided that PhRMA has standing
to challenge the Maine Act on preemption
grounds, we now turn to the merits of
that argument. The district court
addressed preemption only with regard to
the Act's regulation of sales to in-state
distributors, after concluding that such
regulation would not be barred by the
Commerce Clause. It held that the prior
authorization review requirement of the
Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2681(7),
conflicted with the purposes of the
Medicaid program such that the
requirement was invalid under the
Supremacy Clause. If we affirm the
district court's preemption holding, it
would invalidate the Act as to all
distributors, not just those who operate in
Maine, and would obviate the need to
address the Commerce Cause. Therefore,
we analyze the issue of preemption first.1
1 An amicus curiae brief offers another basis for
federal preemption: Edwin D. Schindler, Major
Stockholder and Patent Attorney, argues that the
Maine Act is preempted by federal patent law.
Because these issues were raised for the first time
on appeal by an amicus, not by a party, we do not
consider them. Am. Fed'n of Govt Employees,
Local 3936 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 239
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Under the Supremacy Clause, a federal
law may expressly or impliedly preempt
state law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating
that federal law "shall be the supreme law
of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding"). As the parties
agree, only "implied conflict preemption"
is at issue here...
* * *
To determine whether the state regulation
is consistent with the federal statute, we
examine the "structure and purpose of the
[federal] statute as a whole." Gade, 505
U.S. at 98. The primary purpose of
Medicaid is to enable states to provide
medical services to those whose "income
and resources are insufficient to meet the
costs of necessary medical services . . . ."
42 U.S.C. 5 1396 (2000). Congress
expressly intended that the provision of
medical services be administered by the
state "in a manner consistent with
simplicity of administration and the best
interests of the recipients." Id. 5
1396a(a)(19).
We perceive no conflict between the
Maine Act and Medicaid's structure and
purpose...
Moreover, as set forth in the affidavit of
Kevin Concannon, Commissioner of the
Maine Department of Human Services,
Maine has proposed administrative rules
governing prior authorization aimed at
ensuring that Medicaid recipients will have
access to needed medications...
F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 84 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996) ("an
amicus cannot introduce a new argument into a
case").
PhRMA contends
authorization, however
necessarily interferes with
Medicaid services by
administrative burden on
patients...
that prior
implemented,
the delivery of
placing an
physicians and
This argument is unpersuasive. First, we
are not convinced that the Medicaid
statute is concerned with the motivation
behind imposing prior authorization, as
long as the 24-hour response and the 72-
hour drug-supply requirements, 42 U.S.C.
5 1396r-8(d)(5), are satisfied...
Moreover, even assuming that this inquiry
into the underlying objectives of the Act is
appropriate, we disagree that the Act
serves no purpose related to Medicaid.
The purposes of the Medicaid statute,
read broadly, are consonant with the
purposes of the Maine Rx Program. First,
the Maine Rx Program furthers Medicaid's
aim of providing medical services to those
whose "income and resources are
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services," 42 U.S.C. 5 1396, even
if the individuals covered by the Maine Rx
Progranrare not poor enough to qualify
for Medicaid. Second, there is some
evidence in the record that by making
prescription drugs more accessible to the
uninsured, Maine may reduce Medicaid
expenditures...
Thus, we disagree with the district court's
statement that "If Maine can use its
authority over Medicaid authorization to
leverage drug manufacturer rebates for the
benefit of uninsured citizens, then it can
just as easily put the rebates into a state
program for highway and bridge
construction or school funding." Neither
highway construction nor school funding
relate in any way to the purposes of
providing medical services to the needy,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1396, or of cost-effective
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administration of the Medicaid program,
see id. 5 1396a(a)30(A) (state plans must
assure that payments are consistent with,
inter alia, efficiency and economy).
PhRM1A further contends that the Maine
Rx Program will necessarily harm
Medicaid recipients by impeding access to
their doctors' first-choice medications...
Because this is a facial challenge to a
statute, PhRMA has a difficult burden of
showing that Medicaid recipients will be
harmed by the Maine Rx Program. "A
facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of
course, the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid." United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 745, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 107
S. Ct. 2095 (1987)...
Since both sides agree that the prior
authorization requirement is the
"hammer" or "force" that coerces
manufacturers to enter into the Program,
the possibility that first-choice drugs will
not be readily approved where second-
choice inferior alternatives exist concerns
us. The possibility that the administrative
implications of the prior authorization
requirement will affect the quality of
medical care for Medicaid recipients in
more subtle ways, i.e. through
inconveniencing prescribing physicians,
also concerns us. Dr. Howell's affidavit,
however, is controverted by the affidavits
of other qualified individuals. We simply
cannot say on this record that the Act
conflicts with Medicaid's requirement that
state Medicaid plans assure that care will
be provided in a manner consistent with
the recipients' best interests. 42 U.S.C. 5
1396a(a)(19).
This decision is without prejudice to
PhRMA's right to renew its preemption
challenge after implementation of the Act,
should there be evidence that Medicaid
recipients are harmed by the prior
authorization requirement "as applied."
[Citations omitted.]
D. Dormant Commerce Clause
Holding that the Maine Act is not
preempted by the Medicaid statute, we
next consider whether it violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. The
Constitution provides that Congress shall
have the power "to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian
Tribes[.]" U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The
constitutional provision affirmatively
granting Congress the authority to
legislate in the area of interstate commerce
"has long been understood, as well, to
provide 'protection from state legislation
inimical to the national commerce [even]
where Congress has not acted.
[Citations omitted.] This negative
command, known as the dormant
Commerce Clause, prohibits states from
acting in a manner that burdens the flow
of interstate commerce. Okla. Tax
Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S.
175, 179-80, 131 L. Ed. 2d 261, 115 S. Ct.
1331 (1995); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S.
324, 326 n.1, 105 L. Ed. 2d 275, 109 S. Ct.
2491 (1989).
The restriction imposed on states by the
dormant Commerce Clause is not
absolute, and "the States retain authority
under their general police powers to
regulate matters of legitimate local
concern, even though interstate
commerce may be affected." Maine v.
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 91 L. Ed. 2d
110, 106 S. Ct. 2440 (1986) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The
prohibitions imposed upon state
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regulation by the dormant Commerce
Cause have fallen into several identifiable
categories. To determine whether a statute
violates the dormant Commerce Clause,
we apply one of several levels of analysis,
depending on the effect and reach of the
legislation.
First, a state statute is a per se violation of
the Commerce Clause when it has an
"extraterritorial reach." Healy, 491 U.S. at
336. "[A] statute that directly controls
commerce occurring wholly outside the
boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent
limits of the enacting State's authority and
is invalid regardless of whether the
statute's extraterritorial reach was intended
by the legislature." Id...
Second, if a state statute discriminates
against interstate commerce, we apply
strict scrutiny. It will be scrutinized under
a "virtually per se invalid rule," which
means that the statute will be invalid
unless the state can "show that it advances
a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives." Or.
Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality
of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 100-01, 128 L. Ed. 2d
13, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994) (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted)...
Third, a lower standard of scrutiny is
applied when the state statute regulates
evenhandedly and has only incidental
effects on interstate commerce. In this
situation, a balancing test is applied. Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142,
25 L. Ed. 2d 174, 90 S. Ct. 844 (1970)...
PhRMA contends that the Maine Act is an
impermissible exercise in extraterritorial
regulation and, therefore, is per se
violative of the dormant Commerce
Clause. It argues that the Act necessarily
regulates the transaction that occurs
between the manufacturer and the
distributor outside the borders of Maine.
Maine [] argues that the Act evenhandedly
regulates in-state conduct that only has an
incidental effect on interstate commerce.
Maine contends that we should apply the
lower level of scrutiny, use the Pike
balancing test, and find that the local
benefits of the Maine Rx Program
outweigh the incidental burden on
interstate commerce.
The Maine Act represents a novel
legislative approach to one of the serious
problems of our time, one that resists easy
analysis. We address each of the
potentially applicable dormant Commerce
Clause prohibitions to determine the
appropriate analysis and level of scrutiny.
1. Per Se Invalidity: Extraterritorial
Reach
A state may not pass laws that have the
"'practical effect' of regulating commerce
occurring wholly outside that State's
borders . . . ." Healy, 491 U.S. at 332.
When evaluating the practical effect of the
statute, the court should consider the
statute itself, and "how the challenged
statute may interact with the legitimate
regulatory regimes of other States and
what effect would arise if not one, but
many or every, State adopted similar
legislation." Id. at 336.
PhRMA relies on three cases to support
its argument that the Maine Act is per se
invalid because it regulates conduct
beyond the borders of Maine. The cases
cited, however, are inapposite to the facial
construction of the Maine Act. PhRMA
construes these cases as standing for the
proposition that, "a state may not dictate
the terms on which buyers and sellers do
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business outside of the state." See, e.g.,
Healy, 491 U.S. at 338; Brown-Forman,
476 U.S. at 583-84. This is partially correct
but does not reflect the entire picture. The
cases on which PhRMA relies, however,
involve price control, price affirmation or
price tying schemes. See Healy, 491 U.S.
at 326; Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 575-
76; Baldwin v. GAF. Seelig, 294 U.S.
511, 519, 79 L. Ed. 1032, 55 S. Ct. 497
(1935) ("Seelig"). The statutes in these
cases involved regulating the prices
charged in the home state and those
charged in other states in order to benefit
the buyers and sellers in the home state,
resulting in a direct burden on the buyers
and sellers in the other states.
* * *
The Maine Act is different from these
statutes. Unlike these price affirmation
and price control statutes, the Maine Act
does not regulate the price of any out-of-
state transaction, either by its express
terms or by its inevitable effect. Maine
does not insist that manufacturers sell
their drugs to a wholesaler for a certain
price. Similarly, Maine is not tying the
price of its in-state products to out-of-
state prices. There is nothing within the
Act that requires the rebate to be a certain
amount dependent on the price of
prescription drugs in other states. The Act
merely says that the Commissioner of the
Maine Department of Human Services
shall use "best efforts to obtain an initial
rebate amount equal to or greater than the
rebate calculated under the Medicaid
program. . . ." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,
§ 2681(4)(B). Furthermore, unlike Brown-
Forman and Seelig, the Maine Act does
not impose direct controls on a
transaction that occurs wholly out-of-
state.
PhRMA argues strenuously that the effect
of the Act will be to regulate the
transaction that occurs between the
manufacturer and the wholesaler -- a
transaction that occurs entirely out of
state. It argues that as a result of the
rebate provision, manufacturers will lose a
portion of their profits otherwise obtained
from distributors. Admittedly, it is
possible that the rebate provisions of the
statute may decrease the profits of
manufacturers. Simply because the
manufacturers' profits might be negatively
affected by the Maine Act, however, does
not necessarily mean that the Maine Act is
regulating those profits.
The Act does not regulate the transaction
between manufacturers and wholesalers.
It provides for a negotiated rebate
agreement between "[a] drug
manufacturer or labeler that sells
prescription drugs in [Maine] through the
elderly low-cost drug program . .. or any
other publicly supported pharmaceutical
assistance program . . ." Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 22, 5 2681(3). The rebate
program is voluntary and either the
manufacturer or the State may withdraw
at any time with sixty days' notice. The
Act directs the commissioner to "use the
commissioner's best efforts" to negotiate
the amount of the rebate required, from
the manufacturer. Id. § 2681(4)(B). We
note that the commissioner's "best
efforts" may become coercive or
otherwise inappropriate, but we cannot
say so on this facial challenge...
2. Strict Level
Discriminatory Statute
of Scrutiny:
A statute enacted for a discriminatory
purpose is subject to strict scrutiny. See
Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 270.
Under this strict scrutiny analysis, a statute
violates the Commerce Clause unless the
state can show that the statute serves a
legitimate local purpose that is unrelated
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to economic protectionism and that the
same purpose could not be achieved by
nondiscriminatory means. Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336, 60 L. Ed.
2d 250, 99 S. Ct. 1727 (1979). PhRMA
does not contend, nor did the district
court find, that the Maine Act
discriminates on its face or in its effects.
Therefore, we need not discuss it further.
3. Low Level of Scrutiny: Pike
Balancing Test
When a state statute regulates
evenhandedly and has only incidental
effects on interstate commerce, that
statute will be upheld unless the burden
on interstate commerce is "clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits." Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
* **
The Maine Act is neither an
impermissible extraterritorial reach nor is
it discriminatory, rather, it regulates
evenhandedly and only has incidental
effects on interstate commerce. Therefore,
we apply this lower level of scrutiny,
known as the Pike balancing test.
The district court found the Maine Act to
be per se invalid, and therefore never
determined whether it survives the Pike
balancing test...
Applying the Pike balancing test to the
Maine Act, we consider: (1) the nature of
the putative local benefits advanced by the
statute; (2) the burden the statute places
on interstate commerce; and (3) whether
the burden is "clearly excessive" as
compared to the putative local benefits.
See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
Arguably, the only burden imposed on
interstate commerce by the Maine Act is
its possible effects on the profits of the
individual manufacturers. As the Third
Circuit stated, however, "the fact that a
law may have 'devastating economic
consequences' on a particular interstate
firm is not sufficient to rise to a
Commerce Clause burden." Instructional
Sys., 35 F.3d at 827 (quoting Ford Motor
Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 874 F.2d 926, 943 (3d
Cir. 1989))...
We next consider the local benefits of the
Act, which we find to be substantial. The
Maine Rx Program will potentially provide
prescription drugs to Maine citizens who
could not otherwise afford them. The
Maine Legislature has decided that
without the Maine Rx Program, needy
Maine citizens will continue to be
deprived of necessary medical care
because of rising prescription drug costs.
When measuring manufacturers' possible
loss of profits against the increased access
to prescription drugs for Maine citizens,
the local benefits appear to outweigh the
burden on interstate commerce. At the
very least, the burden on interstate
commerce is not "clearly excessive" as
compared to the local benefits.
It is necessary to recognize the difficulty
in foreseeing what events actually will
occur from the enforcement of this Act,
which admittedly makes the Pike
balancing test more challenging to apply.
We are forced to balance the possible
effects, instead of the actual effects of the
statute in action. For now, it is enough to
say that the Act survives the facial
challenge under the dormant Commerce
Clause.
E. Remaining Preliminary Injunction
Factors
Having concluded that PhRMA is not
likely to succeed on the merits of its
constitutional challenges, we need not
delve into the three remaining preliminary
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injunction factors (risk of irreparable
harm, the balance of equities and the
public interest)...
III. CONCLUSION
In this facial challenge, we perceive no
conflict between the Maine Act and the
Medicaid statute that would result in
federal preemption. The Act sets forth
prior authorization procedures that are
consistent with those explicitly permitted
by Medicaid. PhRMA has not established
at this point that the administrative
burden imposed by prior authorization
will likely harm Medicaid recipients. In the
absence of such evidence, we cannot
conclude that the Act violates the
Supremacy Clause.
Nor does the Act offend the dormant
Commerce Clause. It is not an
extraterritorial regulation on interstate
commerce because it does not regulate
conduct occurring outside the state, but
only regulates in-state activities. Moreover,
from a facial standpoint, the local benefits
of the Act appear to outweigh any
incidental burden on interstate commerce.
For the reasons stated, the Maine Act
survives the facial dormant Commerce
Clause challenge.
This is a close case but we do not think
that, under the applicable law, the State of
Maine should be prohibited from putting
the Act into play...
The decision of the district court is
REVERSED and the temporary
injunction is VACATED.
Concurring Opinion omitted
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High Court to Rule on Maine Curbs on Drug Cost
The Boston Globe
June 29, 2002
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to
rule on the legality of the Maine RX
Program, a case that presents a significant
test of states' power to drive down
prescription drug prices.
The justices, hinting that they have set a
priority on settling key questions of state
authority to control the escalating cost of
medicines, brushed aside a suggestion by
the Bush administration that it was
premature for the court to get involved.
The fate of Maine's program is of wide
interest, with 27 other states considering
adopting a similar approach to cutting
drug costs, especially for elderly and low-
income patients. A number of states are
considering other methods of reducing
drug costs, including filing lawsuits against
pharmaceutical companies to challenge
their pricing practices. High prescription
prices have become a major political issue
in Maine and Massachusetts this year. In
Maine, the Democratic challenger for the
US Senate is Chellie Pingree, who helped
develop the Maine RX Program and is
making prescription drug insurance
coverage a key issue in her campaign
against Senator Susan Collins, a
Republican incumbent. In Massachusetts,
Democratic gubernatorial candidate
Steven Grossman is pressing for the state
to adopt a program similar to Maine's.
Drug manufacturers have been fighting
Maine RX since it was adopted in 2000.
The program has never gone into effect
because court orders have delayed
implementation while drug companies
pursue a court challenge based on federal
law and the interstate commerce clause of
the Constitution.
"This is a case that has national
significance, with other states watching
and waiting," said Attorney General G.
Steven Rowe of Maine. He said that while
Maine officials had hoped that the court
would pass up the case and allow Maine
RX to go into effect, "we look forward to
the court agreeing that this is
constitutional."
Maine RX potentially would affect about
325,000 people who do not have
insurance coverage for drugs, out of
Maine's overall population of about 1.25
million. There is no income or age limit
on who would get benefits. About
225,000 of those 325,000 people are
eligible to participate in another drug price
discount program that Maine has been
operating for the past year, with federal
approval.
Kevin Concannon, Maine's human
services commissioner, said the alternative
program was prepared when Maine RX
was stalled in the courts. It is open to
single individuals with incomes no higher
than $26,000 and couples with incomes up
to $36,000. Discounts are subsidized by
state funds.
So far, 114,000 persons have begun
obtaining discount drugs under that
alternative program, with the discounts
averaging between 20 percent and 25
percent, Concannon said. Drug
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manufacturers have also challenged the
alternative, but the courts have allowed it
to continue as the case proceeds.
Under the Maine RX program, drug
manufacturers are induced, by means they
say are coercive, to subsidize retail price
discounts to state residents.
All Maine residents may buy drugs at
discounts, with the drugstore reimbursed
from a state fund gathered entirely from
rebates by the manufacturers. Any
company whose drugs are sold at retail in
Maine is urged to join the program and
provide rebates.
The state publishes the names of drug
companies who do not join the program
and requires them to get prior approval
from state officials before they sell their
drugs for use by patients covered by
Medicaid, the federal-state program for
the poor. The burden of getting prior
approvals discourages doctors from
prescribing those companies' drugs.
A federal judge struck down Maine RX,
saying that it conflicted with federal
Medicaid law by providing benefits to
people whose incomes exceed 200 percent
of the poverty line and violated the
Constitution by reaching outside Maine's
borders to regulate the business of
pharmaceutical companies.
But the US Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, based in Boston, ruled last year
that the law violates neither federal law
nor the Constitution, although the court
left open the possibility that drug makers
could return to court with new challenges
after the law goes into operation.
The appeals court said the Maine law
"represents a novel legislative approach to
one of the serious problems of our time,
one that resists easy analysis."
The Pharmaceutical Research &
Manufacturers of America, a trade group,
appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court,
where the case has been pending for 11
months. The justices delayed action until
they could receive the advice of the Bush
administration on whether to hear the
case. Last month, the administration
suggested that the court bypass the case.
Justice Department lawyers told the court
that the legal dispute was still in a
preliminary stage and that officials at the
Department of Health and Human
Services were monitoring state programs
to push drug prices lower to see whether
they conform with Medicaid regulations.
The federal lawyers said the department
"should be permitted to use the existing
administrative process to develop
principled distinctions" between what
states may do to attack high drug prices
and what they may not do without
violating federal law.
The federal government, the lawyers said,
"is exploring several avenues for making
prescription drugs more available to low-
income individuals, including seniors, who
are not Medicaid-eligible."
But the Supreme Court took its first
opportunity to act on the case after
receiving the Justice Department's advice,
voting to hear the drug companies' appeal.
The case will come up for a hearing next
winter and is likely to be decided by early
next summer.
In their appeal, the drug manufacturers
told the court that 27 states are
considering model legislation that is nearly
identical to Maine RX and that more than
40 states are considering price-related
drug legislation.
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"Expanded access to prescription drugs is
at the top of the national policy agenda,
and the political and media debates fuel
state initiatives," the companies said.
But, they contended, "the states may not
in the meantime balkanize the national
economy by regulating manufacturers'
sales outside their borders or leverage
authority under the Medicaid statute to
serve non-Medicaid populations."
The justices agreed to hear that appeal in
one of the final orders closing out the
court's term. The next term opens Oct. 7.
Sue Kirchoff and Susan Milligan of the
Globe staff contributed to this report.
Copyright 0 2002 Globe Newspaper
Company
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Court Backs Maine Drug Price Curbs; Ruling Would Allow Controls If Pharmaceutical
Firms Don't Give Discounts
The Washington Post
May 18, 2001
Ceci Connolly
A federal appeals court has cleared the
way for the state of Maine to impose price
controls on prescription drugs if
pharmaceutical companies refuse to
provide a discount for thousands of
uninsured residents.
The decision by the 1st US. Circuit Court
of Appeals in Boston on Wednesday came
in a landmark case that could pave the
way for other states to experiment with
new techniques for curbing escalating
drug costs.
"We're waking up a sleeping giant," said
Kevin Concannon, commissioner of the
Maine Department of Human Services.
Under Maine's law, the state would
leverage its buying clout -- $ 210 million in
Medicaid drug purchases -- to negotiate
discounted prices for the 325,000
residents who do not have private health
insurance and are not covered by
Medicaid. If the drugmakers refused, the
state could begin imposing price caps in
2003. The effort in Maine is part of a
larger trend by states and insurers to put a
clamp on the fastest-growing piece of the
nation's health care economy. Last year,
prescription drug spending rose almost 19
percent, and for most states
pharmaceuticals are consuming ever larger
portions of their budgets.
"In many states, the cost of prescription
drugs exceeds what they spend on
hospitals," said Trish Riley, head of the
National Academy for State Health Policy.
She described the debate
as "one of the hottest
legislatures" today.
over drug
issues in
costs
state
In Florida, for example, officials said they
aim to trim $ 210 million from the state's
Medicaid budget by extracting refunds
from the major pharmaceutical
companies. California, Wisconsin and
New York have drug pricing bills pending,
while Maryland is seeking a federal waiver
to sell medication to retirees at the lower
Medicaid rates, according to the research
company StateScape.
"What the decision means is that the court
system is looking favorably upon states
having the right and ability to control the
costs of pharmaceuticals," said Del.
Michael E. Busch (D-Anne Arundel),
primary author of the Maryland
legislation. "This is very good news for
states and for those who are looking for a
more affordable way to purchase
prescription drugs."
Arguing that Maine's program was
unconstitutional, the pharmaceutical
industry and its allies warned that moving
toward price caps would make access to
the highest-quality drugs more difficult
and hinder future drug development. A
lawyer for Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, which brought
the initial suit, said the trade group is
considering further appeals.
The Maine law, enacted nearly a year ago,
was born out of concern for poor senior
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citizens who trekked over the border to
Canada to buy their medications, said
Concannon.
Participation in the Maine Rx program
would be voluntary. After filling out a
one-page application, participants would
receive a card entitling them to discounts
of between 10 percent and 30 percent, he
said. Pharmacies would be reimbursed by
the state for those discounts.
In support of the pharmaceutical industry,
lawyers for the Washington Legal
Foundation said the case was similar to
current skirmishes in the music industry
over patent rights.
"Coming up with a product, whether it be
a new drug or a hit song, takes a huge
investment," said the chief counsel
Richard Samp. "When you consider that
the average drug costs $ 500 million to
bring to market, you need to allow the
pricing to include the cost of
development, not only of that drug but
the many that don't make it to market."
Opponents argued the Maine legislation
violated laws regulating interstate
commerce.
"If Maine can lower prices for its
consumers, other states may want to do
the same thing for their consumers," said
Samp, who supported the drug industry
suit. "But that's the problem. You can't
protect your state citizens to the detriment
of other states' citizens. The issue of
pharmaceutical prices needs
addressed on a national level."
to be
But the three-judge panel, in its 75-page
ruling, praised Maine for tackling a vexing
problem in a creative way.
"It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory, and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country," the opinion
concludes, quoting Justice Louis Brandeis.
Last month, the Maryland General
Assembly approved a prescription drug
plan that requires state health officials to
ask federal authorities to allow the state to
sell drugs to Medicare recipients at the
discounted price now available only to
those who receive Medicaid.
Under the plan, the state would provide
an additional subsidy for seniors who
make less than 175 percent of the federal
poverty level, reducing the cost of a $ 110
prescription, for example, to about $ 65.
Christine Gerhardt, director of the
Maryland health department's Beneficiary
Services Administration, said yesterday's
ruling "is good news for us and for our
clients," and could improve the chances
that Maryland's request will be approved.
Staff writer Lori Montgomery contributed
to this report.
Copyright © 2001 The Washington Post
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The Election and Why It Counts,
A Special Report: Prescriptions Drugs, More to Issue than Meets Eye,
Proposals Offer Little for Poor or Uninsured Who Aren't Elderly
Newsday
October 29, 2000
Christian Murray
SHE TRUDGES ALONG the sidewalk
after leaving Walgreens pharmacy wearing
a long green cardigan over her pants. In
her hand, she holds a bag containing a $
90 prescription.
Anita Rosen, a senior citizen from Forest
Hills, is paying about $ 300 a month for
six or seven drugs that control, among
other things, her high-blood pressure and
cholesterol. "Sometimes I skip taking a
prescription. I just can't afford it," she
said.
Rosen's problem is a serious one-and one
shared by 11.5 million Americans who rely
solely for their health care coverage on
Medicare, which won't pay for most
prescriptions. And with the rapidly
growing number of seniors nationwide
and skyrocketing drug prices, the issue of
helping the elderly pay for medications
has become a key battleground in the
presidential campaign. But little has been
mentioned in the national debate about
another serious gap in prescription drug
coverage: the 44 million Americans under
65 who lack health insurance and the 9
million who don't have drug coverage.
They, too, are bearing the brunt of drug
prices, which have risen 60 percent since
1991, from an average of $ 23.68 to $
37.38 per prescription, according to the
Kaiser Family Foundation, a Washington-
based health research group.
Many of the uninsured are less able to
afford prescription drugs than seniors,
even though seniors do, on average, take
more prescription drugs. About 6.9
million seniors have incomes below 200
percent of the federal poverty rate-about $
17,000 for a single person and $ 22,000
per couple. This compares with nearly
24.6 million uninsured under 65 who fall
into the same category, including
approximately 8 million children.
Although most of these children are
eligible for state medical support-since
their parents earn less than 200 percent of
the poverty level-they have fallen through
the cracks.
Like Rosen, Nan Rosenblume, 55, an
uninsured woman from Floral Park, has to
pay a large amount for her drugs, which
include several mood-stabilizing drugs.
Her doctor at a nearby clinic provides her
with sample packets of drugs such as
Zoloft, which goes for about $ 2 a pill.
However, she still has to pay for many
other drugs herself, usually out of money
she earns from temp jobs.
Rosenblume is not hopeful about any
assistance from either the federal or state
government. She has already sought
Medicaid but was turned away because
she earns too much.
So, why is much of the focus on seniors?
"It strictly comes down to the
demographics of who votes," said Robert
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Blendon, a professor of health policy and
political analysis at the Harvard School of
Public Health in Cambridge, Mass. The
elderly are "concerned and they vote," he
said, adding that "the uninsured are not a
coherent political force; they are not swing
voters."
"People also feel that seniors are their
moms and dads," Blendon said. Most
people, he added, can't envisage what it is
like to be uninsured,so it is not a hot-
button issue.
But there are a number of misconceptions
about the 44 million Americans under 65
who are uninsured, according to a study
by the Kaiser Foundation. A popular view
is that the uninsured don't work. Yet
three-quarters of the uninsured are in
families where at least one person is
working full time, and many are low-paid
workers, the study showed.
Analysts also say employees who work for
small firms or in transient types of jobs
are more likely to be uninsured.
Take Adele Zane, a jazz vocalist from
Boerum Hill in Brooklyn who has sung in
popular places such as Birdland and the
Iridium Jazz Club. She has spent much of
her musical career supporting herself
through temporary jobs, which have, for
the most part, failed to provide her with
health insurance.
"I come from a nice middle-class family,
I'm educated, I have just chosen an artistic
path for a career," she said, adding how
expensive health insurance is for people
who can't get insurance through their
work.
At times, Zane said, not having insurance
makes her feel like she is on the fringe of
society. "I have a friend who once went to
a clinic and sat there for hours," she said.
"They treated her like garbage."
Zane had health insurance at her last job
but was told it would cost $ 382.75 a
month to keep the coverage going. Zane
is still unsure whether to get coverage or
spend what limited money she has on
promoting her music career.
The cost of insurance for an individual
ranges between $ 230 and $ 400 a month
in the New York-Long Island area, said
John Kaegi, a senior vice president of
marketing for Vytra Health Plans in
Melville. For families, it ranges from $ 500
to $ 700 per month, he added.
Yet the focus of the public debates and
political campaigns has been on seniors.
And many seniors are not short of money
until they reach 75 years old or older. For
instance, the median income for 65- to 69-
year-olds in New York City and on Long
Island is $ 33,609, according to data
provided by Claritas, a San Diego research
firm. The median income for 75- to 79-
year-olds drops to $ 20,519.
Yet both presidential candidates are
proposing prescription drug plans that
offer substantially more aid to seniors
than to the under-65 uninsured.
Vice President Al Gore's proposal offers
prescription drug coverage for nearly 40
million seniors on Medicare immediately-
no matter their income or wealth. For the
prescription drug benefit, seniors would
pay a premium of a little more than $ 20 a
month, said Alan Sager, a professor of
health services at Boston University
School of Public Health.
George W. Bush's plan would provide
states with grants to cover low- income
seniors over the next four years, and then
all seniors would have the choice of being
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part of a Medicare that would include a
drug benefit or joining a government-
subsidized private insurance plan, Sager
said. The private insurance plans would
cover not only prescription drugs but all
the medical needs of people over 65, he
added.
Gore plans to fork out $ 380 billion over
10 years on Medicare-related programs ($
338 billion of which would be on the drug
plan), while Bush would send out $ 200
billion over the same period ($ 158 billion
on drugs), according to Kenneth Thorpe,
a professor of health policy at Emory
University in Atlanta. Gore also plans to
put $ 360 billion in the Medicare fund-to
be used for either Medicare or retiring the
national debt, he added.
In contrast, Gore has slated $ 157 billion
for the uninsured and Bush $ 135 billion-
which would focus mainly on expanding
programs-not on prescription drugs,
Thorpe said.
Statistics do show that the older people
are, the more prescriptions they are likely
to need. According to the Kaiser
Foundation, a woman 75 or older needs
11.7 prescriptions (including refills) per
year. A 45- to 54-year-old woman needs
5.6 per year.
While both the Republican and
Democratic Parties are crunching out
numbers on how to provide prescriptions
for the over-65 age group, the carrots
being offered to the uninsured are limited.
Both parties provide some tax relief here
and there for the uninsured and propose
ways of persuading companies to offer
their employees insurance. But such
proposals are nowhere near as
comprehensive as the Medicare
prescription drug benefits.
In fact, some industry observers are
concerned that the Medicare drug
packages could actually hurt the
uninsured. Their argument is that drug
companies would jack up the prices even
higher on the uninsured, to make up for
the lost revenue once seniors signed on to
a government- or HMO-run drug plan.
The government and HMOs are able to
buy drugs in bulk and negotiate lower
drug prices,thereby cutting pharmaceutical
profits.
For example, the low drug prices
negotiated by foreign countries on behalf
of their citizens has contributed to the
higher prices charged in the United States,
said John Freeman of the Center for
Policy Alternatives, a liberal advocacy
group in Washington.For many
medications, uninsured U.S. residents
shell out twice as much as overseas
consumers do.
One state looking to help both seniors
and the uninsured pay for drugs is Maine,
which passed a law in August that will see
the state negotiate drug prices on behalf
of all its residents who don't have drug
coverage.
"We see constituents in coffee shops, and
all of us have heard about working parents
trying to get antibiotics for their child,"
said Chellie Pingree, the Senate majority
leader who was the driving force behind
the bill. She said Maine wanted to help the
elderly and poor alike.
Currently, over half a million Maine
residents without drug coverage are
shopping one by one and are paying top
dollar. By pooling the purchases on a state
level, Maine sees itself much like an
HMO, Pingree said, which, through its
large customer base, can negotiate drug
prices between 30 percent and 40 percent
off the full market price.
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Maine said if drug companies refuse to
take part in the negotiations, it will impose
price controls based on what other
Western countries pay and the lower
prices the federal government gets in
covering U.S. veterans.
"Our aim is to get 30 percent to 40
percent off the price of prescriptions,"
Pingree said. So far, other states are
expressing interest in similar proposals,
she said. Vermont is a strong proponent
for such a bill, she said, with Pennsylvania,
Minnesota and New York also expressing
an interest, she added.
In New York, Sen. John Marchi (R-Staten
Island) has introduced a number of bills
trying to get the price of prescription
drugs down for all. In 1999, he introduced
a bill that said pharmaceutical companies
could sell their drugs only at the lowest
rate in which they are offered the world
over.
So far, according to Marchi's counsel,
David Jaffe, 17 Republicans in the state
Senate, which consists of 61 members,
have sponsored it. In the House there is a
companion bill that has approximately 40
sponsors. The House has 150 members.
Jaffe said the focus of the federal
government on helping just seniors is
wrong. "If you look at the income levels
around, many seniors are not in the lowest
levels of income," he said. "Why should a
poor parent of a newborn not have
coverage?"
Marchi has also introduced a bulk-
purchasing type bill like Maine's.
New York State will be indirectly helping
the poor pay for prescription drugs by
expanding its health insurance coverage.
Under a new program called Family
Health Plus which goes into effect Jan. 1,
adults with children who make less than
120 percent of the poverty level ($ 20,460
for a family of four) will now be eligible
for health coverage. Adults without
children who earn less than $ 8,350 will
also be eligible.
New York State also has announced plans
to increase the income levels for seniors
who want to join its prescription drug
program. Starting in 2001, a senior earning
up to $ 35,000 and a couple making less
than $ 50,000 can join the program.
The Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America, the
Washington-based trade group for the
drug companies, is trying to put up a
roadblock for Maine-like proposals. The
group alleges the state law is violating
interstate commerce laws as well as federal
Medicaid law.
But Kevin Concannon, commissioner of
the Maine Department of Human Services
in Augusta, said the state should be able
to shake off these claims.
The pharmaceutical group said Maine-
type laws that try to control drug prices
stifle new developments. The controls
lead to a decrease in profits, resulting in
less funding for research and development
and fewer breakthrough drugs.
Jeff Trewhitt, a spokesman for the group,
said the perceived drug price issue "is a
Medicare problem," adding that "this is a
national problem that needs a national
solution."
Staff Writer Robert Fresco contributed to
this story.
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